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The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  reconceptualise	  the	  EU’s	  international	  identity	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  its	  counter-­‐piracy	  efforts	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  	  
While	  in	  the	  past	  grand	  narratives	  have	  lent	  meaning	  to	  the	  EU’s	  role	  in	  the	  
world	  –	  e.g.	  civilian	  power,	  global	  power	  –	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  discipline	  is	  
characterised	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  deficit.	  What	  both	  these	  narratives	  and	  their	  
critique	  misunderstand	  is	  the	  logic	  of	  security	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  by	  disregarding	  its	  
grounding	  in	  a	  particular	  history	  and	  process	  of	  institution-­‐forming,	  most	  notably	  
reflected	  in	  the	  legacy	  of	  constructive	  ambiguity	  and	  the	  transgovernmental	  bias,	  which	  
combine	  to	  produce	  an	  institution	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  de-­‐politicised	  –	  or,	  rather,	  post-­‐
political	  –	  in	  nature.	  	  
	   With	  recourse	  to	  this	  institutional	  particularity,	  I	  propose	  a	  conceptual	  approach	  
based	  on	  the	  imperative	  of	  ‘managing	  globalisation’,	  which	  elucidates	  how	  the	  EU	  
frames	  and	  tackles	  piracy	  as	  an	  adverse	  instance	  of	  globalisation.	  First,	  the	  Somali	  pirate	  
is	  discursively	  removed	  from	  his	  local	  context	  and	  relocated	  to	  the	  global	  security	  
agenda	  as	  the	  unpolitical	  enemy	  of	  all	  and	  threat	  to	  global	  order.	  As	  the	  relevant	  ‘other’	  
he	  is	  used	  to	  legitimate	  EU	  intervention.	  Second,	  the	  EU’s	  declared	  comprehensive	  
approach	  to	  counter-­‐piracy	  reflects	  an	  operationalisation	  of	  the	  new	  dogma	  of	  ‘effective	  
multilateralism’.	  While	  piracy	  mitigation	  remains	  important	  as	  a	  security	  objective,	  
international	  cooperation	  itself	  is	  elevated	  to	  the	  status	  of	  security	  objective.	  
	   Consequently,	  the	  EU’s	  practice	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  is	  driven	  by	  its	  concern	  with	  the	  
management	  of	  globalisation,	  concomitantly	  redefining	  the	  EU’s	  international	  identity	  
towards	  becoming	  a	  global	  security-­‐provider.	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Perhaps	  we	  shouldn’t	  have	  been	  so	  surprised.	  After	  all,	  maritime	  piracy	  is	  a	  very	  
traditional	  security	  issue	  for	  Europe,	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  ‘Sea	  Peoples’	  that	  raided	  ships	  in	  
the	  Mediterranean	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Asia	  Minor	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Late	  Bronze	  Age.1	  It	  has	  
remained	  a	  constant	  issue	  for	  seafaring	  nations	  over	  the	  centuries	  and	  saw	  its	  heyday	  
from	  the	  1650s	  to	  the	  1730s,	  the	  ‘golden	  age	  of	  piracy’.2	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  modern	  
national	  navies	  pirates	  have	  largely	  disappeared	  from	  the	  world’s	  oceans.	  Yet,	  recently	  
piracy	  has	  made	  a	  comeback	  on	  the	  international	  security	  agenda,	  and	  it	  is	  especially	  
Somali	  pirates	  that	  have	  made	  the	  headlines	  since	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  to	  the	  point	  where	  
now	  there	  is	  a	  large-­‐scale	  international	  effort	  underway	  to	  fend	  off	  the	  return	  of	  the	  
‘scurvy	  scourge’.	  	  
The	  European	  Union	  has	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  this,	  fielding	  its	  naval	  mission	  
EUNAVFOR	  Somalia	  (otherwise	  known	  as	  operation	  Atalanta)	  in	  December	  2008.	  Since	  
then	  year	  on	  year	  has	  seen	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  mission,	  which	  has	  garnered	  
overwhelming	  support	  from	  member	  states	  and	  within	  EU	  institutions,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  
additional	  twinning	  security	  missions	  have	  been	  put	  into	  place,	  EU	  Training	  Mission	  
Somalia	  and	  EUCAP	  Nestor.	  Counter-­‐piracy	  has	  become	  a	  stable	  and	  largely	  uncontested	  
item	  on	  the	  EU’s	  security	  agenda.	  But	  why	  has	  this	  happened?	  And	  what	  does	  it	  tell	  us	  
about	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  international	  security	  actor?	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  reasons	  for	  why	  the	  EU	  is	  dealing	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  may	  
seem	  straightforward.	  In	  material	  terms,	  piracy	  represents	  an	  undeniable	  threat,	  which	  
comes	  in	  various	  forms.	  Piracy	  imposes	  economic	  costs	  on	  European	  merchant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Ormerod,	  H.	  (1924).	  Piracy	  in	  the	  Ancient	  World:	  an	  Essay	  in	  Mediterranean	  History.	  
Liverpool:	  University	  of	  Liverpool	  Press;	  Gabbert,	  J.	  J.	  (1986).	  Piracy	  in	  the	  Early	  Hellenistic	  Period:	  
A	  Career	  Open	  to	  Talents,	  Greece	  &	  Rome,	  33	  (2):	  156-­‐163.	  
2	  Rediker,	  M.	  (2004).	  Villains	  of	  All	  Nations:	  Atlantic	  Pirates	  in	  the	  Golden	  Age.	  Boston:	  Beacon	  
Press;	  Cordingly,	  D.	  (1995).	  Under	  the	  Black	  Flag:	  The	  Romance	  and	  the	  Reality	  of	  Life	  Among	  the	  
Pirates.	  New	  York:	  Random	  House.	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companies	  in	  particular	  or	  European	  countries’	  international	  trade	  relationships	  in	  
general,	  either	  in	  actual	  damage	  done,	  or	  by	  fuelling	  increased	  spending	  on	  counter-­‐
piracy	  measures.	  It	  also	  threatens	  the	  lives	  of	  European	  citizens	  directly	  engaged	  in	  
maritime	  trade	  passing	  through	  the	  region.	  Piracy	  also	  endangers	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  
Somalis	  themselves	  as	  it	  disrupts	  the	  delivery	  of	  shipments	  by	  the	  World	  Food	  
Programme.	  Further,	  as	  Somali	  pirates	  raid	  the	  critical	  European-­‐Asian	  sea	  trade	  route	  
passing	  by	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  the	  issue	  carries	  a	  wider	  geostrategic	  relevance.	  
In	  fact,	  all	  of	  these	  reasons	  are	  convincing,	  and	  they	  provide	  a	  good	  reflection	  on	  
the	  various	  narratives	  of	  EU	  power	  that	  are	  often	  invoked	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  EU	  acts	  the	  
way	  it	  does	  on	  the	  international	  scene.	  The	  civilian	  power	  narrative	  can	  be	  traced	  in	  the	  
preoccupation	  with	  trade	  and	  a	  concomitant	  rendition	  of	  security	  in	  economic	  terms.	  
The	  normative	  power/ethical	  power	  narrative	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  consequential	  emphasis	  
of	  the	  humanitarian	  aspect	  of	  the	  EU’s	  engagement.	  The	  global	  power	  narrative	  finds	  
expression	  in	  the	  extrapolation	  from	  the	  local	  manifestation	  of	  piracy	  to	  its	  systemic	  
repercussions,	  that	  is	  the	  geostrategic	  threat	  is	  presents	  to	  global	  trade	  flows.	  However,	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  security	  issue	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  and	  the	  EU’s	  reaction	  to	  it	  fit	  to	  some	  
extent	  into	  all	  of	  these	  different	  narratives	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  very	  much.	  Each	  of	  the	  
power	  narratives	  provides	  an	  internally	  consistent	  perspective	  onto	  the	  actions	  the	  EU	  
takes	  on	  the	  international	  scene,	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  it	  does.	  The	  stories	  they	  tell	  
mean	  to	  bind	  history,	  present	  and	  future	  into	  a	  narrative	  arc	  that	  constitutes	  the	  EU’s	  
international	  identity.	  However,	  where	  these	  narratives	  fail	  is	  in	  their	  disconnect	  of	  the	  
institutional	  reality	  of	  EU	  security,	  and	  the	  outputs	  it	  creates	  –	  as	  recently	  affirmed	  by	  
the	  emergence	  of	  the	  debate	  around	  the	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  deficit.	  
If	  we	  aim	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  security	  actor	  –	  and	  that	  
also	  means	  re-­‐assessing	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  somehow	  special,	  a	  sui	  generis	  actor	  –	  
we	  must	  look	  beyond	  mere	  causes	  of	  EU	  security	  policy,	  and	  rather	  consider	  how	  the	  EU	  
practises	  security.	  Practice	  supposes	  action,	  but	  it	  also	  supposes	  the	  construction	  of	  
meaning.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  piracy	  then,	  the	  question	  is:	  What	  does	  the	  EU’s	  practice	  of	  
security	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  EU	  itself?	  	  
To	  allow	  us	  to	  unpack	  piracy	  as	  a	  security	  issue	  I	  propose	  the	  following	  three	  
basic	  –	  yet	  crucial	  –	  (sets	  of)	  questions	  about	  the	  EU	  and	  Somali	  piracy,	  which	  will	  allow	  
us	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  not	  only	  of	  how	  the	  EU	  does	  security,	  but	  also	  how	  
this	  reflects	  on	  the	  EU’s	  identity	  as	  an	  international	  actor.	  First,	  what	  makes	  Somali	  
piracy	  a	  threat	  for	  the	  EU?	  Put	  differently,	  what	  kind	  of	  security	  issue	  does	  piracy	  
present?	  For	  instance,	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  lens	  of	  Buzan’s	  sectoral	  approach,	  one	  may	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ask	  whether	  Somali	  piracy	  poses	  a	  military,	  political,	  societal,	  economic,	  or	  
environmental	  danger?3	  Second,	  what	  is	  the	  referent	  object	  in	  this	  context?	  When	  the	  
EU	  affirms	  piracy	  as	  a	  threat,	  who	  or	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  protected?	  European	  citizens,	  
companies,	  economies,	  or	  the	  whole	  world?	  Third,	  how	  can	  security	  be	  achieved?	  What	  
policies	  are	  enacted	  to	  achieve	  security?	  This	  triad	  of	  threat,	  referent	  object,	  and	  
policies	  covers	  the	  ‘who’,	  ‘what’	  and	  ‘how’	  of	  any	  given	  security	  issue.	  In	  order	  to	  instil	  
these	  questions	  with	  meaning,	  however,	  we	  have	  to	  assess	  them	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  practice	  of	  EU	  security,	  because:	  
“foreign	  policies	  rely	  upon	  representations	  of	  identity,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  through	  the	  
formulation	  of	  foreign	  policy	  that	  identities	  are	  produced	  and	  reproduced”.4	  	  
	  
Towards	  that	  end	  I	  propose	  the	  conceptual	  lens	  of	  ‘managing	  globalisation’,	  as	  
introduced	  by	  Jacoby	  and	  Meunier.5	  Although	  their	  conceptualisation	  is	  heavily	  drawn	  
from	  and	  oriented	  towards	  EU	  trade	  policy,	  I	  will	  argue	  the	  case	  for	  its	  applicability	  to	  
the	  realm	  of	  EU	  security	  in	  general	  and	  counter-­‐piracy	  in	  particular.	  Managing	  
globalisation	  implies	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  adversely	  affected	  by	  globalisation	  in	  various	  
respects.	  If	  ‘managing’	  means	  “altering	  the	  existing	  course	  of	  things	  and	  reorganising	  
them	  for	  a	  purpose”	  6,	  then	  we	  will	  come	  to	  see	  that	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  the	  EU	  does	  
with	  respect	  to	  Somali	  piracy	  as	  an	  adverse	  instance	  of	  globalisation,	  redefining	  its	  own	  
identity	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  in	  the	  process.	  
I	  propose	  a	  detailed	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  
Africa	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  how	  the	  EU	  constructed	  piracy	  as	  a	  security	  threat	  and	  developed	  
its	  policy	  response	  accordingly.	  The	  original	  contribution	  to	  knowledge	  that	  this	  thesis	  
advances	  is	  twofold:	  at	  the	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  level	  it	  offers	  a	  more	  
contextualised	  understanding	  of	  the	  EU’s	  international	  identity	  by	  disentangling	  the	  
ever-­‐louder	  call	  for	  ‘strategy’	  from	  the	  aspirational	  determinism	  of	  the	  policy	  area	  and	  
placing	  it	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  pervasive	  ‘post-­‐political’	  state	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  EU	  
polity	  in	  particular.	  At	  the	  empirical	  level,	  it	  argues	  that	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  must	  be	  
understood	  not	  as	  a	  functional	  requirement	  of	  Europe’s	  ‘new	  threat’	  agenda	  but	  instead	  
as	  a	  practical	  yet	  reflexive	  effort	  at	  managing	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  globalisation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Buzan,	  B.	  (2007).	  People,	  States	  and	  Fear:	  An	  Agenda	  for	  International	  Security	  Studies	  in	  the	  
Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era	  (2nd	  edition).	  Colchester:	  ECPR	  Press.	  
4	  Hansen,	  L.	  (2006).	  Security	  as	  Practice:	  Discourse	  Analysis	  and	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  London:	  
Routledge,	  p.	  1.	  
5	  Jacoby,	  W.	  &	  Meunier,	  S.	  (2010).	  Europe	  and	  the	  management	  of	  globalization.	  Journal	  of	  
European	  Public	  Policy,	  17	  (3):	  299-­‐317.	  




1.1	  Stretching	  security	  
	  
EUropean	  security	  studies	  now	  constitutes	  a	  productive	  and	  eclectic	  sub-­‐discipline	  that	  
connects	  International	  Relations	  and	  EUropean	  Studies.	  Security	  studies	  acquired	  the	  
status	  of	  an	  academic	  (sub-­‐)discipline	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  when	  it	  was	  still	  referred	  to	  
as	  strategic	  studies.	  The	  field	  of	  study	  generally	  inquires	  into	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  
conflict	  and	  peace.	  At	  its	  outset	  this	  often	  meant	  a	  focus	  on	  global	  superpower	  
competition,	  however,	  contemporary	  scholarship	  has	  become	  much	  wider,	  dealing	  with	  
all	  sorts	  of	  issues	  to	  do	  with	  forms	  of	  organised	  violence.	  This	  widening	  of	  the	  research	  
agenda	  points	  to	  a	  core	  problem	  in	  the	  discipline,	  that	  is	  widespread	  disagreement	  as	  to	  
its	  central	  notion:	  what	  is	  security?	  Arguably	  one	  of	  the	  more	  accepted	  definitions	  that	  
has	  withstood	  the	  test	  of	  time	  is	  that	  by	  Wolfers:	  	  
“Security,	  in	  an	  objective	  sense,	  measures	  the	  absence	  of	  threats	  to	  acquired	  values,	  
and	  in	  a	  subjective	  sense,	  the	  absence	  of	  fear	  that	  such	  values	  will	  be	  attacked.”	  7	  
	  
The	  benefit	  to	  Wolfers’	  definition	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  that	  it	  explicitly	  allows	  for	  a	  
differentiation	  between	  objective	  and	  subjective	  renditions	  of	  (in-­‐)security.	  The	  
implication	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  (in-­‐)security	  may	  differ	  from	  the	  ‘reality’	  of	  
(in-­‐)security.	  While	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  my	  study	  significantly	  departs	  from	  any	  
notion	  that	  implies	  that	  security	  can	  exist	  as	  an	  objective,	  natural	  fact	  and	  instead	  
advocates	  the	  idea	  that	  security	  is	  always	  constructed,	  Wolfers’	  definition	  presents	  a	  
refreshing	  contrast	  to	  most	  mainstream	  thought	  in	  early	  strategic	  studies	  that	  portrayed	  
security	  through	  the	  immutable	  category	  of	  national	  interest.	  Similarly,	  Wolfers’	  focus	  
on	  ‘values’	  rather	  than	  ‘interests’	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  inclusive	  and	  flexible	  
conceptualisation	  of	  security.8	  
While	  the	  strand	  of	  strategic	  studies	  that	  dominated	  the	  late	  phase	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War	  had	  a	  particularly	  constrained	  imagination	  of	  security	  that	  heavily	  relied	  on	  game-­‐
theoretic	  models	  and	  a	  decidedly	  materialist,	  structuralist	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Wolfers,	  A.	  (1952).	  National	  Security	  as	  an	  Ambiguous	  Symbol.	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly,	  67	  
(4):	  481-­‐502.	  
8	  Similar	  definitions	  that	  also	  allude	  to	  ‘values’	  as	  referent	  object	  are	  those	  by	  Lippmann	  (“a	  
nation	  is	  secure	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  not	  in	  danger	  of	  having	  to	  sacrifice	  core	  values,	  if	  it	  
wishes	  to	  avoid	  war,	  and	  is	  able	  ...	  to	  maintain	  them	  by	  victory	  in	  such	  a	  war”	  (Lippmann,	  W.	  
(1943).	  US	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Shield	  of	  the	  Republic.	  Boston:	  Little	  Brown,	  p.	  51)),	  and	  Baldwin	  
(security	  means	  “a	  low	  probability	  of	  damage	  to	  acquired	  values”	  (Baldwin,	  D.	  (1997).	  The	  
Concept	  of	  Security.	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  23	  (1):	  5-­‐26.))	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international	  system,	  most	  prominently	  developed	  in	  Kenneth	  Waltz’	  neo-­‐realism9,	  the	  
field	  of	  security	  studies	  rapidly	  opened	  up	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  broadening	  
of	  the	  international	  security	  agenda	  –	  and	  its	  academic	  counterpart	  –	  quickly	  led	  to	  the	  
emergence	  of	  new	  security	  issues	  and	  a	  fundamental	  rethinking	  of	  security.	  Talk	  of	  
superpower	  confrontation	  abated	  and	  the	  focus	  on	  interstate	  conflict	  became	  less	  
central	  to	  the	  discipline.	  Conversely,	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  security	  studies	  is	  concisely	  
captured	  in	  notions	  such	  as	  Buzan’s	  ‘sectoral	  approach’10	  –	  security	  is	  stretched	  
horizontally	  to	  include	  not	  just	  military	  security	  but	  the	  sectors	  of	  political,	  economic,	  
societal	  and	  environmental	  security	  as	  well	  (new	  referent	  objects)	  –	  and	  notions	  such	  as	  
‘human	  security’	  or	  Samuel	  Huntington’s	  ‘clash	  of	  civilizations’11	  –	  security	  is	  stretched	  
vertically	  below	  and	  above	  the	  nation-­‐state	  (new	  levels	  of	  analysis).	  	  
	  
	  
1.2	  New	  threats	  and	  piracy	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  
	  
In	  this	  globalised,	  interdependent	  world	  European	  states	  see	  themselves	  faced	  with	  a	  
myriad	  of	  ‘new	  threats’,	  which	  extend	  beyond	  a	  traditional	  conception	  of	  security	  solely	  
oriented	  towards	  interstate	  warfare	  and	  includes	  challenges	  such	  as	  terrorism,	  
organised	  crime,	  regional	  instability,	  energy	  supply	  security,	  migratory	  pressures,	  
environmental	  disasters.12	  One	  of	  these	  new	  threats	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  very	  old	  threat	  that	  has	  
made	  a	  rather	  spectacular	  comeback	  onto	  the	  international	  security	  agenda	  in	  2008:	  
piracy.	  Having	  been	  abandoned	  to	  cinemas	  and	  debates	  about	  intellectual	  property	  
rights,	  piracy	  re-­‐emerged	  as	  the	  scourge	  of	  the	  seas	  in	  the	  unlikeliest	  (or	  perhaps	  
likeliest)	  of	  places,	  Somalia.	  Operating	  in	  a	  vast	  area	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  (HoA)	  –	  
including	  Djibouti,	  Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya	  and	  Somalia13	  –	  Somali	  pirates	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Waltz,	  K.	  (1979).	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  New	  York:	  McGraw	  Hill.	  	  
10	  Buzan,	  B.	  (1991).	  People,	  States	  and	  Fear:	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Security	  Studies	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  
Era.	  Brighton:	  Wheatsheaf.	  
11	  Kaldor,	  M.,	  Martin,	  M.	  &	  Selchow,	  S.	  (2007).	  Human	  Security:	  A	  New	  Strategic	  Narrative	  for	  
Europe.	  International	  Affairs,	  83	  (2):	  273-­‐288;	  Huntington,	  S.	  P.	  (1996).	  The	  Clash	  of	  Civilizations	  
and	  the	  Remaking	  of	  World	  Order.	  New	  York:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster.	  
12	  Matlary,	  J.	  H.	  (2009).	  European	  Union	  Security	  Dynamics:	  In	  the	  New	  National	  Interest.	  
Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan;	  Edmunds,	  T.	  (2006).	  What	  Are	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  for?	  The	  
Changing	  Nature	  of	  Military	  Roles	  in	  Europe.	  International	  Affairs,	  82	  (6):	  1059-­‐1075.	  
13	  Although	  the	  EU	  defines	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  somewhat	  expansively	  with	  recourse	  to	  all	  of	  the	  
countries	  belonging	  to	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Authority	  on	  Development	  (IGAD)	  –	  that	  is	  
Djibouti,	  Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	  Somalia,	  Sudan,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Uganda	  –	  the	  latter	  three	  can	  
be	  ignored	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  piracy	  as	  they	  are	  irrelevant	  either	  due	  to	  their	  land-­‐locked	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dominated	  headlines	  and	  policy	  meetings.	  Commission	  President	  Barroso	  remarked	  that	  
“piracy,	  violence	  and	  lawlessness	  continue	  to	  plague	  the	  land	  and	  of	  course	  the	  seas	  of	  
Somalia”.14	  
Appreciating	  that	  “maritime	  routes	  are	  essential	  for	  EU	  trade	  and	  regional	  
stability”15,	  the	  EU	  dispatched	  its	  first	  military	  naval	  mission	  to	  the	  HoA	  under	  the	  
Common	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy	  (CSDP).	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  operation	  Atalanta	  
(formally	  EUNAVFOR	  Somalia)	  was	  launched	  in	  December	  2008	  and	  it	  is	  set	  to	  continue	  
until	  at	  least	  December	  2014,	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  ‘deterrence,	  prevention	  and	  
repression	  of	  acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast’.16	  What	  makes	  
Atalanta	  interesting	  as	  a	  case	  of	  EU	  security	  is	  that	  it	  represents	  a	  departure	  from	  
previous	  CSDP	  missions.	  	  
There	  are	  many	  diverse	  accounts	  of	  why	  member	  states	  may	  choose	  to	  
undertake	  security	  action	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  It	  facilitates	  burden-­‐sharing,	  and	  economies	  of	  
scale;	  it	  facilitates	  risk-­‐sharing	  and	  politics	  of	  scale;	  it	  provides	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  
transformation	  of	  national	  militaries;	  it	  can	  provide	  cover	  for	  particularistic	  national	  
interests;	  it	  spurs	  competitiveness	  in	  the	  European	  defence	  market;	  it	  provides	  an	  
important	  step	  towards	  political	  union.	  With	  seemingly	  endless	  possibilities	  in	  sight,	  
many	  observers	  stood	  confounded	  when	  the	  CSDP	  grinded	  to	  a	  near	  halt	  following	  the	  
enactment	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  (which,	  ironically,	  was	  intended	  to	  lend	  impetus	  to	  the	  
CSDP).	  A	  plethora	  of	  lamentations	  have	  combined	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  CSDP	  suffers	  from	  a	  
‘strategic	  deficit’,	  that	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  purpose	  and	  punch.17	  Since	  then	  the	  only	  missions	  that	  
came	  out	  of	  the	  CSDP	  machinery	  were	  Atalanta	  and	  its	  Somalia-­‐based	  flanking	  missions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
territories	  (South	  Sudan,	  Uganda),	  or	  due	  to	  the	  extremely	  low	  number	  of	  piracy	  incidents	  
(Sudan).	  
14	  Barroso,	  J.	  M.	  (2009).	  Speech	  at	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Somalia.	  Brussels,	  23	  April	  
2009.	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐09-­‐188_en.htm	  
15	  European	  Commission	  (2009).	  The	  Instrument	  for	  Stability	  –	  Multi-­‐annual	  Indicative	  
Programme	  2009-­‐2011,	  Brussels,	  8.4.2009,	  C(2009)2641,	  p.	  12.	  
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/security-­‐conflict/documents/ifs_2009_2011_en.pdf	  
16	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  (2008).	  COUNCIL	  JOINT	  ACTION	  2008/851/CFSP	  of	  10	  November	  2008	  on	  a	  
European	  Union	  military	  operation	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  deterrence,	  prevention	  and	  repression	  of	  
acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast.	  Official	  Journal	  of	  the	  EU,	  L	  301/33,	  12	  
November	  2008.	  	  
17	  Menon,	  A.	  (2011).	  Power,	  Institutions	  and	  the	  CSDP:	  The	  Promise	  of	  Institutionalist	  Theory.	  
Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies,	  49	  (1):	  83-­‐100;	  Biscop,	  S.	  (2002).	  In	  Search	  of	  a	  Strategic	  
Concept	  for	  the	  ESDP.	  European	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Review,	  7:	  473-­‐490;	  Shepherd,	  A.	  (2003).	  The	  
European	  Union’s	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy:	  a	  policy	  without	  substance?	  European	  Security,	  12	  
(1):	  39-­‐63;	  Biscop,	  S.	  &	  Coelmont,	  J.	  (2010).	  A	  Strategy	  for	  CSDP:	  Europe’s	  Ambitions	  as	  a	  Global	  
Security	  Provider.	  Egmont	  paper,	  no.	  37,	  October	  2010;	  Gourlay,	  C.	  (2011).	  The	  Politics	  of	  EU	  
Civilian	  Interventions	  and	  the	  Strategic	  Deficit	  of	  CSDP.	  DCAF,	  EU	  Crisis	  Management	  Papers	  
Series,	  Brussels,	  September	  2011.	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EU	  Training	  Mission	  Somalia	  and	  EUCAP	  Nestor,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  short-­‐term	  missions	  
exclusively	  located	  in	  the	  Sahel.	  
As	  already	  alluded	  to,	  Atalanta	  marks	  a	  strategic	  turn	  for	  CSDP.	  Germond	  and	  
Smith	  argue	  that	  previous	  missions	  often	  lacked	  a	  clearly	  identifiable	  European	  security	  
interest	  (e.g.	  the	  civilian	  monitoring	  mission	  of	  the	  peace	  agreement	  in	  Aceh,	  Indonesia),	  
generally	  were	  of	  a	  very	  limited	  scale	  in	  ambition	  and	  impact,	  and	  operated	  mostly	  as	  
civilian	  missions.	  Even	  the	  few	  military	  missions	  fielded	  under	  CSDP	  were	  mostly	  of	  the	  
static	  peacekeeping	  type	  involving	  ground	  forces.18	  While	  the	  EU’s	  earliest	  interventions	  
would	  in	  fact	  be	  takeovers	  from	  previous	  NATO	  deployments	  (i.e.	  military	  peacekeeping	  
missions	  Concordia	  and	  Althea	  in	  the	  Balkans),	  later	  military	  engagements	  in	  central	  
Africa	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  poorly	  disguised	  French	  attempts	  to	  use	  the	  cover	  of	  the	  
EU	  to	  further	  its	  national	  strategic	  interests	  in	  that	  region.19	  	  	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  accurate	  that	  Atalanta	  is	  markedly	  different	  from	  previous	  EU	  
security	  interventions,	  this	  is	  mostly	  so	  for	  a	  reason	  not	  named	  above.	  A	  core	  problem	  
for	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  has	  been	  not	  so	  much	  a	  lack	  of	  strategy,	  as	  is	  so	  fashionable	  to	  
argue	  these	  days.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  identity,	  or	  rather	  the	  neglect	  of	  a	  fundamental	  
part	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  identity.	  Identity	  necessitates	  an	  elaboration	  of	  the	  self	  through	  
an	  interpellation	  with	  the	  other.	  Yet,	  the	  latter	  has	  been	  either	  absent	  or	  become	  
increasingly	  unknown	  to	  the	  EU.	  Whereas	  a	  tacit	  case	  can	  be	  made	  that	  the	  civilian	  
power	  Europe	  narrative	  drew	  its	  internal	  coherence	  from	  either	  Europe’s	  denunciation	  
of	  its	  own	  violent	  past	  or	  from	  the	  refusal	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  great	  power	  scheme	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War,	  the	  widespread	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Europe’s	  fickleness	  in	  its	  own	  policy	  
circles	  suggests	  that	  the	  civilian	  character	  was	  to	  a	  large	  extend	  borne	  out	  of	  necessity.	  
Similarly,	  the	  normative	  power	  Europe	  narrative	  sets	  itself	  up	  against	  the	  modern	  tenets	  
of	  International	  Relations	  where	  might-­‐is-­‐right,	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  
established.	  The	  global	  power	  Europe	  narrative	  develops	  an	  image	  of	  a	  multipolar	  future	  
world	  order.	  Each	  of	  these	  narratives	  draws	  its	  logics	  of	  action	  either	  from	  a	  temporal	  
‘othering’	  towards	  itself,	  or	  from	  a	  loosely	  defined	  other	  that	  can	  never	  be	  explicitly	  
named.	  In	  its	  security	  efforts	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  the	  EU	  finds	  a	  convenient	  other	  in	  the	  
Somali	  pirate	  –	  the	  enemy	  of	  all	  –	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  EU	  constructs	  an	  important	  
part	  of	  its	  global	  identity,	  the	  management	  of	  globalisation.	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  Germond,	  B.	  &	  Smith,	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  Security	  Interests	  and	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  ESDP:	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  Operation.	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1.3	  Structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  
	  
Chapter	  2	  outlines	  the	  major	  contending	  narratives	  that	  have	  been	  invoked	  to	  describe	  
EU	  power	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  outlines	  the	  three	  core	  narratives,	  namely	  civilian	  power	  EU,	  
normative	  power	  EU	  and	  global	  power	  EU.	  It	  draws	  an	  analytical	  divide	  between	  
civilian/normative	  power	  (the	  two	  are	  collapsed	  into	  each	  other	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
simplicity)	  and	  global	  power.	  These	  power	  narratives	  serve	  to	  map	  the	  analytical	  space	  
that	  largely	  defines	  the	  field	  of	  EU	  security,	  while	  also	  providing	  the	  conceptual	  point	  of	  
departure	  for	  the	  empirical	  investigation	  at	  hand.	  Thus,	  while	  debates	  on	  EU	  power	  
often	  provide	  useful	  analytical	  lenses	  through	  which	  we	  can	  evaluate	  specific	  
institutional	  developments	  or	  policy	  outputs,	  they	  also	  regularly	  obscure	  the	  
relationship	  between	  these	  crucial	  categories.	  
Chapter	  3	  picks	  up	  this	  conceptual	  discontent	  by	  critically	  linking	  it	  to	  the	  
alleged	  ‘strategic	  deficit’	  of	  CSDP.	  It	  outlines	  the	  core	  strategic	  deficiencies	  –	  lack	  of	  clear	  
priorities	  and	  weak	  strategic	  culture;	  lacking	  resources	  and	  mismatched	  instruments;	  
and	  disjointed	  policy	  outputs	  –	  and	  thus	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  
perspective	  onto	  the	  historically	  and	  institutionally	  contingent	  space	  of	  EU	  security.	  
Chapter	  4	  consequentially	  reframes	  the	  problematique	  of	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  
with	  recourse	  to	  the	  specific	  institutional	  history	  and	  structure	  of	  EU	  security.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  pervasive	  constructive	  ambiguity	  has	  favoured	  the	  institutional	  imitation	  of	  
CSDP	  crisis	  management	  structures	  –	  largely	  based	  on	  the	  NATO	  template.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  dense	  transgovernmental	  relations	  and	  executive	  dominance	  characterise	  the	  
governance	  of	  CSDP.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  depoliticised,	  ‘post-­‐political’	  space	  that	  facilitates	  a	  
different	  conceptual	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  EU	  security,	  namely	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘managing	  
globalisation’.	  
Chapter	  5	  introduces	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘managing	  globalisation’,	  which	  forms	  the	  
central	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  this	  study.	  Although	  initially	  derived	  from	  EU	  external	  
trade	  policy,	  the	  concept	  has	  considerable	  theoretical	  and	  analytical	  import	  for	  the	  
study	  of	  EU	  security	  at	  large,	  and	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  in	  particular.	  Based	  on	  five	  
mechanisms	  whereby	  globalisation	  is	  managed	  (i.e.	  expanding	  policy	  scope;	  exercising	  
regulatory	  influence;	  empowering	  international	  institutions;	  enlarging	  the	  territorial	  
sphere	  of	  the	  EU;	  and	  redistributing	  the	  costs	  of	  globalisation),	  we	  can	  construct	  the	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conceptual	  parameters	  that	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  EU	  move	  towards	  becoming	  a	  global	  
security-­‐provider.	  
	   Chapter	  6	  is	  the	  first	  empirical	  chapter	  and	  it	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  EU	  has	  
constructed	  the	  Somali	  pirate	  into	  a	  threat	  to	  global	  order.	  A	  Schmittian	  logic	  of	  identity	  
construction	  –	  rendering	  the	  pirate	  as	  the	  enemy	  of	  all	  –	  frames	  the	  EU’s	  reductionist	  
view	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  piracy	  and	  its	  maximalist	  view	  of	  piracy	  as	  an	  instance	  
of	  organised	  crime.	  This	  rationalises	  the	  EU’s	  global	  role	  as	  a	  manager	  of	  the	  adverse	  
effects	  of	  globalisation.	  	  
Chapter	  7,	  the	  second	  empirical	  section,	  analyses	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  approach	  to	  
Somali	  piracy:	  comprehensive	  security.	  Both	  the	  military	  and	  the	  civilian	  dimension	  of	  
the	  comprehensive	  approach	  are	  structured	  by	  the	  imperatives	  of	  externalisation	  and	  
‘effective	  multilateralism’,	  which	  relocate	  responsibility	  for	  action	  while	  globalising	  the	  
security	  issue,	  respectively.	  In	  turn,	  the	  EU’s	  comprehensive	  approach	  matches	  the	  
notion	  of	  it	  being	  a	  manager	  of	  globalisation.	  
	  
	  
1.4	  A	  note	  on	  method	  
	  
The	  study	  will	  be	  conducted	  as	  a	  detailed	  within-­‐case	  study,	  which	  provides	  for	  a	  high	  
degree	  of	  conceptual	  validity.20	  Due	  to	  its	  epistemological	  foundations	  it	  eschews	  the	  
language	  of	  variables,	  hypotheses	  and	  even	  causality.	  Instead,	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  co-­‐
constitutive	  and	  performative	  relationship	  between	  identity	  and	  politics.	  The	  
phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained	  is	  the	  formation	  of	  piracy	  as	  an	  EU	  security	  threat	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  policy	  response	  following	  from	  this.	  Intensive	  text	  analysis	  is	  carried	  along	  
the	  lines	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  out	  by	  drawing	  on	  two	  major	  types	  of	  sources,	  that	  is	  
official	  documents	  and	  speeches,	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  elite	  interviews.	  The	  time	  
dimension	  of	  the	  empirical	  observations	  covers	  the	  period	  from	  2008	  until	  2013.	  
Most	  of	  the	  core	  official	  documents	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  EU	  Council	  decisions,	  
such	  as	  the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  and	  the	  Strategic	  Framework	  on	  the	  Horn	  of	  
Africa.	  Official	  statements	  by	  the	  High	  Representative,	  the	  EU	  Special	  Representative	  for	  
the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  as	  well	  as	  input	  by	  the	  European	  External	  Action	  Service,	  the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  high-­‐ranking	  personnel	  within	  the	  governing	  bureaucratic	  
structures	  of	  the	  CSDP	  (i.e.	  Political	  and	  Security	  Committee;	  EU	  Military	  Committee;	  EU	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  George,	  A.	  L.	  &	  Bennett,	  A.	  (2005).	  Case	  Studies	  and	  Theory	  Development	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences.	  
Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press,	  p.	  15.	  
	  16	  
Military	  Staff)	  is	  drawn	  upon	  where	  accessible	  and	  relevant.	  This	  is	  complemented	  by	  a	  
number	  of	  strategic	  documents	  at	  the	  national	  level	  that	  make	  direct	  reference	  to	  EU	  
security	  cooperation	  and	  particularly	  counter-­‐piracy.	  	  
To	  substantiate	  my	  argument	  (and	  provide	  a	  measure	  of	  data	  triangulation)	  I	  
draw	  upon	  semi-­‐structured	  elite	  interviews	  with	  a	  number	  of	  officials	  involved	  in	  the	  EU	  
security	  policy	  process,	  both	  from	  the	  European	  and	  national	  levels,	  and	  located	  at	  the	  
strategic,	  operational	  and	  tactical	  levels	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  (for	  a	  list	  consult	  the	  annex).	  
Interviewees	  from	  the	  national	  Permanent	  Representations	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  all	  
asked	  to	  remain	  anonymous.	  Further,	  newspaper	  sources	  are	  used	  to	  provide	  contextual	  
depth	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  Somali	  piracy.	  The	  main	  body	  of	  secondary	  sources	  is	  
constituted	  by	  academic	  literature	  located	  in	  various	  peer-­‐reviewed	  journals	  and	  policy	  
papers	  by	  security	  policy	  think-­‐tanks.	  	  
The	  particular	  difficulty	  with	  gaining	  access	  to	  high-­‐level	  documents	  in	  the	  realm	  
of	  security	  policy	  is	  well-­‐known.	  The	  EU	  as	  an	  entity	  is	  arguably	  more	  and	  less	  
transparent	  in	  this	  regard	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  
culturally	  and	  institutionally	  embedded	  secretiveness	  of	  national	  security	  apparatuses,	  
whose	  long	  and	  proud	  traditions	  have	  made	  them	  fairly	  resistant	  to	  public	  scrutiny	  let	  
alone	  self-­‐motivated	  transparency.21	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  EU	  at	  large	  –	  and	  its	  
security	  policy	  nexus	  in	  particular	  –	  possesses	  certain	  design	  features	  that	  are	  geared	  at	  
maximising	  executive	  control	  over	  the	  policy	  process.	  The	  long	  lamented	  ‘democratic	  
deficit’	  is	  nowhere	  as	  pronounced	  as	  it	  is	  in	  CSDP.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  hardly	  any	  access	  to	  
official	  documents	  at	  the	  operational	  and	  tactical	  levels.	  For	  instance,	  access	  to	  a	  copy	  of	  
the	  manual	  outlining	  the	  Rules	  of	  Engagement	  for	  CSDP	  military	  missions	  –	  certainly	  a	  
less	  contentious	  document	  –	  was	  eventually	  denied.	  	  
There	  is	  however,	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  soft	  sources	  available.	  For	  example,	  
operation	  Atalanta	  has	  its	  own	  website,	  which	  is	  constantly	  being	  updated	  with	  news	  
about	  the	  mission,	  covering	  changes	  in	  the	  operational	  environment	  or	  turnover	  in	  
mission	  deployment	  (see	  http://eunavfor.eu/).	  The	  website’s	  ‘Media	  Room’	  provides	  
links	  to	  the	  mission’s	  Facebook,	  Twitter,	  Flickr,	  and	  Vimeo	  pages	  as	  well	  as	  containing	  
images	  and	  additional	  information	  for	  the	  interested	  visitor.	  Add	  to	  this	  national	  
militaries’	  public	  relations	  efforts	  –	  a	  particular	  gem:	  their	  respective	  Youtube	  channels,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Transparency	  International	  (2013).	  Defence	  and	  Security	  Policy.	  http://www.ti-­‐
defence.org/our-­‐work/defence-­‐corruption-­‐risks-­‐typology/political/defence-­‐security-­‐policy;	  see	  
also	  Transparency	  International’s	  ‘Government	  Defence	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Index,	  
http://government.defenceindex.org/	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such	  as	  the	  one	  of	  Germany’s	  Bundeswehr,	  which	  has	  a	  neat	  video	  about	  its	  
engagement	  in	  Atalanta	  (see	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVWFcdEIiio),	  and	  
there	  is	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  sources	  available	  from	  which	  to	  draw	  inferences	  about	  how	  the	  
EU	  views	  piracy	  and	  its	  own	  role	  in	  tackling	  it.	  While	  many	  of	  these	  soft	  sources	  are	  
often	  dismissed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  authority	  they	  command	  in	  academic	  research,	  they	  
should	  not	  be	  discarded	  outright.	  Instead	  we	  should	  look	  at	  the	  expanded	  virtual	  
presence	  of	  EU	  institutions	  via	  social	  media	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  
general	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  which	  has	  only	  become	  aggravated	  since	  a	  sizable	  portion	  
of	  diplomatic	  cables	  found	  their	  way	  onto	  Wikileaks.	  Also,	  since	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  
discursive	  construction	  of	  piracy	  as	  a	  security	  issue,	  and	  the	  resulting	  policy	  choices,	  this	  
material	  in	  many	  instances	  is	  even	  better	  suited	  for	  our	  purpose	  than	  undisclosed	  














2.1	  Many	  labels,	  fewer	  narratives	  
	  
The	  sheer	  volume	  of	  labels	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  EU’s	  international	  
actorness	  or	  identity	  indicates	  how	  little	  agreement	  there	  is	  to	  this	  question.	  Recent	  
(and	  not	  so	  recent)	  characterisations	  of	  the	  EU	  include	  the	  following:	  ‘civilian	  power’22,	  
‘normative	  power’23,	  ‘ethical	  power’24,	  ‘post-­‐modern	  power’25,	  ‘superpower’26,	  ‘quiet	  
superpower’27,	  ‘global	  power’28,	  and	  even	  ‘metrosexual	  power’29.	  The	  latest	  addition	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Duchêne,	  F.	  (1973).	  The	  European	  Community	  and	  the	  Uncertainties	  of	  Interdependence,	  in:	  
M.	  Kohnstamm	  &	  W.	  Hager	  (Eds.),	  A	  Nation	  Writ	  Large?	  Foreign-­‐Policy	  Problems	  before	  the	  
European	  Community.	  London:	  Macmillan;	  Telo,	  M.	  (2006).	  Europe:	  a	  Civilian	  Power?	  European	  
Union,	  Global	  Governance,	  World	  Order.	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  
23	  Manners,	  I.	  (2002).	  Normative	  Power	  Europe:	  A	  Contradiction	  in	  Terms?	  Journal	  of	  Common	  
Market	  Studies,	  40	  (2):	  235-­‐258;	  Bicchi,	  F.	  (2006).	  ‘Our	  Size	  Fits	  All’:	  Normative	  Power	  Europe	  and	  
the	  Mediterranean.	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  13	  (2):	  286-­‐303;	  Forsberg,	  T.	  (2011).	  
Normative	  Power	  Europe,	  Once	  Again:	  A	  Conceptual	  Analysis	  of	  an	  Ideal	  Type.	  Journal	  of	  
Common	  Market	  Studies,	  49	  (6):	  1183-­‐1204.	  
24	  Aggestam,	  L.	  (2008).	  Introduction:	  ethical	  power	  Europe?	  International	  Affairs,	  84	  (1):	  1-­‐11.	  	  
25	  Smith,	  M.	  (2003).	  The	  framing	  of	  European	  foreign	  and	  security	  policy:	  towards	  a	  post-­‐modern	  
policy	  framework?	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  10	  (4):	  556-­‐575.	  
26	  Schnabel,	  R.	  A.	  (2005).	  The	  Next	  Superpower?	  The	  Rise	  of	  Europe	  and	  its	  Challenge	  to	  the	  
United	  States.	  Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield;	  McCormick,	  J.	  (2007).	  The	  European	  Superpower.	  
Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  
27	  Moravcsik,	  A.	  (2009).	  Europe:	  The	  quiet	  superpower.	  French	  Politics,	  7	  (3/4):	  403-­‐422.	  
28	  Rogers,	  J.	  (2009).	  From	  ‘Civilian	  Power’	  to	  ‘Global	  Power’:	  Explicating	  the	  European	  Union’s	  
‘Grand	  Strategy’	  Through	  the	  Articulation	  of	  Discourse	  Theory.	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  
Studies,	  47	  (4):	  831-­‐862;	  Howorth,	  J.	  (2010).	  The	  EU	  as	  a	  Global	  Power:	  Grand	  Strategy	  for	  a	  
Global	  Grand	  Bargain?	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies,	  48	  (3):	  455-­‐474.	  
29	  Khanna,	  P.	  (2004).	  The	  Metrosexual	  Superpower.	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1	  July	  2004,	  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/the_metrosexual_superpower,	  last	  accessed	  
17	  April	  2013.	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the	  list	  is	  ‘market	  power	  Europe’.30	  Nor	  is	  this	  an	  entirely	  new	  debate	  initiated	  by	  major	  
institutional	  deepening	  in	  the	  form	  of	  CFSP	  and	  CSDP.	  	  
The	  multiplicity	  and	  complexity	  of	  EU	  identities	  leads	  some	  sceptics	  to	  conclude	  
that	  trying	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue	  is	  a	  fool’s	  errand.	  And	  while	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  that	  
“rather	  than	  concentrating	  on	  what	  the	  EU	  is	  (…),	  we	  should	  concentrate	  on	  what	  the	  
EU	  does”31,	  the	  simultaneous	  fascination	  and	  disillusionment	  with	  the	  EU’s	  international	  
identity	  reflects	  a	  certain	  promise	  that	  this	  line	  of	  inquiry	  holds.	  
For	  one	  thing,	  the	  EU	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  rather	  stand-­‐alone	  experiment	  in	  
international	  politics,	  which	  hints	  at	  new	  forms	  of	  governance	  as	  well	  as	  a	  fundamental	  
reshaping	  of	  notions	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  legitimacy.	  Arguably,	  this	  becomes	  even	  more	  
true	  towards	  the	  background	  of	  what	  increasingly	  looks	  not	  only	  like	  a	  functional	  crisis	  
at	  EU	  level	  –	  be	  it	  economics,	  democracy,	  security	  or	  else	  –	  but	  an	  existential	  one.	  Again,	  
while	  the	  cynics	  may	  already	  herald	  the	  end	  of	  the	  European	  project,	  it	  is	  more	  
rewarding	  to	  scrutinise	  how	  change	  in	  the	  material	  and	  ideational	  conditions	  that	  shape	  
the	  EU	  brings	  about	  change	  in	  the	  EU’s	  perception	  of	  itself	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  as	  
well	  as	  others’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  turn,	  since	  “the	  international	  role	  and	  
development	  of	  an	  international	  actor	  […]	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  it	  conceptualizes	  itself	  
and	  its	  means”.32	  As	  such,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  sui	  generis	  actor,	  one	  that	  is	  
predicated	  on	  a	  more	  variegated	  conception	  of	  actorness	  and	  legitimacy,	  continues	  to	  
challenge	  us	  to	  question	  core	  concepts	  of	  the	  IR	  discipline.	  The	  continuing	  relevance	  of	  
the	  ‘what	  kind	  of	  an	  actor’	  debate	  rests	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  ‘know’	  what	  to	  ‘do’	  in	  international	  politics,	  it	  must	  ‘know’	  what	  its	  own	  role	  in	  this	  
realm	  is.	  	  
Furthermore,	  this	  multiplicity	  and	  complexity	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  are	  
inconsistencies	  and	  contradictions	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy.	  While	  all	  too	  often	  
debate	  remains	  overly	  descriptive	  and	  unimaginative	  –	  see	  buzzwords	  such	  as	  the	  
militarisation	  of	  the	  EU	  -­‐	  we	  may	  inquire	  as	  to	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  EU	  attempts	  and	  
manages	  to	  resolve	  these	  contradictions.	  It	  may	  seem	  rather	  conventional	  when	  Henrik	  
Larsen	  states	  that	  the	  EU	  seeks	  to	  portray	  itself	  “as	  a	  political	  unit	  with	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  
world	  politics	  with	  its	  own	  interests.	  Europe	  is	  constructed	  as	  an	  international	  unit	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Jurje,	  F.	  &	  Lavenex,	  S.	  (2013,	  forthcoming).	  Trade	  Agreements	  as	  Venues	  for	  ´Market	  Power	  
Europe´?	  The	  Case	  of	  Immigration	  Policy.	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies.	  
31	  Smith,	  K.	  E.	  (2005).	  Beyond	  the	  civilian	  power	  EU	  debate.	  Politique	  europeenne,	  2005/3,	  No.	  17:	  
63.	  
32	  Larsen,	  H.	  (2002).	  A	  Global	  Military	  Actor?	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict,	  37	  (3):	  286.	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identity”.33	  However,	  the	  narratives	  that	  are	  forwarded	  to	  conceptualise	  and	  
contextualise	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  are	  not	  merely	  objective	  labels	  that	  describe	  foreign	  
policy	  activity	  and	  behaviour	  but	  are	  also	  framing	  devices	  that	  legitimise	  EU	  actorness	  
and	  power	  on	  the	  global	  stage.	  By	  tracing	  these	  contending	  EU	  power	  narratives	  we	  can	  
make	  intelligible	  this	  “process	  of	  continuous	  framing	  and	  reframing	  of	  the	  policy	  
space”.34	  In	  a	  highly	  illustrative	  exposé	  of	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  where	  identity	  is	  
constantly	  constructed	  and	  reconstructed,	  Ian	  Manners	  provides	  a	  historical-­‐contextual	  
overview	  of	  EU	  power	  narratives,	  in	  which	  he	  outlines	  six	  ‘myths	  of	  global	  Europa’:	  the	  
bull	  myth;	  the	  third	  force	  myth;	  the	  civilian	  power	  myth;	  the	  normative	  power	  myth;	  the	  
gender	  myth;	  and	  the	  multipolar	  myth.35	  	  
I	  will	  broadly	  maintain	  the	  categorisation	  forwarded	  by	  Karen	  E.	  Smith,	  as	  it	  
provides	  for	  analytical	  distinctiveness.36	  Thus,	  we	  may	  reduce	  the	  multitude	  of	  EU	  
international	  identity	  or	  actorness	  into	  two	  ‘ideal’	  types:	  civilian/normative	  power;	  and	  
global	  power.37	  We	  also	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  additional	  null-­‐case	  scenario	  
where	  the	  EU	  would	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  non-­‐power	  (the	  following	  chapter	  touches	  
upon	  this	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  EU’s	  strategic	  deficit).	  
The	  distinguishing	  features	  of	  these	  two	  major	  narratives	  are	  the	  following:	  The	  
civilian/normative	  narrative	  aims	  at	  milieu	  goals,	  formulated	  in	  the	  form	  of	  (universal)	  
norms	  productive	  of	  a	  cosmopolitan	  international	  order.	  It	  operates	  by	  means	  of	  
persuasion,	  formulated	  in	  the	  diplomatic,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  spheres.	  The	  global	  
power	  narrative,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  self-­‐referential	  in	  that	  it	  pursues	  possession	  goals	  
constitutive	  of	  a	  European	  interest	  (however	  loosely	  defined),	  arguably	  (strategic)	  
equivalence	  in	  a	  multipolar	  world.	  The	  means	  employed	  can	  be	  of	  a	  diplomatic,	  
economic	  and	  military	  nature,	  and	  they	  may	  be	  applied	  coercively	  and	  preventively.	  	  
The	  next	  two	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  discuss	  in	  turns	  the	  two	  major	  EU	  power	  
narratives	  employed	  here:	  civilian/normative	  power,	  and	  global	  power.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Larsen,	  H.	  (2000).	  The	  Concept	  of	  Security	  in	  the	  EU/CFSP.	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Affairs,	  54	  (3):	  352,	  emphasis	  added.	  
34	  Smith,	  M.	  (2003).	  The	  framing	  of	  European	  foreign	  and	  security	  policy:	  towards	  a	  post-­‐modern	  
policy	  framework?	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  10	  (4):	  557.	  
35	  Manners,	  I.	  (2010).	  Global	  Europa:	  Mythology	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  World	  Politics.	  Journal	  
of	  Common	  Market	  Studies:	  48	  (1):	  67-­‐87.	  
36	  Smith,	  K.	  E.	  (2008).	  European	  Union	  foreign	  policy	  in	  a	  changing	  world.	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  
37	  In	  Smith’s	  terms,	  respectively:	  civilian	  power;	  power	  bloc;	  and	  flop.	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2.2	  Values,	  cooperation,	  persuasion:	  Civilian	  power	  EU/normative	  power	  EU	  
	  
In	  its	  earliest	  elaborations	  such	  as	  that	  forwarded	  by	  Duchêne,	  the	  ‘civilian’	  or	  ‘civilising’	  
essence	  of	  the	  EU	  is	  directed	  mostly	  inwards.	  European	  integration	  serves	  as	  a	  
cooperative	  endeavour	  to	  stabilise,	  or	  domesticate,	  interstate	  relations.	  Civilian	  power	  
aims	  “to	  bring	  to	  international	  problems	  the	  sense	  of	  common	  responsibility	  and	  
structures	  of	  contractual	  politics	  which	  have	  in	  the	  past	  been	  associated	  almost	  
exclusively	  with	  “home”	  and	  not	  foreign,	  that	  is	  alien,	  affairs”.38	  As	  such,	  the	  notion	  of	  
civilian	  power	  represents	  “a	  new	  stage	  in	  political	  civilisation”.39	  This	  idea	  of	  European	  
integration	  as	  a	  peace	  project	  continues	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  relevance	  today,	  however	  it	  
has	  little	  bearing	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  itself.	  European	  
foreign	  policy	  as	  foreign	  policy	  between	  EU	  member	  states	  has	  in	  many	  ways	  become	  
Europe’s	  domestic	  politics.	  To	  gauge	  whether	  the	  notion	  of	  civilian	  power	  maintains	  its	  
relevance	  we	  must	  turn	  to	  the	  external	  dimension	  of	  the	  EU.	  
Here	  the	  four	  core	  elements	  of	  civilian	  power	  are:	  civilian	  means;	  civilian	  ends;	  
the	  use	  of	  persuasion;	  and	  civilian	  control	  over	  foreign	  and	  defence	  policy-­‐making.	  The	  
civilian	  means	  identified	  by	  Karen	  E.	  Smith	  are	  by	  definition	  non-­‐military	  and	  include	  
economic,	  diplomatic	  and	  cultural	  policy	  instruments.40	  Civilian	  ends	  are	  commonly	  held	  
to	  be	  the	  civilising	  of	  interstate	  relations	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  increasing	  size	  and	  
importance	  of	  the	  body	  of	  international	  law,	  international	  cooperation	  and	  solidarity,	  
commitment	  to	  environmental	  sustainability,	  and	  the	  diffusion	  of	  values	  of	  equality,	  
justice	  and	  tolerance.41	  What	  sets	  this	  notion	  of	  international	  actorness	  apart	  from	  
traditional	  conceptions	  is	  found	  in	  Wolfers’	  distinction	  between	  possession	  and	  milieu	  
goals.42	  Whereas	  possession	  goals	  are	  derived	  from	  and	  advance	  the	  ‘national	  interest’,	  
milieu	  goals	  are	  aimed	  at	  environmental	  stabilisation.	  	  
Here	  we	  need	  to	  address	  the	  tensions	  that	  frequently	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  amongst	  
proponents	  of	  civilian	  power.	  While	  for	  some	  observers	  the	  creation	  of	  military	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Duchêne,	  F.	  (1973).	  The	  European	  Community	  and	  the	  Uncertainties	  of	  Interdependence,	  in:	  
M.	  Kohnstamm	  &	  W.	  Hager	  (Eds.),	  A	  Nation	  Writ	  Large?	  Foreign-­‐Policy	  Problems	  before	  the	  
European	  Community,	  p.	  20.	  London:	  Macmillan.	  
39	  Ibid,	  p.	  19.	  
40	  Smith,	  K.	  E.	  (2005).	  Beyond	  the	  civilian	  power	  EU	  debate.	  Politique	  europeenne,	  2005/3,	  No.	  17:	  
63.	  
41	  see	  Duchêne,	  F.	  (1973).	  The	  European	  Community	  and	  the	  Uncertainties	  of	  Interdependence,	  
in:	  M.	  Kohnstamm	  &	  W.	  Hager	  (Eds.),	  A	  Nation	  Writ	  Large?	  Foreign-­‐Policy	  Problems	  before	  the	  
European	  Community.	  London:	  Macmillan;	  Maull,	  H.	  W.	  (1990).	  Germany	  and	  Japan:	  The	  New	  
Civilian	  Powers.	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  69	  (5),	  Winter	  1990/91.	  
42	  Wolfers,	  A.	  (1962).	  Discord	  and	  Collaboration:	  Essays	  on	  International	  Politics.	  Baltimore:	  Johns	  
Hopkins	  Press.	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structures	  at	  EU	  level	  –	  most	  notably	  the	  Battlegroups	  under	  the	  CSDP	  –dealt	  a	  death	  
blow	  to	  the	  civilian	  power	  notion,	  others	  maintain	  its	  relevance	  by	  submitting	  that	  
ultimately	  it	  is	  civilian	  ends	  that	  matter,	  even	  if	  the	  means	  may	  not	  be.43	  In	  fact,	  some	  
would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  coercive	  means	  that	  make	  civilian	  ends	  and	  the	  actor	  
that	  pursues	  them	  credible.	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning	  is	  well	  represented	  in	  debates	  about	  
humanitarian	  intervention	  –	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  humanitarian.44	  However,	  Smith	  
maintains	  that	  in	  order	  for	  civilian	  power	  to	  be	  conceptually	  meaningful,	  it	  should	  
demarcate	  soft	  power	  (i.e.	  persuasion	  and	  attraction).45	  	  
It	  is	  the	  economic	  field	  that	  arguably	  best	  demonstrates	  the	  internal	  
contradictions	  of	  the	  civilian	  power	  narrative.	  Early	  conceptualisations	  of	  civilian	  power	  
relied	  on	  the	  centrality	  of	  economic	  power	  as	  a	  means	  to	  pursue	  the	  national	  interest.46	  
Economic	  power	  is	  here	  generally	  regarded	  as	  a	  soft	  form	  of	  power.	  Because	  it	  is	  bound	  
up	  in	  structures	  of	  interdependence	  it	  supposedly	  operates	  in	  a	  more	  conciliatory	  
fashion	  than	  the	  direct,	  coercive	  power	  of	  military	  might.	  According	  to	  Rosecrance	  the	  
EU	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  trading	  state.47	  Due	  to	  the	  EU’s	  deep	  embeddedness	  in	  
global	  economic	  interdependence	  it	  has	  a	  principal	  interest	  in	  the	  stability	  of	  its	  
environment	  –	  both	  peripheral	  and	  global	  –	  thus	  facilitating	  reciprocity	  and	  negotiation	  
rather	  than	  coercion	  towards	  its	  counterparts.	  Here	  civilian	  power	  is	  functionally	  derived	  
from	  the	  EU’s	  strength	  as	  an	  economic	  entity	  and	  its	  weakness	  as	  a	  military	  one.	  
Michael	  Smith	  points	  at	  this	  fact	  when	  he	  contends	  that	  	  
“the	  framing	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  has	  created	  a	  policy	  space	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  
effective	  opportunity	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  role	  and	  preferences	  of	  ‘trading	  statehood’,	  
and	  in	  which	  member	  state	  foreign	  policies	  predominate	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  stakes	  are	  raised	  
in	  terms	  of	  ‘high	  politics’”.48	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Stavridis,	  S.	  (2001).	  “Militarising”	  the	  EU:	  The	  concept	  of	  civilian	  power	  Europe	  revisited.	  The	  
International	  Spectator:	  Italian	  Journal	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  36	  (4):	  43-­‐50.	  
44	  Manners,	  I.	  (2002).	  Normative	  Power	  Europe:	  A	  Contradiction	  in	  Terms?	  Journal	  of	  Common	  
Market	  Studies,	  40	  (2):	  235-­‐258.	  
45	  Smith,	  K.	  E.	  (2005).	  Beyond	  the	  civilian	  power	  EU	  debate.	  Politique	  europeenne,	  2005/3,	  No.	  17:	  
68;	  Soft	  power	  does	  not	  imply	  ‘weakness’,	  which	  is	  precisely	  what	  Robert	  Kagan	  asserts	  in	  his	  
gendering	  of	  European	  and	  US	  approaches	  to	  power:	  “Americans	  are	  from	  Mars	  and	  Europeans	  
are	  from	  Venus”	  (see	  Kagan,	  R.	  (2003).	  Of	  Paradise	  and	  Power:	  America	  and	  Europe	  in	  the	  New	  
World	  Order.	  New	  York:	  Knopf.).	  	  
46	  Twitchett,,	  K.	  J.	  (1976).	  External	  Relations	  or	  Foreign	  Policy?	  In:	  K.	  J.	  Twitchett	  (Ed.),	  Europe	  and	  
the	  World:	  The	  External	  Relations	  of	  the	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  Market.	  London:	  Europa	  Publications,	  pp.	  1-­‐2.	  
47	  Rosecrance,	  R.	  (1986).	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  trading	  state:	  Commerce	  and	  conquest	  in	  the	  modern	  
world.	  New	  York:	  Basic	  Books.	  
48	  Smith,	  M.	  (2003).	  The	  framing	  of	  European	  foreign	  and	  security	  policy:	  towards	  a	  post-­‐modern	  
policy	  framework?	  Journal	  of	  European	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  Policy,	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  (4):	  568.	  
	  23	  
However,	  the	  EU’s	  trade	  power	  assumes	  a	  more	  reflexive,	  self-­‐interested	  image	  
when	  we	  consider	  its	  modes	  of	  operation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  EU	  is	  an	  established	  
‘power	  in	  trade’	  because	  it	  is	  the	  single	  largest	  international	  trading	  bloc.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  the	  EU	  is	  increasingly	  a	  ‘power	  through	  trade’	  because	  it	  uses	  market	  access	  to	  
exert	  pressure	  and	  bring	  about	  change	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  of	  its	  trading	  partners.49	  
The	  idea	  of	  ‘power	  through	  trade’	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  uses	  trade	  to	  achieve	  
non-­‐trade	  objectives,	  such	  as	  preferential	  bilateral	  agreements	  or	  regional	  initiatives	  like	  
the	  economic	  partnership	  agreements	  (EPAs)	  with	  groups	  of	  African	  states.	  Here	  EU	  
foreign	  policy	  action	  appears	  decidedly	  self-­‐interested,	  and	  trade	  power	  operates	  
according	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  direct	  power,	  its	  relational	  quality	  being	  closer	  to	  coercion	  than	  
sometimes	  admitted	  by	  proponents	  of	  the	  civilian	  power	  narrative.	  Meunier	  and	  
Nicolaïdis’	  assertion	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  ‘conflicted	  trade	  power’	  thus	  is	  not	  only	  derived	  
from	  differences	  in	  member	  states’	  preferences	  but	  also	  from	  the	  tensions	  that	  exist	  
between	  the	  priorities	  this	  external	  governance	  approach	  advocates	  and	  the	  norms	  it	  
promotes	  towards	  the	  EU’s	  trading	  partners.50	  We	  can	  thus	  detect	  a	  fraying	  of	  the	  
civilian	  power	  ideal-­‐type	  with	  respect	  to	  external	  economic	  policy.	  
The	  previous	  example	  provides	  a	  telling	  illustration	  of	  the	  conceptual	  
inconsistencies	  of	  civilian	  power.	  The	  fluidity	  of	  the	  civilian	  power	  narrative	  –	  especially	  
with	  regard	  to	  its	  soft	  power	  predisposition	  and	  emphasis	  of	  universal	  values	  –	  comes	  
into	  view	  when	  we	  approach	  the	  more	  recent	  discourse	  on	  EU	  ‘normative	  power’.	  
	  
The	  normative	  power	  narrative	  hinges	  on	  the	  EU’s	  norms,	  rules	  and	  values,	  and	  their	  
export	  and	  promotion	  abroad.	  EU	  value-­‐projection	  seeks	  to	  construct	  its	  target	  in	  the	  
image	  of	  the	  EU	  itself.	  Ian	  Manners	  forwards	  the	  notion	  of	  normative	  power	  with	  
reference	  to	  Carr’s	  distinction	  between	  economic	  power,	  military	  power	  and	  power	  over	  
opinion.	  It	  is	  this	  latter	  ‘ideational’	  orientation	  of	  power	  that	  seeks	  to	  separate	  the	  
concept	  from	  previous	  debates	  that	  seemed	  preoccupied	  with	  capabilities	  and	  move	  
towards	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  EU	  shapes	  conceptions	  of	  ‘normal’.51	  This	  
approach	  is	  necessarily	  directly	  derived	  from	  the	  history	  of	  the	  EU	  itself,	  and	  its	  ‘special’	  
standing	  in	  international	  relations,	  constructing	  itself	  as	  a	  post-­‐Westphalian	  and	  anti-­‐	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  &	  Nicolaïdis,	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  (2005).	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Smith	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Realpolitik	  alternative	  to	  great	  power	  rivalry.	  Normative	  power	  seeks	  to	  ‘overcome’	  
power	  politics	  through	  the	  strengthening	  of	  cosmopolitan	  law.52	  Manners	  outlines	  five	  
core	  norms,	  which	  are	  deeply	  ingrained	  in	  the	  constitutive	  documents	  of	  the	  European	  
Union:	  peace,	  liberty,	  democracy,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  human	  rights.	  To	  these	  he	  adds	  
four	  minor	  norms,	  which	  he	  admits	  are	  more	  circumstantial	  and	  contested:	  social	  
solidarity,	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  sustainable	  development,	  and	  good	  governance.	  
Therefore,	  while	  normative	  power	  is	  exemplary	  power	  and	  thus	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  
being	  of	  the	  EU	  itself,	  its	  ends	  are	  also	  declared	  universally	  applicable.	  It	  is	  the	  
normativity	  of	  European	  Union	  that	  sets	  it	  apart	  as	  an	  international	  actor.	  
This	  is	  simultaneously	  where	  the	  concept	  runs	  into	  trouble	  since	  such	  a	  self-­‐
understanding	  risks	  being	  highly	  particularistic.53	  Normative	  power	  in	  the	  previous	  
elaboration	  translates	  into	  ‘a	  force	  for	  good’.	  However,	  some	  have	  posed	  the	  question	  
whether	  the	  EU	  projects	  its	  own,	  internally	  derived	  norms	  on	  the	  outside	  world	  –	  as	  
suits	  the	  civilising	  power	  –	  or	  whether	  it	  promotes	  a	  set	  of	  ‘universally’	  acclaimed	  norms	  
in	  its	  external	  relations.54	  And	  even	  a	  claim	  to	  universality	  is	  not	  unproblematic	  as	  put	  
succinctly	  by	  Thomas	  Diez:	  	  
“The	  standards	  of	  the	  self	  are	  not	  simply	  seen	  as	  superior	  but	  of	  universal	  validity,	  with	  
the	  consequence	  that	  the	  other	  should	  be	  convinced	  or	  otherwise	  brought	  to	  accept	  the	  
principles	  of	  the	  self”.55	  	  
	  
If	  we	  consider	  how	  the	  EU’s	  external	  trade	  policy	  is	  implemented,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  
“its	  external	  efforts	  are	  about	  replication	  more	  than	  domination”.56	  This	  ‘external	  
governance’	  operates	  through	  the	  export	  of	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  rules	  and	  procedures	  to	  
other	  countries	  and	  regions.57	  The	  EU’s	  support	  for	  regionalism	  and	  subsequent	  inter-­‐
regionalism	  is	  a	  clear	  manifestation	  of	  its	  preference	  for	  re-­‐constructing	  its	  international	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partners	  in	  its	  own	  image.58	  This	  clearly	  sheds	  doubt	  on	  the	  universality	  of	  EU	  normative	  
power.	  
Another	  point	  of	  contention	  for	  normative	  power	  has	  been	  the	  interest-­‐value	  
dialectic.	  While	  normative	  power	  is	  conceptually	  wedded	  to	  the	  latter,	  the	  idea	  has	  been	  
raised	  that	  normative	  arguments	  may	  be	  forwarded	  for	  a	  strategic	  purpose.59	  In	  this	  
vein,	  Adrian	  Hyde-­‐Price	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  so-­‐called	  transformative	  power	  of	  the	  EU.	  
Its	  constitutive	  elements	  –	  i.e.	  the	  EU’s	  economic	  preponderance,	  its	  ability	  to	  withhold	  
market	  access,	  and	  the	  promise	  of	  membership	  –	  are	  all	  sources	  of	  ‘hard	  power’,	  by	  
which	  he	  seems	  to	  say	  ‘means	  of	  coercion’.60	  	  	  
In	  a	  conceptually	  more	  dense	  elaboration	  and	  hence	  more	  explicit	  stylisation	  as	  
another	  ideal-­‐type	  of	  EU	  power,	  Tuomas	  Forsberg	  identifies	  a	  number	  of	  criteria	  for	  and	  
mechanism	  of	  normative	  power	  to	  make	  the	  concept	  more	  meaningful.	  These	  are:	  1)	  
normative	  identity,	  i.e.	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  normative	  entity;	  2)	  normative	  interests;	  3)	  norm-­‐
based	  behaviour;	  4)	  normative	  means	  of	  influence;	  and	  5)	  ability	  to	  achieve	  normative	  
ends.61	  The	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  normative	  power	  functions	  are:	  by	  persuasion,	  
by	  invoking	  norms,	  by	  shaping	  discourse,	  or	  by	  leading	  by	  example.	  
While	  this	  conceptualisation	  provides	  for	  more	  analytical	  rigour	  than	  earlier	  
approaches,	  its	  similarity	  to	  Karen	  E.	  Smith’s	  fashioning	  of	  civilian	  power	  is	  readily	  
apparent.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  point	  where	  we	  suggest	  collapsing	  these	  two	  narratives	  into	  each	  
other	  to	  produce	  observable	  implications	  for	  them.	  The	  civilian/normative	  power	  
complex	  shares	  a	  focus	  on	  milieu	  goals,	  which	  are	  usually	  formulated	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
(universal)	  norms	  productive	  of	  a	  cosmopolitan	  international	  order.	  Power	  transmission	  
operates	  by	  means	  of	  persuasion	  and	  exemplification,	  formulated	  in	  the	  diplomatic,	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2.3	  Interests,	  security,	  strategy:	  Global	  power	  EU	  
	  
This	  most	  recent	  narrative	  is	  closely	  predicated	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  EU’s	  military	  
dimension	  –	  starting	  with	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  Common	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy	  in	  
1999	  –	  and	  finds	  its	  most	  prominent	  elaboration	  in	  EU	  discourses	  on	  strategy	  (and	  
particularly	  grand	  strategy).	  It	  pertains	  to	  a	  more	  global,	  interventionist	  and	  
preventative	  agenda	  for	  EU	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  seeks	  to	  defend	  and	  promote	  EU	  
interests	  abroad,	  and	  advances	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  geopolitical	  actor.	  	  
This	  global	  power	  narrative	  follows	  both	  the	  temporal	  and	  functional	  logic	  of	  
classical	  realism,	  which	  holds	  that	  political	  entities	  seek	  to	  convert	  their	  resources	  into	  
power.	  Krotz	  locates	  this	  functionality	  of	  ‘more	  capacity	  for	  action	  leads	  to	  more	  action’	  
with	  reference	  to:	  
“Europe’s	  quest	  for	  greater	  security	  autonomy,	  the	  long-­‐term	  tenacity	  of	  the	  European	  
actorhood	  project,	  the	  piecemeal	  expansion	  of	  European	  foreign	  political	  involvement	  
and	  perhaps	  especially	  the	  EU	  elites’	  aspirations	  to	  fabricate	  an	  increasingly	  robust	  
European	  security	  and	  defence	  actor”.62	  	  
	  
This	  latter	  point	  is	  also	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Rogers’	  argument	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  ‘discursive	  polity’,	  
where	  a	  group	  of	  euro-­‐strategists	  elaborated	  and	  facilitated	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  from	  
civilian	  power	  to	  global	  power.63	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  multitude	  of	  studies	  that	  assert	  the	  
prominent	  role	  of	  an	  ‘epistemic	  community’	  of	  EU	  security	  in	  shaping	  the	  rapid	  
institutionalisation	  of	  the	  Common	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy.64	  	  
It	  is	  not	  a	  far	  stretch	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  CSDP	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	  dynamic	  
policy	  areas	  of	  the	  EU	  since	  its	  inception.	  France	  and	  the	  UK	  –	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  
unravelling	  Kosovo	  crisis	  –	  agreed	  on	  a	  critical	  turn	  in	  EU	  ‘defence’	  at	  St.	  Malo	  in	  1998:	  
"the	   Union	   must	   have	   the	   capacity	   for	   autonomous	   action,	   backed	   by	   credible	   military	  
forces,	  the	  means	  to	  decide	  to	  use	  them,	  and	  the	  readiness	  to	  do	  so,	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  
international	  crises".	  	  
	  
To	  this	  end	  member	  states	  created	  a	  new	  institutional	  apparatus	  for	  CSDP	  almost	  from	  
scratch.	  Rather	  than	  putting	  the	  supranational	  EU	  bureaucracy	  in	  charge	  –	  i.e.	  the	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  in	  European	  Security	  and	  
Defence	  Policy.	  West	  European	  Politics,	  27	  (2):	  211–	  234.	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Commission	  –	  member	  states	  chose	  to	  create	  a	  support	  structure	  around	  the	  rather	  
intergovernmental	  Council	  Secretariat	  and	  the	  member	  states’	  Permanent	  
Representations.65	  This	  includes	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  bureaucratic	  bodies,	  such	  as	  the	  
Political	  and	  Security	  Committee	  (PSC),	  the	  EU	  Military	  Committee	  (EUMC),	  the	  EU	  
Military	  Staff	  (EUMS),	  the	  European	  Defence	  Agency	  (EDA),	  and	  various	  more.	  The	  
Petersberg	  Tasks	  –	  updated	  under	  the	  Headline	  Goal	  2010	  –	  specify	  the	  types	  of	  
engagements	  the	  EU	  would	  aim	  to	  undertake:	  ”joint	  disarmament	  operations,	  
humanitarian	  and	  rescue	  tasks,	  military	  advice	  and	  assistance	  tasks,	  conflict	  prevention	  
and	  peace-­‐keeping	  tasks,	  tasks	  of	  combat	  forces	  undertaken	  for	  crisis	  management,	  
including	  peace-­‐making	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  stabilisation”.66	  Operationally,	  the	  original	  
aspiration	  was	  to	  be	  able	  to	  field	  a	  European	  Rapid	  Reaction	  Force	  (ERRF),	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  
the	  Helsinki	  Headline	  Goal	  (HHG).67	  However,	  it	  quickly	  became	  clear	  that	  capability	  
development	  would	  not	  be	  forthcoming	  as	  quickly	  as	  hoped.	  Eventually,	  the	  ERRF	  was	  
substituted	  with	  the	  smaller,	  more	  flexible	  Battlegroups	  concept	  to	  allow	  for	  frequent,	  
parallel	  missions	  in	  distant	  theatres.	  The	  early	  culmination	  of	  this	  institutional	  progress,	  
however,	  came	  with	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  EU’s	  first	  operations	  in	  2003	  and	  the	  issuance	  of	  
the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  (ESS)	  in	  December	  that	  year.	  	  
The	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  drafted	  by	  then	  High	  Representative	  Javier	  
Solana	  was	  widely	  hailed	  as	  the	  most	  significant	  development	  in	  European	  security	  
policy	  since	  the	  setting	  up	  of	  the	  CFSP	  some	  ten	  years	  prior.	  Entitled	  ‘	  A	  Secure	  Europe	  in	  
a	  Better	  World’,	  the	  document	  provides	  the	  outlines	  for	  a	  more	  ‘active,	  capable,	  and	  
coherent’	  EU	  on	  the	  international	  stage.68	  The	  strategy	  represents	  a	  combination	  of	  
familiar	  truths	  –	  such	  as	  regarding	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  the	  transatlantic	  link,	  the	  
importance	  of	  international	  institutions	  and	  order,	  and	  the	  EU’s	  preoccupation	  with	  its	  
immediate	  neighbourhood	  –	  with	  a	  crucial	  new	  positioning	  of	  the	  EU.	  With	  respect	  to	  
the	  latter,	  what	  is	  arguably	  most	  remarkable	  about	  the	  document	  is	  the	  explicitly	  global	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Vanhoonacker,	  S.,	  Dijkstra,	  H.	  &	  Maurer,	  H.	  (2010).	  Understanding	  the	  Role	  of	  Bureaucracy	  in	  
the	  European	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy:	  The	  State	  of	  the	  Art,	  European	  Integration	  online	  
Papers,	  Special	  Issue	  1,	  Vol.	  14:	  1-­‐33.	  
66	  European	  Union	  (2007).	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  amending	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  
Treaty	  establishing	  the	  European	  Community.	  Lisbon,	  13	  December	  2007,	  Article	  28b.	  Official	  
Journal	  of	  the	  EU,	  C	  306,	  Volume	  50,	  17	  December	  2007.	  
67	  “Co-­‐operating	  voluntarily	  in	  EU-­‐led	  operations,	  Member	  States	  must	  be	  able,	  by	  2003,	  to	  
deploy	  within	  60	  days	  and	  sustain	  for	  at	  least	  one	  year	  military	  forces	  of	  up	  to	  50,000-­‐60,000	  
persons	  capable	  of	  the	  full	  range	  of	  Petersberg	  tasks”	  [stated	  in	  Article	  17	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  
European	  Union].	  
68	  European	  Council	  (2003).	  A	  Secure	  Europe	  in	  a	  Better	  World	  –	  European	  Security	  Strategy.	  
Brussels,	  12	  December	  2003.	  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf,	  
last	  accessed	  7	  June	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orientation	  of	  the	  strategy.	  The	  EU	  is	  held	  to	  be	  “inevitably	  a	  global	  player”	  that	  is	  
compelled	  to	  “share	  in	  the	  responsibility	  for	  global	  security	  and	  in	  building	  a	  better	  
world”.	  The	  key	  threats	  identified	  are	  terrorism,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  
destruction,	  regional	  conflicts,	  state	  failure,	  and	  organised	  crime.	  Most	  of	  these	  so-­‐
called	  ‘new’	  threats	  are	  transnational,	  indiscrete	  and	  dynamic	  in	  nature.	  Overall,	  the	  
European	  security	  landscape	  has	  become	  decidedly	  more	  complex	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War,	  and	  so	  have	  the	  challenges	  facing	  European	  nations.	  According	  to	  the	  
strategy,	  ”the	  European	  Union	  is	  particularly	  well-­‐equipped	  to	  respond	  to	  such	  multi-­‐
faceted	  situations”,	  propagating	  a	  vision	  of	  security	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  comprehensive	  
approach	  and	  works	  through	  ‘effective	  multilateralism’	  and	  ‘preventive	  engagement’.	  As	  
we	  will	  come	  to	  see,	  the	  ESS	  is	  a	  very	  broad	  document	  whose	  ‘strategic’	  purview	  is	  
limited.	  Its	  more	  imminent	  –	  and	  contentious	  –	  contribution	  to	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  was	  the	  
introduction	  and	  dispersion	  of	  strategy	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Subsequently,	  we	  can	  observe	  
the	  blossoming	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  ‘strategic’	  documents	  (both	  geographically	  and	  issue-­‐
based)	  as	  well	  as	  ‘strategic’	  partnerships	  (these	  will	  be	  critically	  evaluated	  in	  the	  
following	  chapter).	  
	   What	  exactly	  the	  CSDP	  and	  the	  ESS	  imply	  for	  the	  orientation	  of	  the	  EU	  on	  the	  
international	  stage	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  heated	  debate.	  For	  instance,	  while	  especially	  
in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  circles	  and	  academia	  we	  find	  the	  assertion	  that	  the	  CSDP	  and	  
ESS	  channel	  the	  EU’s	  global	  ambition	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  represents	  a	  soft	  balancing	  effort	  
against	  the	  United	  States69,	  this	  claim	  has	  been	  rather	  convincingly	  refuted.70	  A	  more	  
contentious	  issue	  has	  been	  whether	  this	  development	  heralds	  the	  militarisation	  of	  the	  
EU71,	  and	  if	  so	  what	  precisely	  we	  should	  understand	  by	  that.	  The	  small	  scale	  of	  the	  few	  
military	  missions	  the	  EU	  has	  undertaken	  throws	  that	  claim	  into	  doubt.	  However,	  in	  the	  
new	  discourse	  on	  the	  EU’s	  global	  role	  and	  responsibilities	  we	  can	  increasingly	  find	  the	  
terminology	  of	  geopolitics.	  The	  most	  explicit	  and	  ambitious	  thinking	  along	  these	  lines	  
advocates	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  ‘forward	  presence’	  for	  the	  EU	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
member	  states’	  overseas	  military	  installations.72	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  See	  Art,	  R.	  J.	  (2005).	  Striking	  the	  balance.	  International	  Security,	  30	  (3):	  177-­‐185.	  
Posen,	  B.	  (2006).	  European	  Union	  Security	  and	  Defense	  Policy:	  Response	  to	  Unipolarity?	  Security	  
Studies,	  15	  (2),	  pp.	  149-­‐86.	  
70	  Howorth,	  J.	  &	  Menon,	  A.	  (2009).	  Still	  Not	  Pushing	  Back:	  Why	  the	  European	  Union	  Is	  Not	  
Balancing	  the	  United	  States.	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution,	  53	  (5):	  727-­‐744.	  
71	  Manners,	  I.	  (2006).	  European	  Union	  ‘Normative	  Power’	  and	  the	  Security	  Challenge.	  European	  
Security,	  15:	  405-­‐421.	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  Rogers,	  J.	  (2011).	  A	  New	  Geography	  of	  European	  Power?	  EGMONT	  paper	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  EGMONT	  Royal	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  International	  Relations,	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   The	  qualitative	  shift	  of	  the	  ESS	  towards	  a	  more	  self-­‐interested,	  interest-­‐based,	  
assertive	  notion	  of	  actorness	  is	  obvious.	  It	  reflects	  a	  growing	  conviction	  that	  in	  order	  for	  
the	  EU	  to	  be	  a	  credible	  actor	  it	  must	  possess	  the	  full	  range	  of	  foreign	  policy	  instruments,	  
that	  is	  including	  military	  power.	  Consequently,	  the	  global	  power	  narrative	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  
focus	  on	  possession	  goals,	  which	  are	  formulated	  in	  a	  wide,	  global	  context.	  Policy	  
prescriptions	  are	  multisectoral	  (military,	  economic,	  diplomatic)	  and	  may	  be	  exercised	  
coercively.	  	  
	  
The	  following	  table	  summarises	  the	  previous	  discussion	  by	  outlining	  a	  rough	  typology	  of	  
EU	  power:	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Typology	  of	  EU	  power	  
Civilian/normative	  power	   Global	  power	  
Milieu	  goals	   Possession	  goals	  
(Universal)	  Values,	  norms	   (European)	  Interest	  
Cosmopolitan	  int’l	  order	   ‘Effective	  multilateralism’	  
Diplomatic;	  economic;	  cultural;	  
legalistic	  
Military;	  economic;	  diplomatic	  
Persuasion;	  exemplification;	  
transformation	  
Coercion;	  prevention;	  pre-­‐emption;	  	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  these	  ideal	  types	  are	  stylisations	  that	  may	  be	  
difficult	  to	  maintain	  when	  contrasted	  with	  empirical	  reality.	  Furthermore,	  the	  above	  
typology	  neglects	  a	  crucial	  dimension	  of	  EU	  security	  policy	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  
outside	  world.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Barbé	  &	  Kienzle,	  a	  distinction	  can	  be	  drawn	  with	  regard	  
to	  whether	  the	  EU	  functions	  as	  a	  security	  provider	  or	  a	  security	  consumer.73	  Whereas	  
the	  former	  reflects	  an	  integrated	  view	  of	  security	  –	  the	  security	  of	  others	  is	  connected	  
to	  one’s	  own	  security	  –	  the	  latter’s	  view	  of	  security	  is	  mostly	  self-­‐referential.	  Therefore,	  
a	  security	  provider	  cares	  about	  systemic	  stability,	  while	  a	  security	  consumer	  is	  primarily	  
motivated	  by	  his	  own	  parochial	  security	  concerns.	  The	  distinction	  is	  interesting	  because	  
it	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  way	  to	  situate	  the	  EU’s	  security	  policy	  –	  here	  specifically	  counter-­‐
piracy	  –	  in	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  international	  security.	  It	  also	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  fluidity	  of	  
EU	  power	  narratives.	  Whereas	  global	  power	  EU	  seems	  more	  representative	  of	  a	  security	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  Barbé,	  E.	  &	  Kienzle,	  B.	  (2007).	  Security	  Provider	  or	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  Union	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consumer	  approach,	  civilian	  power/normative	  power	  appears	  reflective	  of	  a	  security	  
provider	  approach.	  
	   We	  should	  also	  note	  that	  all	  of	  the	  narratives	  that	  are	  forwarded	  make	  a	  claim	  
to	  being	  relevant	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  While	  the	  ‘global	  power’	  narrative	  seems	  to	  imply	  
that	  it	  may	  be	  more	  ‘global’	  than	  the	  others,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  so.	  The	  civilian	  and	  
normative	  power	  objective	  of	  a	  cosmopolitan	  international	  order	  operates	  at	  the	  same	  
level	  as	  the	  global	  power	  idea	  of	  effective	  multilateralism.	  	  
	  
	  
2.4	  EU	  ‘multiple	  personality	  disorder’?	  
	  
That	  the	  characterisation	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  messy	  
affair	  should	  seem	  obvious	  by	  now:	  	  
“Pinning	  a	  single	  international	  identity	  on	  the	  EU	  is	  […]	  not	  easy:	  sometimes	  it	  appears	  
to	  be	  a	  civilian	  power,	  using	  persuasion	  to	  pursue	  milieu	  goals;	  at	  others	  it	  looks	  like	  a	  
power	  bloc,	  seeking	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  its	  geopolitical	  and	  economic	  interests;	  
occasionally	  the	  hybrid	  of	  civilian	  power	  and	  power	  bloc	  may	  also	  fit.	  But	  the	  EU	  also	  
seems	  to	  be	  flirting	  rather	  dangerously	  with	  failure	  and	  irrelevance”.74	  	  
	  
Possibly	  due	  to	  this,	  much	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  other	  questions	  of	  
European	  foreign	  policy,	  for	  instance	  the	  issue	  of	  effectiveness.75	  While	  this	  research	  is	  
very	  valuable	  in	  gaining	  deeper	  empirical	  knowledge	  of	  EU	  external	  action,	  it	  usually	  fails	  
to	  contribute	  to	  a	  better	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  the	  EU	  itself.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  EU	  
may	  be	  a	  sui	  generis	  actor	  remains	  and	  in	  this	  context	  we	  need	  to	  re-­‐assess	  notions	  of	  
EU	  power	  and	  actorness	  in	  the	  world,	  because	  it	  appreciates	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  
political	  entity	  still	  in	  the	  making,	  or,	  as	  it	  is	  sometimes	  put,	  “always	  becoming,	  never	  
being”.	  	  
The	  types	  of	  (grand)	  narratives	  displayed	  by	  ‘civilian	  power	  EU’	  or	  ‘global	  power	  
EU’	  do	  not	  merely	  reflect	  the	  nature	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  outcomes	  but	  in	  the	  first	  place	  
signal	  a	  specific	  self-­‐understanding	  and	  -­‐location	  in	  international	  relations.	  To	  criticise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Smith,	  K.	  E.	  (2008).	  European	  Union	  foreign	  policy	  in	  a	  changing	  world.	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  
p.	  240.	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  C.	  (2011).	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  Foreign	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  50	  (3):	  457-­‐474;	  Asseburg,	  M	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  Kempin,	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  (2009).	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  of	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such	  ideal-­‐types	  for	  not	  corresponding	  with	  empirical	  reality	  is	  a	  valid	  undertaking,	  
however,	  here	  it	  would	  miss	  the	  point	  of	  tracing	  and	  explicating	  such	  contradictions	  
between	  identity	  and	  behaviour.	  As	  actors	  disown	  or	  rationalise	  these	  contradictions	  in	  
an	  effort	  to	  maintain	  cognitive	  integrity	  –	  that	  is	  logical	  and	  normative	  continuity	  in	  the	  
constitutive	  narrative	  of	  their	  identity	  –	  or	  acknowledge	  and	  integrate	  such	  
contradictions	  into	  a	  newly	  emerging	  discourse	  of	  self-­‐identification,	  we	  come	  to	  
understand	  the	  utility	  of	  employing	  these	  power	  narratives	  as	  heuristic	  devices	  that	  
provide	  us	  with	  a	  grid	  onto	  which	  we	  can	  map	  the	  EU’s	  international	  action.	  
Tracing	  the	  evolution	  of	  EU	  power	  narratives	  it	  should	  seem	  clear	  that	  their	  
emergence	  is	  strongly	  contingent	  on	  the	  history	  of	  European	  integration	  itself,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  wider	  changes	  in	  the	  socioscape	  of	  European	  security.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  civilian	  power	  
narrative	  is	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  EU’s	  particular	  institutional	  development	  as	  it	  is	  with	  
its	  struggle	  to	  define	  for	  itself	  a	  place	  in	  a	  Cold	  War	  world	  of	  great	  power	  rivalry.	  The	  
same	  applies	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  ‘normative	  power’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
transformation	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  the	  1990s,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘global	  power’	  
towards	  the	  backdrop	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  While	  their	  emergence	  is	  highly	  
contingent,	  their	  endurance	  is	  persistent.	  Each	  of	  these	  ‘stories’	  of	  the	  EU’s	  power	  and	  
role	  continue	  to	  shape	  the	  expectations	  and	  objectives	  of	  policy-­‐makers.	  They	  all	  
suggest	  a	  type	  of	  linearity	  and	  purposefulness	  that	  guides	  EU	  action	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  
study	  seeks	  to	  disentangle	  how	  these	  different	  narratives	  achieve	  this	  guidance	  and	  how	  
they	  relate	  to	  each	  other.	  What	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  is	  that	  while	  a	  specific	  power	  
narrative	  may	  be	  dominant	  over	  others	  at	  any	  given	  point,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  
different	  narratives	  are	  necessarily	  mutually	  exclusive	  in	  so	  far	  as	  their	  practical	  
representation	  in	  official	  discourse	  is	  concerned.	  Larsen	  makes	  this	  point	  when	  he	  
argues	  that	  “whether	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  civilian	  power	  is	  a	  question	  of	  how	  it	  is	  conceptualized	  
in	  the	  dominant	  discourse”.76	  While	  this	  analytical	  feat	  may	  prove	  difficult	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  ascribing	  the	  empirical	  observations	  that	  follow	  from	  that,	  it	  again	  focuses	  our	  
attention	  on	  the	  fluidity	  of	  narratives.	  
The	  central	  EU	  power	  narratives	  that	  have	  been	  introduced	  here	  provide	  the	  
backdrop	  to	  my	  conceptual	  framework	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘management	  of	  
globalisation’	  and	  the	  subsequent	  empirical	  investigation	  of	  how	  Somali	  piracy	  has	  
emerged	  as	  an	  EU	  ‘security	  issue’,	  what	  material	  and	  ideational	  factors	  drive	  EU	  
counter-­‐piracy	  efforts,	  and	  how	  these	  reflect	  the	  EU’s	  international	  identity.	  Further,	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while	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  EU	  security	  oscillates	  between	  the	  geopolitical,	  global	  
power	  narrative	  and	  the	  ‘EU	  in	  crisis’	  narrative	  (in	  short,	  CSDP	  is	  meaningless	  and	  the	  EU	  
is	  doomed	  to	  irrelevance	  in	  international	  security),	  we	  will	  come	  to	  see	  that	  there	  is	  
substantial	  continuity	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  EU	  external	  action.	  However,	  this	  is	  illustrated	  
not	  by	  a	  dogmatic	  attachment	  to	  the	  grand	  narratives	  of	  EU	  power,	  but	  rather	  by	  
explicating	  the	  important	  relationship	  between	  structure	  and	  practice	  of	  EU	  security.	  	  
	  
	  
2.5	  Narratives,	  discourses	  and	  identities	  of	  security	  
	  
According	  to	  one	  prolific	  observer,	  EU	  security	  amounts	  to	  little	  more	  than	  “cheap	  talk	  
and	  empty	  slogans”.77	  And	  while	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  EU	  security	  activity	  does	  not	  
measure	  up	  to	  the	  grand	  designs	  and	  expectations	  that	  are	  frequently	  invoked	  to	  this	  
end,	  it	  is	  precisely	  in	  the	  semiotic	  structures	  of	  EU	  security	  that	  we	  can	  find	  revealing	  
answers	  to	  questions	  and	  contradictions.	  After	  all,	  any	  specific	  foreign	  and	  security	  
policy	  depends	  upon	  the	  representations	  of	  the	  objects	  it	  pertains	  to,	  such	  as	  the	  
specific	  threat,	  security	  crisis,	  or	  country.	  It	  follows	  that:	  
“foreign	  policies	  need	  to	  ascribe	  meaning	  to	  the	  situation	  and	  to	  construct	  the	  objects	  
within	  it,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  they	  articulate	  and	  draw	  upon	  specific	  identities	  of	  other	  
states,	  regions,	  peoples,	  and	  institutions	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  national,	  regional,	  
or	  institutional	  Self”.78	  
	  
Although	  this	  study	  does	  not	  present	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  discourse	  analysis	  but	  
rather	  aims	  at	  a	  pragmatic	  yet	  critical	  analysis	  of	  EU	  security	  as	  reflected	  in	  the	  material	  
and	  ideational	  dimensions	  of	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy,	  it	  still	  seeks	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  validity	  
as	  a	  further	  theoretical	  and	  analytical	  step	  towards	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  
practice	  of	  EU	  security.	  The	  underlying	  rationale	  here	  is	  to	  gain	  a	  clearer	  view	  of	  what	  
constitutes	  the	  self	  for	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  international	  context.	  Implicit	  in	  this	  endeavour	  is	  
the	  goal	  to	  render	  more	  explicit	  the	  perceived	  others	  of	  EU	  security.	  By	  clearly	  
demarcating	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  self	  and	  the	  other	  can	  we	  appreciate	  the	  relational	  
quality	  of	  identity.	  For	  example,	  to	  call	  something	  ‘modern’	  simultaneously	  means	  
calling	  something	  else	  ‘backwards’.	  There	  is	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  such	  geographical,	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chronological	  and	  political	  juxtapositions	  that	  construct	  identities	  for	  various	  objects	  of	  
international	  life.79	  	  
While	  officials	  engaged	  in	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  derive	  their	  formal	  authority	  
from	  their	  privileged	  institutional	  position,	  their	  ability	  to	  create	  authority	  for	  
themselves	  also	  rests	  in	  their	  particular	  expertise,	  that	  is	  their	  ability	  to	  demonstrate	  
knowledge	  on	  a	  specific	  foreign	  policy	  matter.	  Accordingly,	  knowledge	  is	  an	  important	  
source	  of	  authority.	  It	  does	  not	  rest	  exclusively	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  policy	  speech,	  as	  other	  
genres	  –	  foremost	  academic	  analysis	  and	  journalistic	  reporting	  –	  also	  lay	  claim	  to	  
authority.80	  Which	  genre	  produces	  acceptable	  knowledge	  remains	  a	  question	  for	  
empirical	  investigation.	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  speech	  when	  grounded	  in	  authority	  creates	  
meaning.	  This	  meaning	  becomes	  most	  intelligible	  when	  framed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  narrative.	  	  	  
	   The	  previous	  discussion	  of	  the	  various	  EU	  power	  narratives	  should	  give	  the	  
reader	  an	  impression	  of	  the	  link	  between	  EU	  interests/values	  and	  the	  behavioural	  traits	  
of	  actorness	  as	  well	  as	  how	  this	  is	  situated	  both	  spatially	  and	  temporally	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  international	  relations.	  Narrative	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  framing	  of	  action	  and	  
power	  rather	  than	  action	  or	  power	  as	  substantive	  categories.	  Therefore,	  it	  does	  not	  
claim	  to	  specify	  that	  EU	  security	  and	  identity	  is	  one	  thing	  or	  another.	  Quite	  to	  the	  
contrary,	  	  
“narrative	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  how	  ‘this’	  or	  ‘that’	  formulation	  of	  European	  security	  
and	  identity	  coexist;	  how	  categories	  of	  meaning	  and	  principles	  of	  action	  such	  as	  security,	  
strategy	  or	  identity	  are	  transformed;	  how	  practices	  move	  between	  contradictory	  logics	  
of	  action,	  and	  how	  contradictory	  discourses	  formulated	  by	  security	  actors	  are	  
reconciled”.81	  	  	  
	  
The	  notion	  of	  narratives	  directs	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  internal	  features	  of	  the	  stories	  the	  
EU	  tells	  about	  itself	  as	  an	  international	  actor.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  unpack	  this	  story-­‐telling,	  we	  should	  turn	  to	  the	  analytical	  insights	  of	  
discourse	  theory.	  Discourse	  analysis	  is	  now	  a	  well-­‐established	  method	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  
International	  Relations	  and	  European	  Studies.82	  This	  also	  extends	  to	  the	  study	  of	  EU	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  F.	  (2007).	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  of	  Security:	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  (pp.	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  193.	  
82	  See	  Hansen,	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  War.	  London:	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  D.	  &	  Torfing,	  J.	  (2005).	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  Politics:	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and	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  New	  York:	  Palgrave;	  Milliken,	  J.	  (1999).	  The	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  of	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Relations:	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  European	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  International	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  5	  (2):	  
225-­‐254;	  Mole,	  R.	  (2007).	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  of	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  Politics.	  Basingstoke:	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foreign	  policy.	  For	  instance,	  Larsen	  provides	  an	  instructive	  overview	  of	  how	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  
international	  actor	  is	  constructed	  through	  discursive	  practices.83	  While	  there	  are	  
significant	  differences	  within	  the	  field	  of	  discourse	  theory,	  there	  exists	  a	  centre	  ground	  
which	  most	  approaches	  share,	  captured	  by	  the	  widespread	  agreement	  that	  discourse	  
represents	  a	  “form	  of	  social	  practice”	  that	  operates	  in	  a	  co-­‐constitutive	  fashion	  as	  it	  is	  
not	  only	  produced	  by	  social	  structures	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  reproduces	  these	  same	  
structures.84	  In	  the	  broadest	  sense	  then,	  discourses	  are	  framings	  of	  meaning	  and	  lenses	  
of	  interpretation.	  
Discourse	  theory	  proposes	  that	  social	  phenomena	  are	  never	  complete,	  finished.	  
Instead,	  identities	  are	  always	  open	  to	  contestation	  and	  reformulation	  as	  the	  social	  
struggle	  over	  ‘meaning’	  rages	  on.	  However,	  it	  is	  precisely	  those	  attempts	  at	  fixing	  
meaning	  through	  the	  formulation	  and	  imposition	  of	  hegemony	  (i.e.	  by	  excluding	  all	  
other	  possible	  meanings)	  where	  discourse	  theory	  finds	  its	  point	  of	  departure.	  Some	  
practical	  considerations	  arise	  out	  of	  this	  discussion	  of	  discourse.	  First,	  discourse	  analysis	  
aims	  at	  uncovering	  how	  texts	  imbue	  the	  author	  with	  authority	  and	  construct	  subjects	  
and	  objects	  through	  representations.	  Second,	  the	  discourse	  analyst’s	  task	  is	  to	  unpack	  
the	  organisation	  of	  objects	  into	  narratives	  to	  illuminate	  the	  power	  relations	  that	  give	  the	  
text	  structure.	  In	  the	  study	  of	  EU	  security	  this	  means	  conceiving	  of	  power	  as	  something	  
in	  language	  rather	  than	  behind	  language.	  	  
There	  remains	  much	  disagreement	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  discourse,	  specifically	  
regarding	  the	  boundaries	  of	  language	  and	  material	  ‘reality’.	  The	  standard	  Foucaultian	  
conceptualisation	  of	  discourse	  seeks	  to	  make	  intelligible	  the	  “practices	  that	  form	  the	  
objects	  of	  which	  they	  speak”	  85,	  however,	  this	  “understanding	  of	  discourse	  remains	  
“conceptually	  vague	  regarding	  extra-­‐linguistic	  practice”.86	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  try	  to	  
provide	  a	  more	  meaningful	  conceptualisation	  of	  discourse	  by	  accounting	  for	  both	  “the	  
linguistic	  and	  the	  behavioral	  aspects	  of	  social	  practice”.87	  Their	  understanding	  of	  
discourse	  is	  thus	  much	  broader,	  encompassing	  the	  entirety	  of	  social	  space.	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  Reconsidering	  the	  concept	  of	  discourse	  for	  the	  field	  of	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  Political	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Further,	  discourse	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  other	  concepts	  of	  linguistics,	  
such	  as	  ‘text’,	  ‘language’	  or	  ‘ideology’.	  The	  difference	  exists	  in	  that	  a	  text	  is	  a	  central	  part	  
of	  any	  discourse,	  but	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  complemented	  by	  its	  two	  other	  operative	  parts,	  
namely	  interaction	  and	  social	  context.	  For	  instance,	  a	  single	  text	  cannot	  constitute	  a	  
discourse	  as	  it	  merely	  represents	  a	  unit	  of	  analysis	  through	  which	  discursive	  structures	  
become	  intelligible	  –	  but	  not	  the	  overall	  discourse	  itself.	  Instead,	  the	  text	  must	  be	  linked	  
to	  other	  texts	  –	  this	  intertextuality	  locates	  the	  meaning	  of	  texts	  between	  them.88	  This	  is	  
usually	  done	  in	  the	  form	  of	  direct	  quotes	  or	  by	  co-­‐opting	  key	  concepts	  and	  
catchphrases.89	  
A	  brief	  look	  at	  some	  of	  the	  accounts	  employing	  discourse	  analysis	  in	  European	  
foreign	  policy	  shows	  that	  the	  approach’s	  input	  has	  been	  rather	  half-­‐hearted	  and	  
insufficient.	  For	  instance,	  Stuart	  Croft’s	  account	  of	  how	  different	  discourses	  regarding	  
the	  organisation	  of	  the	  European	  security	  architecture	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  vied	  for	  
hegemony	  demonstrates	  the	  central	  role	  of	  discourses	  in	  producing	  the	  social	  structures	  
that	  constitute	  the	  space	  of	  European	  security.90	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  ‘shallow’	  
constructivism	  that	  Croft	  employs,	  it	  remains	  dubious	  whether	  it	  was	  indeed	  ‘ideas’	  
rather	  than	  ‘interests’	  that	  were	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  process	  that	  established	  NATO	  as	  
the	  pre-­‐eminent	  security	  organisation	  in	  Europe.	  This	  also	  points	  to	  a	  problem	  
previously	  mentioned	  regarding	  constructivism,	  namely	  the	  dissociation	  of	  ideas	  from	  
interests.	  Whereas	  one	  may	  argue	  that	  they	  should	  be	  treated	  analytically	  discrete	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  clear	  observable	  implications,	  more	  often	  than	  not	  the	  
division	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  they	  must	  be	  competing	  explanatory	  factors.	  We	  can	  
observe	  a	  similar	  shortcoming	  in	  Jolyon	  Howorth’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  epistemic	  
communities	  in	  CSDP.91	  He	  argues	  that	  policy	  elites	  constructed	  a	  new	  discourse	  on	  
European	  security,	  thereby	  facilitating	  the	  CSDP.	  He	  maintains	  that	  initial	  differences	  in	  
interests	  could	  be	  smoothed	  over	  by	  constructive	  ambiguity	  as	  long	  as	  there	  was	  a	  
common	  commitment	  to	  the	  actual	  paradigm	  shift	  towards	  CSDP.	  Although	  Howorth	  
claims	  that	  ideas	  play	  a	  central	  role,	  he	  subordinates	  them	  to	  interests	  in	  saying	  that	  the	  
former	  must	  be	  reflective	  of	  the	  latter.	  Again,	  what	  we	  often	  find	  applied	  to	  European	  
foreign	  policy	  is	  a	  ‘shallow’	  constructivism	  that	  does	  not	  take	  its	  own	  supposed	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explanatory	  power	  of	  ideas	  seriously,	  or	  due	  to	  methodological	  reasons	  sees	  the	  need	  to	  
juxtapose	  ideas	  and	  interests	  (see	  ‘conventional	  constructivism’).	  	  
Arguably,	  the	  most	  consequential	  application	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  in	  EU	  foreign	  
policy	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Lene	  Hansen’s	  work	  on	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  It	  departs	  from	  more	  
shallow	  approaches	  in	  that	  it	  rejects	  the	  positivistic	  causal	  theorising	  found	  therein,	  
instead	  emphasising	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  co-­‐constitutive	  construction	  of	  meaning	  in	  
the	  formation	  and	  reformulation	  of	  identity.	  She	  puts	  the	  issue	  thus:	  
“representations	  of	  identity	  and	  policy	  are	  linked	  through	  discourse,	  but	  […]	  they	  do	  not	  
stand	  in	  a	  causal	  relationship	  with	  one	  another	  as	  representations	  of	  identity	  are	  
simultaneously	  the	  precondition	  for	  and	  (re)produced	  through	  articulations	  of	  policy”.92	  	  
	  
While	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  this	  study	  to	  conduct	  a	  thorough	  post-­‐structural	  
discourse	  analysis	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Hansen’s	  work,	  it	  is	  the	  stated	  intention	  to	  provide	  a	  
critical	  vantage	  point	  unto	  the	  self/other	  dichotomy	  of	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy,	  and	  how	  this	  
informs	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  EU’s	  identity	  as	  an	  international	  actor.	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  L.	  (2006).	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As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  essential	  dividing	  line	  between	  the	  two	  
major	  competing	  grand	  strategic	  narratives	  –	  civilian/normative	  power	  vs.	  global	  power	  
–	  can	  be	  concisely	  summarised	  in	  terms	  of	  ends	  and	  means:	  are	  the	  values/interests	  
that	  motivate	  EU	  security	  policy	  other-­‐	  or	  self-­‐regarding	  (milieu	  vs.	  possession	  goals),	  
and	  are	  these	  pursued	  by	  means	  of	  persuasion	  or	  coercion?	  However,	  while	  it	  seems	  
that	  these	  narratives	  do	  provide	  useful	  frames	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  situate	  and	  assess	  what	  
the	  EU	  does	  on	  the	  international	  scene,	  there	  has	  emerged	  a	  consensus	  in	  the	  academy	  
that	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  suffers	  from	  a	  structural	  malaise	  at	  its	  very	  heart,	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘strategic	  deficit’.	  As	  previously	  explored	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  EU	  power,	  the	  rise	  of	  
‘strategy’	  seems	  intimately	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  newly	  emergent	  narrative	  of	  EU	  global	  
power,	  and	  it	  has	  become	  a	  pervasive	  term	  in	  EU	  foreign	  policy.	  However,	  as	  much	  as	  
the	  term	  has	  been	  used,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  abused.	  	  
The	  issuance	  of	  the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  in	  December	  2003	  was	  widely	  
hailed	  as	  a	  milestone	  in	  EU	  foreign	  policy,	  a	  modest	  but	  crucial	  element	  in	  galvanising	  
the	  EU’s	  external	  dimension	  and	  its	  recognition	  in	  the	  world.	  Ten	  years	  on,	  commentary	  
on	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  has	  become	  overwhelmingly	  
bleak.	  By	  some	  accounts	  the	  EU	  is	  doomed	  to	  irrelevance93,	  and	  the	  presumed	  
workhorse	  of	  its	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  identity	  as	  a	  global	  player	  –	  the	  CSDP	  –	  is	  said	  to	  be	  
“dead	  in	  the	  water”94,	  or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  in	  a	  state	  of	  disarray.95	  There	  exists	  a	  myriad	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  G.	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  logical	  choice.	  Financial	  Times	  Online,	  19	  May	  2008.	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  19	  September	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  last	  accessed	  14	  June	  2013.	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  A.	  (2011).	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  Institutions	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  the	  CSDP:	  The	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  of	  Institutionalist	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Journal	  of	  Common	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  49	  (1):	  83-­‐100;	  interview	  with	  N.	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of	  studies	  that	  identify	  a	  lack	  of	  strategy	  –	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  strategic	  ‘deficit’	  or	  
‘void’	  –	  as	  the	  core	  impediment	  to	  the	  effective	  delivery	  of	  EU	  crisis	  management	  
policy.96	  While	  these	  accounts	  differ	  in	  the	  focus	  of	  their	  critiques,	  they	  all	  share	  the	  
underlying	  theme	  that	  in	  EU	  security	  policy	  there	  persists	  an	  inflationary	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘strategy’,	  and	  little	  specification	  as	  to	  what	  it	  actually	  signifies.	  Arguably	  the	  excessive	  
invocation	  of	  ‘strategy’	  is	  a	  malaise	  that	  troubles	  the	  entire	  international	  relations	  
discipline.	  97	  It	  seems	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  commentators	  of	  CSDP	  are	  set	  to	  make	  their	  
contribution	  in	  this	  regard.	  If	  we	  conceive	  of	  strategy	  as	  connecting	  long-­‐term	  priority	  
goals	  with	  adequate	  instruments	  and	  resources	  to	  achieve	  these,98	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  
that	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  is	  regularly	  invoked	  as	  a	  fundamental	  critique	  of	  EU	  security	  
policy.	  
What	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  widespread	  disaffection	  with	  EU	  foreign	  policy?	  In	  
the	  following	  the	  chapter	  with	  outline	  the	  constitutive	  features	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  
deficit.	  First,	  CSDP	  suffers	  from	  a	  lack	  and	  clarity	  of	  priorities.	  It	  remains	  dubious	  for	  
what	  reasons	  and	  where	  the	  EU	  sees	  it	  most	  prescient	  to	  act.	  This	  arbitrariness	  of	  action	  
is	  reflective	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  a	  shared	  strategic	  culture	  at	  EU	  level,	  as	  member	  states	  
often	  continue	  to	  view	  EU	  security	  through	  national	  lenses.	  Second,	  the	  CSDP	  lacks	  
resources	  and	  employs	  mismatched	  instruments,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  action	  is	  stifled	  
before	  it	  can	  be	  embarked	  upon.	  Third,	  CSDP	  produces	  disjointed	  outputs.	  Missions	  may	  
selectively	  fulfil	  certain	  security	  goals,	  however,	  there	  is	  usually	  no	  elaboration	  of	  how	  a	  
given	  mission	  responds	  to	  a	  particular	  ‘European’	  security	  interest.	  	  
Through	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  EU’s	  strategic	  deficit,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  
delineate	  and	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  specific	  contradictions	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  (the	  study	  of)	  
EU	  security	  policy.	  While	  the	  offered	  critiques	  are	  generally	  valid	  in	  their	  line	  of	  
argumentation	  they	  are	  also	  somewhat	  misleading	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  imply	  that	  an	  
international	  actor	  that	  is	  structurally	  highly	  different	  from	  nation-­‐states	  should	  have	  a	  
developed	  strategic	  rationale	  at	  its	  disposal.	  This	  “crypto-­‐normative	  attachment	  to	  the	  
state”	  is	  the	  source	  of	  much	  conceptual	  and	  analytical	  confusion	  in	  the	  study	  of	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European	  security	  in	  general.99	  Further,	  the	  quantitative,	  economic	  language	  of	  deficit	  
that	  is	  often	  invoked	  in	  this	  context	  is	  descriptive	  of	  a	  shortage	  of	  political	  will	  and	  
material	  resources,	  however,	  it	  ignores	  the	  structural	  inhibitions	  of	  CSDP	  that	  are	  rooted	  
in	  the	  integration	  process	  itself.	  	  
	  
	  
3.1	  Unclear	  priorities	  and	  a	  weak	  strategic	  culture	  
	  
At	  its	  core,	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  hints	  at	  a	  lack	  of	  purpose,	  as	  the	  question	  ‘to	  do	  what	  in	  
the	  world’	  remains	  unanswered.	  What	  are	  the	  EU’s	  (security)	  interests	  in	  the	  world?	  
Which	  interest	  has	  priority	  over	  the	  other?	  To	  answer	  these	  questions	  the	  EU’s	  core	  
strategic	  document,	  the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  (ESS),	  provides	  some	  useful	  clues,	  
yet	  ultimately	  comes	  up	  short,	  as	  it	  “tells	  us	  how	  to	  do	  things,	  but	  not	  what	  to	  do”.100	  
While	  it	  was	  widely	  welcomed	  as	  an	  important	  step	  to	  rationalise	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  
action,	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  strategic	  document	  followed	  quickly	  and	  have	  only	  become	  
louder.101	  	  
A	  look	  at	  the	  2008	  Report	  on	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  European	  Security	  
Strategy	  (RI-­‐ESS),	  which	  was	  meant	  to	  make	  the	  objectives	  and	  promises	  of	  the	  2003	  
document	  operative,	  illustrates	  the	  failure	  in	  strategic	  clarification.102	  Although	  the	  RI-­‐
ESS’	  original	  purpose	  was	  the	  crucial	  and	  previously	  sidelined	  issue	  of	  implementation,	  it	  
complicated	  the	  issue	  of	  prioritisation	  by	  adding	  cyber	  security,	  energy	  security	  and	  
climate	  change	  to	  the	  list	  of	  threats,	  while	  seemingly	  taking	  failed	  states	  and	  regional	  
conflict	  off	  it.	  This	  in	  itself	  is	  confusing	  and	  it	  aggravates	  the	  persistent	  problem	  evident	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  matching	  capabilities	  and	  instruments	  of	  intervention	  to	  specific	  crisis	  
scenarios,	  and	  the	  ordering	  of	  these	  in	  terms	  of	  importance,	  both	  functionally	  and	  
geographically.	  Strategic	  prioritisation	  requires	  the	  EU	  to	  state	  clearly	  for	  what,	  where,	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and	  how	  it	  would	  put	  to	  use	  the	  various	  foreign	  policy	  instruments	  at	  its	  disposal.103	  
While	  the	  EU	  does	  have	  relevant	  policy	  prescriptions	  as	  to	  making	  strategy	  operative	  –	  
see	  especially	  the	  Helsinki	  Headline	  Goal	  and	  the	  2010	  Headline	  Goal	  with	  regard	  to	  
capability	  development	  –	  we	  will	  come	  to	  see	  that	  these	  are	  defunct	  as	  well.	  Overall,	  the	  
EU’s	  security	  strategy	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  strategic	  concept	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  its	  
member	  states	  or	  NATO	  possess.104	  	  
A	  similar	  shortcoming	  in	  depth	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  EU’s	  strategic	  
partnerships,	  which	  cuts	  directly	  into	  the	  idea	  of	  effective	  multilateralism	  advocated	  by	  
the	  ESS.	  Reflective	  of	  its	  political	  ambition	  to	  become	  a	  global	  actor,	  the	  EU	  has	  
negotiated	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  partnerships	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  international	  actors.	  
Apart	  from	  Europe’s	  traditional	  partners	  such	  as	  the	  US,	  Canada	  and	  NATO,	  the	  EU	  has	  
signed	  agreements	  with	  Brazil,	  China,	  India,	  Japan,	  Mexico,	  Russia	  and	  South	  Africa,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  African	  Union.	  The	  major	  problem	  with	  the	  EU’s	  strategic	  partnerships	  is	  the	  
fact	  that	  they	  are	  undeserving	  in	  name.105	  For	  example,	  with	  regard	  to	  Russia	  and	  China,	  
two	  increasingly	  assertive	  international	  powers,	  the	  partnerships	  are	  undermined	  by	  
widespread	  member	  state	  disagreement	  regarding	  the	  scope	  and	  nature	  of	  cooperation,	  
as	  well	  as	  a	  disconnect	  between	  EU	  bilateralism	  and	  member	  state	  bilateral	  
relationships.106	  Further,	  in	  order	  to	  render	  the	  idea	  of	  effective	  multilateralism	  
meaningful	  the	  strategic	  partnerships	  need	  to	  be	  functionalised	  in	  line	  with	  foreign	  
policy	  priorities.107	  Since	  these	  remain	  rather	  blurry	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  ESS	  does	  not	  
provide	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  plan	  regarding	  how	  to	  organise	  these	  relationships	  with	  the	  
partners	  it	  identifies.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  clearly	  elaborated	  strategic	  priorities	  reflects	  the	  weakness	  of	  a	  
common	  strategic	  culture	  at	  EU	  level.	  Numerous	  studies	  have	  occupied	  themselves	  with	  
the	  question	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  EU	  possesses	  or	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
constructing	  a	  strategic	  culture,	  and	  the	  tacit	  consensus	  is	  that	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  tell.	  
According	  to	  Christoph	  Meyer,	  European	  strategic	  culture	  denotes	  the	  “ideas,	  norms	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and	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  that	  are	  shared	  across	  the	  actors	  and	  publics	  involved	  in	  the	  
processes	  of	  pursuing	  European	  security	  and	  defence	  policies”.108	  The	  breadth	  of	  the	  
definition	  is	  telling	  as	  it	  indicates	  that	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  workable	  it	  must	  be	  inclusive.	  
Contrast	  this	  later	  definition	  with	  an	  earlier	  one	  –	  more	  substantive	  and	  narrow	  –	  
provided	  by	  Cornish	  and	  Edwards	  at	  the	  time	  when	  CSDP’s	  institutionalisation	  was	  still	  
in	  its	  infancy,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  the	  role	  of	  military	  force	  in	  Europe	  was	  the	  crucial	  
topic.	  	  
“The	  institutional	  confidence	  and	  processes	  to	  manage	  and	  deploy	  military	  force	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  accepted	  range	  of	  legitimate	  and	  effective	  policy	  instruments,	  together	  with	  
general	  recognition	  of	  the	  EU’s	  legitimacy	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  with	  military	  
capabilities.”	  109	  
	  
The	  more	  inclusive	  definition	  has	  meant	  that	  agreement	  is	  possible	  on	  the	  
notion	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  convergence	  between	  the	  strategic	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  of	  
European	  states	  is	  taking	  place;	  however,	  the	  reality	  of	  which	  is	  limited	  and	  incoherent.	  
For	  instance,	  Meyer	  observes	  that	  normative	  convergence	  towards	  a	  shared	  European	  
strategic	  culture	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  so	  far	  as	  territorial	  defence	  is	  decreasing	  in	  
importance	  across	  European	  states,	  intervention	  for	  humanitarian	  reasons	  is	  becoming	  
the	  benchmark	  for	  European	  action,	  UN	  authorisation	  is	  considered	  crucial,	  and	  the	  EU	  
is	  increasingly	  identified	  as	  the	  appropriate	  forum	  for	  cooperation.	  Differences	  remain,	  
however,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  use	  of	  force	  abroad	  (especially	  with	  reference	  to	  dealing	  with	  
threats	  pre-­‐emptively),	  the	  ambiguous	  future	  of	  NATO	  and	  attachment	  to	  the	  US,	  and	  
the	  critical	  issue	  of	  the	  acceptability	  of	  casualties	  as	  a	  result	  of	  European	  intervention.110	  
Bastian	  Giegerich	  arrives	  at	  the	  same	  conclusion	  when	  pointing	  to	  three	  major	  cleavages	  
among	  CSDP	  members.111	  The	  first	  exists	  between	  so-­‐called	  Europeanists	  and	  
Atlanticists,	  rooted	  in	  member	  states’	  respective	  preference	  to	  conduct	  collective	  
security	  via	  different	  institutional	  venues,	  i.e.	  NATO	  or	  CSDP.	  The	  second	  divide	  centres	  
on	  the	  preferred	  type	  of	  intervention,	  separating	  those	  countries	  that	  more	  willingly	  
advocate	  military	  solutions	  and	  those	  that	  prefer	  civilian	  means.	  The	  third	  cleavage	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concerns	  the	  underlying	  conception	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  military,	  that	  is	  whether	  the	  CSDP	  
should	  serve	  the	  ends	  of	  territorial	  defence	  or	  force	  projection.	  As	  there	  is	  no	  
overarching	  agreement	  as	  to	  shared	  European	  security	  interests	  and	  member	  states	  are	  
expectedly	  unwilling	  to	  integrate	  military	  forces	  under	  a	  supranational	  authority,	  policy	  
follows	  a	  pattern	  of	  ad	  hoc,	  selective	  engagements	  that	  strains	  member	  state	  cohesion.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  fact	  that	  member	  states	  continue	  to	  widely	  disagree	  on	  priorities	  
let	  alone	  an	  overarching	  teleology	  of	  CSDP	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  they	  differ	  in	  their	  security	  interests,	  preferences	  and	  identities,	  the	  most	  
significant	  and	  lasting	  distinction	  constituted	  by	  their	  different	  views	  towards	  the	  
concept	  of	  defence	  itself.112	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  creation	  of	  credible	  if	  modest	  military	  
structures	  and	  resources	  at	  EU	  level	  indicates	  a	  convergence	  of	  member	  states	  around	  
the	  notion	  of	  crisis	  management.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  as	  national	  military	  
institutions	  remain	  highly	  distinct,	  what	  exactly	  crisis	  management	  entails	  continues	  to	  
be	  interpreted	  through	  national	  security	  lenses,	  supporting	  the	  notion	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  
single	  ‘European’	  way	  of	  war”.113	  It	  follows	  that	  “if	  the	  EU	  cannot	  have	  an	  open	  
discussion	  about	  areas	  of	  interest	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	  see	  how	  the	  EU	  can	  achieve	  an	  adequate	  calculus	  of	  military	  needs.114	  Consequently,	  




3.2	  Lacking	  resources	  and	  mismatched	  instruments	  
	  
Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  institutional	  politics,	  a	  look	  at	  the	  ‘means’	  of	  CSDP	  in	  the	  
forms	  of	  resources	  –	  particularly	  military	  assets	  –	  and	  operational	  instruments	  is	  
necessary.	  The	  readiness	  of	  European	  armed	  forces	  for	  EU	  crisis	  management	  
operations	  may	  be	  called	  into	  question	  from	  the	  outset,	  especially	  if	  seen	  towards	  the	  
background	  of	  persistently	  low	  levels	  of	  defence	  spending	  and	  thinly-­‐stretched	  troops	  
already	  engaged	  in	  other	  multilateral	  missions.	  This	  picture	  is	  further	  compounded	  by	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current	  fiscal	  austerity	  measures	  that	  have	  led	  to	  severe	  cuts	  in	  European	  militaries	  
across	  the	  board.	  All	  this	  combines	  to	  “the	  EU’s	  failure	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  defence	  
ambitions	  and	  commitments	  on	  capabilities”.116	  	  
EU	  shortcomings	  in	  capability	  development	  are	  particularly	  pronounced	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  enablers,	  such	  as	  airlift,	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  re-­‐fuelling,	  and	  C4ISR	  
(Command,	  Control,	  Communications,	  Computers,	  Intelligence,	  Surveillance	  and	  
Reconnaissance).	  The	  dismal	  story	  of	  the	  Airbus	  A400M	  military	  transport	  aircraft	  is	  
certainly	  the	  most	  intensively	  media-­‐covered	  disappointment	  of	  EU	  capability	  
development,	  but	  it	  reflects	  a	  wider	  trend	  of	  shortfalls	  that	  has	  been	  identified	  in	  the	  
2010	  Headline	  Goal.	  Even	  as	  limited	  operational	  capability	  was	  starting	  to	  become	  a	  
reality	  in	  2007,	  the	  EU	  remained	  unable	  to	  address	  the	  crucial	  strategic	  question:	  “how	  
many	  concurrent	  operations,	  at	  which	  scale	  and	  at	  which	  level	  of	  intensity	  does	  the	  EU	  
want	  to	  be	  able	  to	  implement	  […]?”.117	  	  
Tracing	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  CSDP’s	  primary	  crisis	  management	  mechanisms	  
provides	  a	  telling	  illustration	  of	  the	  disconnect	  between	  ends	  and	  means.	  In	  order	  to	  
equip	  the	  CSDP	  with	  the	  necessary	  punch	  to	  respond	  to	  crisis	  situations,	  member	  states	  
agreed	  under	  the	  Helsinki	  Headline	  Goal	  (HHG)	  in	  December	  1999	  to	  create	  the	  
European	  Rapid	  Reaction	  Force	  (ERRF),	  allowing	  for	  the	  deployment	  of	  up	  to	  60,000	  
troops	  within	  sixty	  days	  and	  for	  a	  period	  of	  up	  to	  one	  year.	  In	  many	  respects	  this	  idea	  
resembled	  NATO’s	  Implementation	  Force	  (IFOR),	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  operational	  mandate	  
and	  force	  size/composition.	  The	  Balkan	  wars	  of	  the	  1990s	  are	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  
foundational	  crisis	  of	  CSDP,	  and	  thus	  a	  crisis	  management	  delivery	  mechanism	  to	  
respond	  to	  such	  a	  scenario	  was	  considered	  necessary.118	  	  
However,	  as	  political	  progress	  on	  establishing	  such	  a	  large	  force	  was	  not	  
forthcoming,	  the	  ERRF	  made	  way	  for	  the	  new	  Battlegroups	  concept,	  which	  has	  since	  
become	  the	  CSDP’s	  intended	  core	  instrument	  of	  intervention.	  It	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  
Franco-­‐British	  summit	  at	  Le	  Touquet	  in	  February	  2003,	  was	  further	  formalised	  in	  
November	  2003	  with	  the	  participation	  of	  Germany,	  and	  formally	  adopted	  by	  the	  
member	  states	  in	  June	  2004	  as	  part	  of	  the	  2010	  Headline	  Goal.119	  The	  Battlegroups	  were	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established	  with	  a	  close	  eye	  towards	  NATO’s	  Response	  Force	  (NRF),	  which	  was	  endorsed	  
in	  November	  2002.	  The	  Battlegroups	  make	  use	  of	  NATO	  certification	  requirements	  to	  
ensure	  interoperability	  and	  military	  effectiveness,	  and	  mirror	  the	  NRF	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
overarching	  objective	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  armed	  forces	  as	  well	  as	  pertaining	  to	  a	  
similar	  spectrum	  of	  tasks	  in	  crisis	  management.120	  However,	  the	  NRF	  was	  originally	  
designed	  for	  considerably	  more	  extensive	  operations	  than	  the	  Battlegroups.	  In	  terms	  of	  
the	  specific	  operational	  profile	  –	  size,	  capabilities,	  timeframe	  and	  requirements	  –	  the	  
Battlegroups	  reflect	  the	  mission	  parameters	  of	  the	  CSDP	  operation	  Artemis	  in	  the	  DRC	  in	  
2003.121	  Artemis	  itself	  was	  largely	  modelled	  on	  the	  UN	  Protection	  Force	  (UNPROFOR)	  in	  
the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  in	  1992	  regarding	  the	  elements	  of	  its	  rapid	  response	  
mechanism.122	  	  
Instead	  of	  the	  ERRF’s	  60,000-­‐troop	  composition,	  the	  Battlegroups	  concept	  uses	  
battalion	  size,	  that	  is	  1,500	  soldiers.	  Two	  country	  groups	  are	  meant	  to	  operate	  at	  any	  
one	  time,	  rotating	  every	  six	  months.	  However,	  even	  though	  the	  Battlegroups	  were	  
declared	  operational	  in	  2007	  they	  have	  not	  been	  used	  in	  a	  single	  operation.	  Accordingly,	  
member	  state	  support	  for	  the	  concept	  has	  been	  faltering,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  in	  the	  first	  
half	  of	  2013	  only	  the	  Weimar	  Battlegroup	  is	  operational,	  with	  no	  contributions	  
envisioned	  for	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  year.	  It	  seems	  that	  “the	  EU’s	  capacity	  for	  foreign	  
policy	  and	  military	  power	  is	  less	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  Member	  State	  parts”.123	  
	  
	  
3.3	  Disjointed	  outputs	  	  
	  
We	  gain	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  these	  conceptual	  confusions	  operating	  within	  CSDP	  
by	  assessing	  its	  policy	  outputs.	  By	  a	  simple	  quantitative	  measure	  CSDP	  seems	  very	  
productive.	  Since	  2003	  the	  EU	  has	  fielded	  almost	  30	  independent	  missions.	  These	  
missions	  are	  of	  a	  very	  diverse	  nature,	  covering	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  both	  military	  and	  
civilian	  engagements.	  Also,	  what	  we	  can	  observe	  since	  is	  the	  globalisation	  of	  the	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operational	  area	  –	  with	  missions	  located	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  central	  Africa,	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  
Africa,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Central	  Asia	  and	  even	  Indonesia.	  	  	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  policy	  output	  has	  markedly	  slowed	  down	  since	  2009	  
operations	  are	  still	  being	  planned	  and	  fielded.	  The	  EU	  still	  has	  many	  missions	  in	  the	  field	  
–	  17	  in	  total	  124	  –	  so	  a	  point	  has	  to	  be	  made	  with	  regard	  to	  limited	  resources	  and	  general	  
caution	  as	  to	  policy	  overstretch.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  numerous	  of	  these	  missions	  go	  
back	  as	  far	  as	  2004	  and	  2005	  and	  whose	  mandates	  have	  been	  extended	  repeatedly	  
demonstrates	  a	  degree	  of	  continuity	  and	  commitment.	  What	  is	  more	  interesting,	  
though,	  is	  an	  apparent	  concentration	  of	  regional	  focus.	  The	  last	  seven	  missions,	  starting	  
in	  2008,	  were	  all	  located	  in	  Africa.	  EUNAVFOR	  Somalia	  (originally	  EUNAVCO),	  EUTM	  
Somali	  and	  EUCAP	  Nestor	  contribute	  to	  regional	  security	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  Other	  
missions	  include	  EUCAP	  Sahel,	  EUAVSEC	  South	  Sudan,	  EUTM	  Mali,	  and	  EUBAM	  Libya.	  	  	  
Nonetheless,	  overall	  these	  missions	  demonstrate	  clear	  limits	  to	  EU	  strategy	  as	  
they	  generally	  suffer	  from	  limited	  mandates	  (for	  instance,	  they	  prioritise	  risk	  
minimisation	  over	  impact)	  and	  they	  do	  not	  tie	  into	  a	  greater	  strategic	  vision	  for	  CSDP.125	  
Missions	  reflect	  a	  reactive	  approach	  to	  crises	  as	  they	  manifest	  themselves,	  rather	  than	  
emanating	  from	  the	  joint	  formulation	  of	  European	  geostrategic	  interests	  and	  a	  proactive	  
concern	  for	  advancing	  these.	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  operations	  lack	  clearly	  
identifiable	  European	  security	  interests	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (e.g.	  the	  civilian	  monitoring	  
mission	  of	  the	  peace	  agreement	  in	  Aceh,	  Indonesia),	  they	  are	  usually	  of	  very	  limited	  
scale	  in	  ambition	  and	  impact,	  and	  operate	  mostly	  as	  civilian	  missions.126	  Even	  the	  few	  
military	  missions	  the	  CSDP	  fielded	  were	  mostly	  of	  the	  static	  peacekeeping	  type	  involving	  
ground	  forces	  with	  highly	  constrained	  rules	  of	  engagement	  and	  therefore	  consolidate	  at	  
the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  operational	  spectrum	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  Petersberg	  Tasks.127	  
Further,	  the	  EU’s	  earliest	  interventions	  were	  in	  fact	  operational	  takeovers	  from	  previous	  
NATO	  deployments	  (i.e.	  military	  peacekeeping	  missions	  Concordia	  and	  Althea	  in	  the	  
Balkans),	  later	  military	  engagements	  in	  central	  Africa	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  poorly	  
disguised	  French	  ‘laundering’	  attempts	  to	  use	  the	  cover	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  further	  its	  national	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strategic	  interests	  in	  that	  region.128	  Additionally,	  CSDP	  missions	  are	  generally	  
undertaken	  by	  few	  member	  states	  cooperating	  and	  regularly	  it	  is	  a	  single	  nation	  that	  
provides	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  forces,	  putting	  into	  question	  how	  ‘common’	  a	  policy	  CSDP	  really	  
is.	  None	  of	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  CSDP	  missions	  are	  useless	  and	  generally	  ill-­‐conceived,	  
however,	  the	  image	  of	  EU	  crisis	  management	  that	  emerges	  brings	  to	  mind	  well-­‐known	  
(yet	  overdrawn)	  stereotypes	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  political	  dwarf	  and	  military	  worm,129	  or	  an	  
actor	  from	  Venus	  that	  is	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  accept	  the	  harsh	  realities	  and	  necessities	  
of	  international	  relations.130	  
Beyond	  the	  obvious	  critique	  of	  what	  the	  EU	  does	  and	  the	  way	  it	  does	  it,	  it	  is	  also	  
rewarding	  to	  consider	  those	  instances	  where	  the	  EU	  failed	  or	  chose	  not	  to	  act.	  The	  most	  
relevant,	  recent	  example	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  EU’s	  inability	  to	  become	  engaged	  in	  the	  
Libyan	  conflict,	  regarded	  by	  various	  commentators	  as	  a	  remarkable	  failure,	  akin	  to	  an	  
‘April	  fool’s	  joke’.131	  It	  is	  remarkable	  as	  the	  challenge	  seemed	  tailor-­‐fitted	  to	  the	  EU’s	  
aspirations	  as	  an	  actor	  in	  crisis	  management.	  The	  geographical	  vicinity	  of	  the	  crisis,	  the	  
clear	  identifiability	  of	  not	  just	  EU	  regional	  strategic	  interests	  but	  also	  of	  aggressor	  and	  
victim,	  the	  expected	  limited	  scale	  of	  intervention	  necessary	  for	  military	  victory,	  and	  
even	  a	  marked	  willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  key	  member	  states	  to	  commit	  themselves	  
(notably	  France	  and	  the	  UK)	  cumulatively	  present	  a	  crisis	  scenario	  not	  much	  unlike	  
Kosovo	  in	  1998,	  generally	  considered	  the	  constitutive	  crisis	  of	  EU	  military	  crisis	  
management.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Council	  gave	  its	  final	  approval	  for	  a	  military	  mission	  tasked	  
with	  supporting	  UN-­‐led	  relief	  efforts,	  EUFOR	  Libya.132	  Yet	  it	  was	  never	  put	  into	  place,	  
due	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  generating	  a	  UN	  mandate,	  in	  turn,	  incurred	  upon	  the	  EU	  mostly	  by	  
itself.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  mission’s	  mandate	  was	  of	  such	  limited	  scope	  and	  ambition	  
that	  it	  was	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  doing	  justice	  to	  the	  challenge	  that	  the	  situation	  in	  Libya	  
presented	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  telling	  that	  once	  again	  the	  actual	  combat	  
undertaken	  by	  Western	  forces	  in	  Libya	  was	  carried	  out	  through	  NATO,	  notably	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Menon,	  A.	  (2009).	  Empowering	  Paradise?	  The	  ESDP	  at	  ten.	  International	  Affairs,	  85	  (2):	  227-­‐
246.	  
129	  Eyskens,	  M.	  (1991).	  WAR	  IN	  THE	  GULF:	  EUROPE;	  Gulf	  Fighting	  Shatters	  Europeans'	  Fragile	  
Unity.	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  25	  January	  1991.	  	  http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-­‐
in-­‐the-­‐gulf-­‐europe-­‐gulf-­‐fighting-­‐shatters-­‐europeans-­‐fragile-­‐unity.html?pagewanted=1,	  last	  
accessed	  17	  September	  2013.	  
130	  Kagan,	  R.	  (2003).	  Of	  Paradise	  and	  Power:	  America	  and	  Europe	  in	  the	  New	  World	  Order.	  New	  
York:	  Knopf.	  	  
131	  Gomes,	  A.	  (2011).	  Was	  Eufor	  Libya	  an	  April	  fool's	  joke?	  EUObserver,	  13	  July	  2011.	  
http://euobserver.com/opinion/32624,	  last	  accessed	  14	  August	  2013.	  
132	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  (2011).	  Council	  Decision	  2011/210/CFSP	  of	  1	  April	  2011on	  a	  European	  Union	  
military	  operation	  in	  support	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  operations	  in	  response	  to	  the	  crisis	  
situation	  in	  Libya	  (EUFOR	  Libya).	  Official	  Journal	  of	  the	  EU,	  L	  89/17.	  5.4.2011.	  
	  47	  
France	  and	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  driver’s	  seat	  and	  the	  US	  adopting	  a	  rather	  passive	  role.	  It	  is	  a	  
legitimate	  question	  to	  ask	  whether	  15	  years	  and	  twice	  as	  many	  missions	  later	  the	  EU	  has	  
yet	  to	  make	  considerable	  headway	  in	  establishing	  itself	  as	  a	  veritable	  security	  actor	  with	  
the	  ability	  to	  tackle	  dangerous	  crises	  decisively.	  Yet,	  perhaps,	  this	  is	  asking	  the	  wrong	  
question.	  
	   As	  we	  will	  come	  to	  see	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  marks	  a	  strategic	  turn	  for	  CSDP	  –	  not	  
so	  much	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  now	  the	  EU	  does	  strategy	  ‘	  properly’,	  or	  ‘better’,	  but	  rather	  by	  
detaching	  it	  from	  the	  often	  prescriptive	  power	  narratives	  that	  we	  have	  previously	  
discussed	  and	  that	  serve	  poorly	  to	  situate	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  multifaceted	  actor	  in	  the	  global	  
arena.	  While	  for	  many	  observers	  frustrated	  with	  the	  field	  of	  CSDP	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  
has	  become	  its	  cul-­‐de-­‐sac	  or	  the	  annunciation	  of	  a	  death	  foretold,	  I	  instead	  regard	  it	  as	  a	  
welcome	  troublemaker	  that	  can	  reinvigorate	  the	  field	  of	  EU	  security.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  
redirecting	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  the	  policy	  space	  of	  EU	  security,	  
particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  institutional	  evolution	  –	  put	  differently,	  we	  need	  to	  
reframe	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  illustrate	  the	  historicity	  and	  
contextuality	  of	  EU	  security.	  The	  next	  chapter	  demonstrates	  this	  point	  by	  critically	  
assessing	  those	  features	  that	  provide	  the	  foundation	  to	  the	  institutional	  sui	  generis	  
nature	  of	  EU	  security:	  the	  legacy	  of	  ‘constructive	  ambiguity’	  and	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  a	  
bureaucratic	  transgovernmentalism	  operative	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  EU	  security	  that	  produces	  
highly	  consensual	  and	  technocratic	  outcomes.	  These	  two	  dynamics	  combine	  to	  produce	  
the	  advent	  of	  the	  ‘post-­‐political’	  state	  of	  EU	  security,	  which	  in	  turn	  supports	  a	  specific	  












While	  the	  various	  EU	  power	  narratives	  have	  provided	  relevant	  conceptual	  lenses	  to	  the	  
study	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  past,	  they	  now	  become	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  
differentiate	  analytically	  and	  often	  blend	  into	  each	  other	  when	  applied	  to	  case	  studies.	  
This	  study	  is	  no	  exemption	  in	  this	  regard.	  The	  empirical	  story	  told	  in	  chapters	  6	  and	  7	  
would	  confirm	  a	  blurring	  of	  power	  narratives	  if	  indeed	  they	  employed	  such	  a	  conceptual	  
approach.	  Similarly,	  the	  fundamental	  critique	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  –	  i.e.	  its	  strategic	  
deficit	  –	  points	  our	  attention	  to	  important	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  conception	  and	  delivery	  
of	  EU	  foreign	  policy.	  However,	  it	  also	  misunderstands	  the	  way	  the	  EU	  functions	  as	  an	  
international	  actor.	  In	  the	  following	  I	  will	  try	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  this	  confusion	  by	  
outlining	  two	  crucial	  and	  defining	  contingencies	  of	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  EU	  security:	  
1)	  the	  constructive	  ambiguity	  inherent	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  EU	  security	  as	  represented	  
by	  the	  institutional	  imitation	  of	  crisis	  management	  structures,	  and	  2)	  the	  dense	  
transgovernmental	  interactions	  under	  executive	  dominance	  that	  now	  govern	  CSDP.	  
These	  two	  stories	  combine	  to	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  policy	  space	  that	  is	  inherently	  
depoliticised,	  or	  even	  ‘post-­‐political’.	  When	  assessing	  EU	  security	  policy	  we	  must	  take	  its	  
post-­‐political	  reality	  into	  account.	  This	  realisation	  provides	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  different	  
conceptual	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  EU	  security,	  one	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  
‘management	  of	  globalisation’.133	  	  
	  
	  
4.1	  From	  constructive	  ambiguity	  to	  institutional	  imitation	  
	  
We	  may	  choose	  to	  make	  an	  argument	  in	  the	  course	  of	  discussing	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  as	  
to	  the	  cumbersome	  institutional	  processes	  that	  govern	  CSDP	  –	  such	  an	  the	  unanimity	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rule,	  the	  ‘costs-­‐lie-­‐where-­‐they-­‐fall’	  funding	  mechanism	  of	  operations,	  or	  the	  
fragmentation	  of	  foreign	  policy	  activities	  between	  CFSP	  and	  CSDP	  and	  between	  ‘pillars’	  
more	  generally	  –	  such	  that	  these	  appear	  as	  endemic	  features	  of	  EU	  
intergovernmentalism	  in	  the	  high	  politics	  of	  security.	  It	  is	  accurate	  to	  locate	  the	  
dynamics	  underlying	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  in	  the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  EU	  security	  
policy.	  However,	  such	  institutional	  inertia	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  
cooperative	  logic	  at	  play	  but	  rather	  deeply	  ingrained	  in	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  the	  institution.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  evolution	  of	  EU	  strategy	  and	  the	  present	  
disillusionment	  with	  it,	  we	  need	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  and	  resulting	  process	  of	  
institutionalisation	  of	  the	  CSDP,	  which	  came	  under	  way	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  and	  took	  
organisational	  shape	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  Many	  of	  the	  misconceptions	  regarding	  EU	  
strategy	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  the	  architectural	  design	  of	  European	  
security.	  To	  a	  large	  extent	  the	  weakness	  of	  strategy	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  member	  state	  
divergences	  on	  security	  policy.	  However,	  rather	  than	  merely	  being	  a	  coordination	  
problem	  in	  specific	  instances	  of	  policy-­‐making,	  strategic	  ambiguity	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  institutionalisation	  itself	  and	  therefore	  even	  precedes	  the	  recent	  debate	  on	  
EU	  strategy.	  As	  such,	  ambiguity	  assumes	  a	  structural	  quality	  that	  continues	  to	  constrain	  
the	  elaboration	  of	  strategy	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  EU’s	  international	  actorness	  and	  identity.	  In	  
reconstructing	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  CSDP	  we	  come	  across	  one	  of	  the	  most	  peculiar	  
features	  of	  the	  ‘institution’,	  namely	  that	  its	  component	  parts	  largely	  represent	  copies	  of	  
NATO	  and	  WEU	  structures.	  With	  recourse	  to	  the	  causal	  arguments	  of	  structuration	  and	  
institutional	  isomorphism	  we	  can	  comprehend	  this	  structural	  imitation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
strategic	  and	  architectural	  ambiguity	  inherent	  in	  the	  space	  of	  European	  security,	  that	  is	  
uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  CSDP’s	  purpose	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  NATO.	  
A	  striking	  feature	  of	  the	  institution	  CSDP	  is	  the	  similarity	  of	  its	  bureaucratic	  
organisation	  to	  that	  of	  NATO.	  This	  similarity	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  pointed	  out.	  According	  
to	  Howorth,	  the	  PSC,	  EUMC	  and	  EUMS	  are	  “all	  roughly	  modelled	  on	  their	  NATO	  
equivalents”.134	  The	  move	  from	  an	  ad	  hoc	  to	  a	  permanent	  committee	  was	  largely	  
induced	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Council	  (NAC).	  While	  the	  NAC	  may	  be	  
considered	  to	  possess	  more	  authority	  over	  decisions,	  the	  tasks	  and	  functions	  with	  which	  
the	  PSC	  is	  endowed	  follow	  closely	  the	  NAC	  template.	  The	  PSC	  did	  not	  initially	  have	  a	  
permanent	  chair	  –	  as	  it	  was	  left	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  High	  Representative	  to	  assume	  
this	  function	  or	  not	  –	  but	  the	  reforms	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  now	  provide	  for	  such	  a	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permanent	  chairman.135	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  EU	  Military	  Committee,	  the	  composition	  of	  
its	  responsibilities	  and	  functions	  closely	  reflects	  that	  of	  NATO’s	  Military	  Committee.136	  
Further,	  its	  members	  are	  double-­‐hatted	  and	  thus	  represent	  their	  country	  in	  both	  NATO	  
and	  CSDP,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  France	  and	  Belgium.137	  An	  issue	  of	  contention	  between	  
France	  and	  the	  UK	  was	  the	  level	  of	  seniority	  of	  diplomats	  within	  the	  PSC,	  and	  it	  was	  left	  
to	  each	  country	  to	  decide	  what	  level	  diplomats	  to	  have	  them	  represent	  in	  the	  body.138	  
Yet	  overall,	  the	  CSDP’s	  bureaucratic	  organisation	  largely	  resembles	  that	  of	  NATO.	  
The	  logic	  behind	  this	  process	  of	  imitation	  is	  that	  of	  institutional	  isomorphism.139	  
It	  describes	  the	  homogenisation	  of	  institutional	  structures	  across	  organisations	  that	  
inhabit	  the	  same	  policy	  field.	  To	  put	  it	  simply,	  organisations	  that	  face	  the	  same	  
environmental	  conditions	  imitate	  each	  other.	  These	  new	  structures	  allow	  imitating	  
institutions	  to	  conform	  better	  to	  the	  normative	  demands	  posed	  by	  that	  environment.	  
The	  essential	  condition	  for	  isomorphism	  to	  occur	  is	  that	  the	  respective	  organisations	  
sustain	  relations	  and	  depend	  on	  each	  other,140	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  the	  organisational	  
field	  exhibits	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  ‘structuration’:	  	  
“an	  increase	  in	  the	  extent	  of	  interaction	  among	  organizations	  in	  the	  field;	  the	  
emergence	  of	  sharply	  defined	  interorganizational	  structures	  of	  domination	  and	  patterns	  
of	  coalition;	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  information	  load	  with	  which	  organizations	  in	  a	  field	  must	  
contend;	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  mutual	  awareness	  among	  participants	  in	  a	  set	  of	  
organizations	  that	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  a	  common	  enterprise”.141	  
	  
We	  may	  describe	  the	  European	  security	  space	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  international	  regime	  
complexity,	  which	  refers	  to	  “the	  presence	  of	  nested,	  partially	  overlapping,	  and	  parallel	  
international	  regimes	  that	  are	  not	  hierarchically	  ordered”.142	  NATO	  and	  the	  EU	  can	  be	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portrayed	  to	  be	  in	  such	  an	  interdependent	  relationship,	  which	  involves	  “reciprocal	  
costly	  effects	  of	  transaction”.143	  Both	  organisations	  depend	  on	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  
their	  functionality	  (the	  problem	  to	  be	  solved)	  as	  well	  as	  their	  means	  to	  act.	  This	  also	  
explains	  the	  substantial	  degree	  of	  institutional	  overlap,	  as	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  
membership,	  mandate,	  and	  resources.144	  The	  relationship	  does	  not	  imply	  symmetrical	  
dependence	  (in	  fact,	  it	  is	  rather	  asymmetrical),	  nor	  does	  it	  presuppose	  complementarity	  
or	  conflict	  between	  the	  respective	  organisations.	  
I	  am	  not	  so	  much	  concerned	  here	  with	  laying	  out	  the	  causal	  logic	  of	  institutional	  
isomorphism,	  which	  has	  in	  fact	  been	  done	  elsewhere.145	  What	  I	  do	  contend	  here,	  
however,	  is	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  isomorphic	  change	  –	  particularly	  as	  reflected	  in	  its	  mimetic	  
version	  –	  supports	  the	  idea	  of	  imitation	  rather	  than	  mere	  similarity	  precisely	  because	  of	  
the	  strategic	  ambiguity	  present	  in	  EU	  security.	  Mimetic	  isomorphism	  occurs	  as	  a	  
response	  to	  uncertainty	  and	  results	  in	  imitative	  modelling.	  As	  DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	  
state,	  “when	  goals	  are	  ambiguous,	  or	  when	  the	  environment	  creates	  symbolic	  
uncertainty,	  organizations	  may	  model	  themselves	  on	  other	  organizations”.146	  If	  
rationally	  derived	  templates	  for	  optimal	  institutional	  design	  are	  unavailable,	  policy-­‐
makers	  turn	  to	  related	  institutions	  that	  are	  seen	  as	  more	  successful	  or	  legitimate.147	  
Here	  it	  is	  the	  political	  actors	  that	  operate	  within	  the	  ‘receiving’	  system	  that	  identify	  
desirable	  structures	  from	  other	  systems	  and	  push	  for	  their	  imitation.	  	  
Uncertainty	  in	  CSDP	  comes	  in	  two	  guises148.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  uncertainty	  
derives	  from	  the	  strategic	  ambiguity	  of	  CSDP.	  What	  are	  its	  objectives	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
nature	  and	  location	  of	  crises	  it	  seeks	  to	  address?	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  is	  its	  functional	  
and	  geographical	  purpose	  and	  its	  priorities?	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  uncertainty	  is	  inherent	  
in	  the	  contested,	  unresolved	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  with	  NATO	  and	  the	  hierarchy	  in	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the	  European	  security	  architecture,	  a	  debate	  that	  goes	  back	  at	  least	  to	  the	  early	  
1990s.149	  Is	  this	  relationship	  one	  of	  competition	  or	  complementarity?150	  A	  ‘grand	  
bargain’	  between	  the	  two	  organisations	  remains	  elusive.151	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  “from	  the	  first,	  CSDP	  was	  characterized	  by	  
marked	  disagreements	  among	  its	  creators	  as	  to	  its	  ultimate	  nature	  and	  purpose”.152	  The	  
policy	  area’s	  birth	  certificate	  –	  the	  St.	  Malo	  declaration	  –	  reflected	  a	  Franco-­‐British	  
agreement	  to	  disagree	  over	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  new	  project,	  
i.e.	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘autonomy’	  and	  the	  underlying	  rationale	  of	  cooperation.	  
While	  France	  took	  the	  former	  to	  mean	  autonomy	  from	  NATO	  (i.e.	  from	  the	  US),	  the	  UK	  
perceived	  it	  as	  autonomy	  within	  NATO	  (i.e.	  a	  stronger	  European	  capability	  within	  NATO).	  
Viewed	  through	  French	  eyes	  the	  CSDP	  was	  a	  critical	  step	  towards	  political	  integration,	  
whereas	  for	  the	  British	  it	  was	  a	  necessary	  evil	  to	  upgrade	  European	  military	  capabilities	  
in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  Atlantic	  Alliance.	  This	  ‘constructive	  ambiguity’	  153	  or	  ‘studied	  
ambiguity’	  154	  allowed	  member	  states	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  project	  while	  diverging	  
on	  its	  purpose.	  
Both	  these	  interrelated	  types	  of	  uncertainty	  are	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  the	  recent	  
debates	  on	  the	  EU’s	  strategic	  deficit.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  
uncertainty	  –	  i.e.	  strategic	  ambiguity	  –	  not	  only	  exists	  as	  a	  functional	  and	  coordinative	  
condition	  of	  European	  security	  but	  also	  as	  an	  institutional	  one	  that	  continues	  to	  exert	  
constraining	  pressure	  on	  the	  elaboration	  of	  EU	  strategy	  and	  EU	  strategic	  culture.	  
Therefore,	  what	  is	  now	  more	  often	  than	  not	  lamented	  as	  the	  ‘deficit’	  of	  EU	  security	  
policy,	  has	  in	  fact	  been	  an	  important	  institutional	  driver	  that	  has	  shaped	  the	  very	  
structures	  and	  cooperative	  logic	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  CSDP.	  
What	  this	  story	  illuminates	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  need	  to	  approach	  the	  notion	  of	  
strategy	  with	  more	  conceptual	  and	  contextual	  awareness	  than	  is	  often	  the	  case.	  It	  also	  
points	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  more	  historically	  contingent	  reading	  of	  EU	  power	  or	  EU	  grand	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strategy	  narratives	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  We	  need	  to	  
locate	  the	  practice	  of	  EU	  security	  within	  its	  institutional	  and	  discursive	  contexts.	  	  
	  
	  
4.2	  Transgovernmentalism	  and	  post-­‐politics	  in	  European	  security	  
	  
The	  institutional	  reality	  of	  EU	  security	  policy	  as	  constituted	  by	  the	  structures	  and	  
processes	  of	  CSDP	  remains	  a	  peculiarity.	  Viewed	  through	  the	  major	  lenses	  of	  European	  
integration	  theory,	  most	  observers	  would	  place	  CSDP	  in	  the	  camp	  of	  intergovernmental	  
politics.	  The	  modest	  role	  accorded	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  marginal	  role	  accorded	  to	  the	  
Parliament,	  and	  the	  missing	  role	  accorded	  to	  the	  Court,	  work	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  point.	  
CSDP	  is	  a	  creature	  of	  the	  member	  states	  and	  for	  the	  member	  states.	  And	  yet	  the	  gradual	  
integration	  in	  defence	  matters	  relocates	  a	  measure	  of	  decision-­‐making	  (if	  not	  decision-­‐
taking)	  in	  the	  hallways	  of	  Brussels,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  swift	  and	  pervasive	  accumulation	  
of	  bureaucratic	  organisation	  under	  the	  CSDP	  and	  the	  closely	  structured	  interactions	  
within	  the	  policy	  space	  that	  produce	  commonly	  shared	  norms.155	  It	  may	  not	  comply	  with	  
the	  expectations	  of	  the	  unitary	  decision-­‐making	  systems	  found	  at	  national	  levels,	  
however,	  it	  does	  bring	  to	  light	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  certain	  ‘supranationality’	  in	  EU	  security	  
that	  is	  difficult	  to	  ignore.	  In	  order	  to	  ameliorate	  this	  confusing	  picture	  of	  integration	  we	  
must	  look	  towards	  the	  notion	  of	  transgovernmentalism.	  	  
According	  to	  Helen	  Wallace,	  transgovernmentalism	  comprises	  the	  following	  
features:	  1)	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  in	  determining	  the	  direction	  of	  
policy;	  2)	  the	  predominance	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  (in	  its	  various	  ministerial	  
formations)	  in	  steering	  cooperation;	  3)	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  the	  Commission;	  4)	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  EP	  and	  Court;	  5)	  the	  involvement	  of	  a	  core	  group	  of	  national	  policy-­‐makers;	  
6)	  the	  adoption	  of	  special	  modes	  of	  cooperation,	  most	  noticeable	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
Council	  Secretariat;	  7)	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  policy-­‐process	  from	  national	  parliaments	  and	  
electorates;	  and	  8)	  the	  capacity	  to	  occasionally	  deliver	  meaningful	  collective	  policy	  
outputs.156	  Clearly,	  the	  notion	  of	  transgovernmentalism	  intends	  to	  transcend	  the	  overly	  
simplifying	  dichotomy	  of	  intergovernmentalism	  vs.	  supranationalism	  that	  has	  
traditionally	  been	  invoked	  to	  describe	  the	  institutional	  balance	  of	  EU	  politics.	  Howorth	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makes	  a	  very	  similar	  attempt	  in	  this	  direction	  but	  couches	  his	  terminology	  in	  the	  pre-­‐
existing	  frames	  of	  reference.	  His	  idea	  of	  ‘supranational	  inter-­‐governmentalism’	  
(alternatively	  called	  ‘coordigration’)	  accounts	  for	  the	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  seeks	  
to	  reduce	  the	  institutional	  complexity	  of	  the	  CSDP.157	  The	  similarity	  is	  obvious	  in	  his	  
definition	  of	  supranational	  inter-­‐governmentalism,	  which	  he	  takes	  to	  mean:	  	  
“the	  phenomenon	  whereby	  a	  profusion	  of	  agencies	  of	  inter-­‐governmentalism	  take	  root	  
in	  Brussels	  and,	  through	  dialogue	  and	  socialization	  processes,	  reaction	  to	  ‘events’	  and	  a	  
host	  of	  other	  dynamics,	  gradually	  create	  a	  tendency	  for	  policy	  to	  be	  influenced,	  
formulated	  and	  even	  driven,	  from	  within	  that	  city”.158	  	  
	  
While	  Howorth’s	  definition	  is	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  that	  of	  Wallace,	  the	  term	  
‘transgovernmentalism’	  should	  be	  preferred	  as	  it	  hints	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  system	  of	  
governance	  that	  incorporates	  its	  own	  unique	  way	  of	  doing	  politics,	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  
mere	  mélange	  of	  two	  ideal	  types.	  	  
	   Most	  of	  the	  core	  features	  of	  transgovernmentalism	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  formal	  
relationship	  between	  EU	  institutions	  as	  well	  as	  national	  actors.	  The	  abridged	  story	  goes	  
like	  this:	  The	  European	  Council	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  steer	  and	  conduct	  policy-­‐
making,	  relying	  on	  the	  input	  from	  the	  specially	  created	  bureaucracy	  that	  is	  now	  located	  
largely	  within	  the	  European	  External	  Action	  Service.	  While	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Commission	  
has	  been	  traditionally	  marginal	  it	  has	  received	  a	  slight	  boost	  with	  the	  inauguration	  of	  the	  
Lisbon	  Treaty	  by	  giving	  it	  a	  hand	  in	  the	  EEAS,	  a	  closer	  association	  with	  the	  High	  
Representative,	  and	  a	  role	  in	  civilian	  crisis	  management.	  Nonetheless,	  The	  European	  
Parliament	  fares	  even	  worse	  as	  apart	  from	  some	  formalistic	  oversight	  and	  confirmation	  
powers	  its	  sole	  instrument	  to	  exert	  influence	  is	  via	  the	  budgetary	  process,	  and	  even	  here	  
effective	  control	  is	  absent	  regarding	  military	  CSDP	  missions.159	  Similarly,	  national	  
parliaments	  have	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  exercise	  control	  powers	  over	  multinational	  military	  
deployments	  agreed	  upon	  at	  the	  EU	  level.160	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  missing	  
altogether	  from	  the	  policy	  area.	  The	  overall	  picture	  is	  one	  where	  policy	  input	  is	  highly	  
constrained	  outside	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  governments	  and	  judicial	  review	  of	  acts	  passed	  
absent.161	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Howorth,	  J.	  (2000).	  European	  Integration	  and	  Defence:	  the	  Ultimate	  Challenge?	  Chaillot	  Paper	  
No.	  43.	  Paris:	  WEU	  Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies,	  p.	  36.	  
158	  Howorth,	  J.	  (2007).	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  
Macmillan,	  p.	  30.	  
159	  Von	  Ondarza,	  N.	  (2008).	  Die	  EU-­‐Sicherheits-­‐	  und	  Verteidigungspolitik	  im	  Schatten	  der	  
Ungewissheit.	  SWP-­‐Study	  S27,	  Oktober	  2008,	  Berlin.	  
160	  Born,	  H.,	  Anghel,	  S.,	  Dowling,	  A.	  &	  Fuior,	  T.	  (2008).	  Parliamentary	  Oversight	  of	  ESDP	  Missions.	  
DCAF	  Policy	  Papers,	  28.	  Geneva:	  Geneva	  Centre	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Control	  of	  Armed	  Forces.	  
161	  Jørgensen,	  K.	  E.	  (2002).	  Making	  the	  CFSP	  Work,	  in:	  J.	  Peterson	  &	  M.	  Shackleton	  (Eds.)	  The	  
	  55	  
Consequently,	  there	  is	  a	  high	  level	  of	  executive	  dominance	  in	  EU	  security	  policy.	  
With	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  EEAS	  and	  elevation	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  this	  
image	  has	  been	  propounded	  even	  further.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  since	  national	  
parliaments	  continue	  to	  be	  held	  at	  arm’s	  length.	  As	  Stetter	  points	  out,	  “the	  main	  
institutional	  dividing	  line	  in	  EU	  foreign	  politics	  is	  […]	  not	  located	  on	  the	  supranational-­‐
intergovernmental	  dimension	  but	  rather	  between	  the	  EU	  executive	  […]	  and	  those	  actors	  
controlling	  the	  executive”.162	  Especially	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  parliaments	  –	  both	  
European	  and	  national	  –	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  CSDP	  is	  accompanied	  by	  an	  
erosion	  of	  democratic	  standards	  in	  terms	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  
organised	  opposition.163	  To	  speak	  of	  ‘collusive	  delegation’	  –	  as	  invoked	  by	  Matthias	  
Koenig-­‐Archibugi164	  –	  may	  be	  a	  conceptual	  bridge	  too	  far	  as	  the	  empirical	  reality	  of	  CSDP	  
outputs	  does	  not	  paint	  the	  conspiratorial	  picture	  implied	  by	  the	  notion,	  as	  reflected	  in	  
the	  low	  intensity	  of	  CSDP	  missions,	  and	  their	  non-­‐contestation	  in	  domestic	  political	  
arenas.	  However,	  the	  idea	  that	  European	  politics	  –	  and	  including	  European	  security	  
policy	  –	  is	  conducted	  at	  two	  levels	  simultaneously	  is	  difficult	  to	  deny.165	  	  
What	  the	  consolidation	  of	  executive	  control	  over	  CSDP	  also	  means	  is	  that	  while	  
functional	  unity	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  is	  largely	  preserved,	  the	  political	  separation	  of	  the	  
CSDP	  from	  other	  EU	  and	  EC	  external	  activities	  –	  as	  maintained	  by	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  –	  
demonstrates	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  institutional	  fragmentation	  in	  European	  foreign	  
policy.	  This	  development	  follows	  a	  trend	  described	  by	  Giandomenico	  Majone	  with	  
regard	  to	  approaches	  of	  ‘new	  governance’	  (i.e.	  institutional	  innovation)	  aimed	  at	  
achieving	  progress	  in	  politically	  sensitive	  areas,	  even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  sacrificing	  overall	  
coherence	  of	  the	  system.166	  With	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  separate	  bureaucratic	  structure	  –	  and	  
one	  whose	  ‘design’	  bears	  no	  direct	  relationship	  to	  the	  functional	  demands	  of	  EU	  security	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Institutions	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (pp.	  210-­‐233).	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP.	  
162	  Stetter,	  S.	  (2004).	  Cross-­‐pillar	  Politics:	  Functional	  Unity	  and	  Institutional	  Fragmentation	  of	  EU	  
Foreign	  Policies.	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  11	  (4):	  721-­‐2.	  
163	  Koenig-­‐Archibugi,	  M.	  (2002).	  The	  Democratic	  Deficit	  of	  EU	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy.	  The	  
International	  Spectator,	  37	  (4):	  61-­‐73;	  Wagner,	  W.	  (2006).	  The	  democratic	  control	  of	  military	  
power	  Europe.	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  13	  (2):	  200-­‐216.	  
164	  Koenig-­‐Archibugi,	  M.	  (2004).	  International	  Governance	  as	  New	  Raison	  d’État?	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  
EU	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy.	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  10	  (2):	  147-­‐
188.	  
165	  See	  Matlary,	  J.	  H.	  (2009).	  European	  Union	  Security	  Dynamics:	  In	  the	  New	  National	  Interest.	  
Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  
166	  Majone,	  G.	  (2009).	  Dilemmas	  of	  European	  Integration:	  the	  Ambiguities	  &	  Pitfalls	  of	  Integration	  
by	  Stealth.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  p.	  15.	  
	  56	  
–	  it	  seems	  adequate	  to	  characterise	  the	  CSDP	  essentially	  as	  a	  distinct	  political	  sphere	  
with	  its	  own	  rules	  and	  norms	  of	  governance.167	  	  
However,	  transgovernmentalism	  should	  not	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  description	  
of	  the	  formal	  institutional	  balance	  between	  actors	  but	  we	  should	  also	  take	  into	  account	  
the	  internal	  dynamics	  within	  this	  executive-­‐led	  domain.	  A	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  
assessed	  the	  role	  of	  transgovernmental	  networks	  in	  EU	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  from	  an	  
institutional	  process-­‐oriented	  perspective	  presents	  the	  most	  elaborate	  research	  avenue	  
to	  fill	  popular	  (but	  often	  under-­‐specified)	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘strategic	  culture’	  with	  
empirical	  meaning.168	  A	  number	  of	  case	  studies	  illustrate	  the	  applicability	  of	  
transgovernmentalism	  to	  the	  policy	  space	  of	  EU	  security.	  
Frédéric	  Mérand	  points	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  transgovernmental	  networks	  
in	  the	  CSDP.	  He	  argues	  that	  “European	  defence	  has	  created	  a	  historically	  unprecedented	  
political	  space	  for	  bureaucratic	  elites	  to	  experiment	  and	  enact	  new	  forms	  of	  
transnational	  governance”.169	  Howorth’s	  case	  study	  of	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  
Political	  and	  Security	  Committee	  shows	  the	  gradual	  emergence	  of	  consensual	  relations	  
that	  produce	  shared	  expectations	  and	  understandings	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  EU	  security	  
cooperation.170	  Davis	  Cross	  confirms	  such	  shared	  professional	  norms	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
EUMC	  representatives,	  which	  facilitate	  concurrence	  between	  NATO	  and	  CSDP.171	  We	  
thus	  find	  in	  Brussels	  a	  network	  of	  national	  actors	  and	  those	  based	  European	  External	  
Action	  Service	  (and	  previously	  in	  the	  Council	  Secretariat),	  which	  sits	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  
CSDP,	  and	  where	  policy	  is	  not	  just	  done	  collectively	  but	  with	  an	  increasingly	  collective	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vision	  and	  purpose	  in	  mind,	  and	  according	  to	  a	  shared	  understanding	  of	  the	  appropriate	  
conduct	  in	  this	  regard.172	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  Daniel	  Thomas	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  EU’s	  normative	  and	  policy	  
commitments	  significantly	  impact	  on	  member	  states’	  behaviour	  in	  CFSP.173	  His	  analysis	  
refers	  to	  two	  ‘meta-­‐norms’	  (joint	  action	  as	  an	  intrinsic	  value;	  and	  consistency	  and	  
coherence	  across	  time	  and	  policy-­‐areas)	  and	  a	  number	  of	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  
norms	  (examples	  of	  the	  former	  are	  democracy	  promotion,	  rule	  of	  law,	  human	  rights,	  
conflict	  prevention	  or	  multilateralism,	  whereas	  examples	  of	  the	  latter	  are	  the	  
coordination	  reflex,	  confidentiality	  and	  consensus-­‐seeking).	  His	  line	  of	  argumentation	  
maintains	  that	  the	  common	  institution	  (i.e.	  CFSP)	  prescribes	  appropriate	  behaviour	  to	  its	  
members,	  which	  empowers	  certain	  negotiation	  practices	  and	  outcomes	  while	  de-­‐
legitimising	  others.	  The	  outcome	  of	  this	  is	  that	  participation	  in	  the	  common	  policy-­‐
making	  process	  may	  lead	  actors	  to	  depart	  from	  their	  initial,	  divergent	  preferences	  due	  
to	  the	  value	  attached	  to	  norm-­‐consistent	  behaviour	  (entrapment),	  and	  that	  iterated	  
cooperation	  facilitates	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  approach	  aimed	  at	  producing	  acceptance	  
among	  participants	  (cooperative	  bargaining).174	  
Sustained,	  iterated	  cooperation	  thus	  compels	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  
socialisation	  dynamics	  to	  which	  actors	  within	  the	  network	  find	  themselves	  exposed.	  
Socialisation	  and	  learning	  mechanisms	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  structuring	  actors’	  
expectations,	  behaviour	  and	  even	  identities	  within	  the	  space	  of	  European	  foreign	  policy.	  
Complex	  social	  learning	  occurs	  in	  circumstances	  where:	  (a)	  individuals	  share	  common	  
professional	  backgrounds;	  (b)	  the	  group	  feels	  in	  crisis	  or	  faced	  by	  policy	  failure;	  (c)	  there	  
is	  a	  high	  density	  of	  interactions;	  and	  (d)	  the	  group	  is	  insulated	  from	  direct	  political	  
pressure.175	  The	  incremental	  but	  nevertheless	  tangible	  effect	  of	  socialisation	  has	  been	  
confirmed	  in	  various	  studies.	  	  
For	  instance,	  Christoph	  Meyer	  points	  to	  the	  convergence	  of	  national	  strategic	  
cultures	  due	  to	  cross-­‐socialisation	  among	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  the	  PSC	  and	  the	  EU	  Military	  
Committee	  (EUMC),	  which	  is	  reinforced	  by	  post-­‐crisis	  learning.176	  This	  is	  confirmed	  in	  a	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number	  of	  other	  studies	  investigating	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  CSDP	  bureaucratic	  bodies,	  
such	  as	  the	  PSC,	  EUMC	  or	  CFSP	  working	  groups.177	  While	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  
socialisation	  may	  be	  strategic	  rather	  than	  internalised178,	  the	  impression	  remains	  that	  
actors	  conform	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  policy	  space.	  Similarly,	  Michael	  E.	  Smith	  argues	  
that	  common	  policy	  goals	  and	  cooperative	  behaviours	  have	  gradually	  developed	  in	  an	  
endogenous	  process	  of	  incremental	  institutionalisation.179	  Institutional	  development	  
and	  changes	  in	  state	  behaviour	  are	  caught	  in	  a	  two-­‐way	  relationship,	  which	  strongly	  
impacts	  on	  European	  foreign	  policy	  cooperation.180	  Thus,	  with	  the	  formalisation	  of	  the	  
policy-­‐area	  comes	  an	  increase	  in	  states’	  cooperative	  attitudes.	  His	  conceptualisation	  of	  
institutionalisation	  hints	  at	  a	  quasi-­‐evolutionary	  process	  whereby	  an	  initial	  
intergovernmental	  bargain	  becomes	  subsumed	  by	  the	  endogenous	  dynamics	  of	  
cooperation.	  Over	  time,	  supranational	  actors	  exert	  their	  influence	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  
decision-­‐making	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  policy-­‐area	  become	  socialised	  so	  as	  to	  adopt	  a	  
shared	  understanding	  of	  their	  joint	  goals	  and	  interests.	  Such	  a	  change	  is	  illustrated	  by	  a	  
shift	  from	  a	  bargaining	  approach	  to	  a	  more	  problem-­‐solving	  oriented	  style	  of	  
cooperation.	  While	  the	  deterministic	  conception	  of	  institutionalisation	  –	  comparable	  to	  
a	  ratchet	  –	  may	  overstate	  the	  supranational	  case,	  it	  nonetheless	  highlights	  the	  crucial	  
role	  of	  endogenous	  dynamics	  in	  EU	  security.	  
Europeanisation	  also	  contributes	  interesting	  insights	  in	  this	  regard	  by	  providing	  
a	  more	  structured	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  policy	  convergence	  (also	  known	  as	  ‘national	  
adaptation’	  and	  ‘downloading’).181	  The	  focus	  on	  policy	  convergence	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  
that	  it	  denotes	  the	  only	  strand	  of	  Europeanisation	  theory	  that	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other	  major	  strands	  –	  national	  projection	  and	  socialisation	  are	  captured	  by	  rational-­‐
choice	  institutionalism	  and	  sociological	  institutionalism/constructivism,	  respectively.	  
Policy	  convergence	  means	  the	  top-­‐down	  reception	  of	  stimuli	  and	  incentives	  generated	  
at	  the	  EU	  level	  and	  the	  adaptation	  of	  national	  policy	  through	  their	  incorporation	  into	  the	  
domestic	  polity,	  thus	  creating	  policy	  convergence.	  The	  ‘goodness	  of	  fit’	  between	  
domestic	  institutions	  and	  adaptation	  pressures	  is	  central	  here.	  This	  vertical	  process	  of	  
causality	  entails	  that	  “where	  states	  have	  an	  opportunity,	  they	  will	  seek	  to	  create	  
international	  rules	  and	  institutions	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  domestic	  principles	  of	  
political	  order”.182	  For	  instance,	  Eva	  Gross	  demonstrates	  an	  unexpected	  degree	  of	  
adaptation	  in	  national	  security	  and	  defence	  policies.183	  Other	  studies	  make	  similar	  
arguments	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  (tacitly)	  emerging	  European	  strategic	  culture.184	  
Europeanisation	  compounds	  the	  view	  that	  elite	  socialisation	  pervades	  the	  CSDP’s	  
bureaucratic	  structures	  and	  leads	  to	  convergence	  in	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours.185	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  refrain	  from	  any	  deterministic	  claims	  as	  to	  the	  inevitability	  of	  defence	  
integration	  and	  political	  union	  deriving	  from	  these	  dynamics,	  though.	  Convergence	  
remains	  constrained	  as	  member	  states	  continue	  to	  attach	  great	  value	  to	  the	  
preservation	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  defence.186	  	  
Consequently,	  the	  question	  remains	  whether	  convergence	  is	  largely	  procedural	  
or	  whether	  it	  actually	  impacts	  on	  actors’	  self-­‐understanding	  (i.e.	  their	  identities),	  but	  the	  
fact	  that	  a	  considerable	  level	  of	  convergence	  is	  taking	  place	  is	  largely	  accepted	  in	  the	  
field.	  Its	  significance	  becomes	  apparent	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  transgovernmental	  
dynamics	  and	  associated	  processes	  of	  socialisation	  feed	  back	  into	  the	  overall	  process	  of	  
institutionalisation,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  Michael	  E.	  Smith	  in	  his	  book	  Europe’s	  Foreign	  and	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Security	  Policy:	  The	  Institutionalization	  of	  Cooperation.187	  That	  there	  is	  a	  broader	  cultural	  
context	  to	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  institutions	  is	  a	  point	  that	  was	  made	  clear	  in	  the	  
previous	  discussion	  on	  the	  structuration	  of	  the	  European	  security	  policy	  space	  and	  its	  
concurrent	  dynamics	  of	  institutional	  imitation	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  overlapping	  of	  
security	  organisations188	  and	  the	  “unreflexive	  transfer	  of	  knowledge	  and	  of	  patterned	  
practices”	  between	  them.189	  If	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  functionality	  of	  institutions	  is	  at	  
least	  partially	  subsumed	  by	  a	  broader	  cultural	  context	  of	  meaning	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
embedded,	  we	  also	  immediately	  grasp	  the	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  the	  socioscape	  of	  
European	  security	  at	  large:	  that	  is	  its	  density	  of	  institutionalisation	  (including	  the	  EU,	  
NATO,	  the	  OSCE,	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe).	  
An	  important	  concept	  that	  ties	  into	  the	  debate	  on	  transgovernmentalism	  is	  that	  
of	  epistemic	  communities	  because	  it	  directs	  out	  attention	  to	  the	  critical	  issue	  of	  
authority	  derived	  from	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  institutional	  location.	  A	  number	  of	  
authors	  have	  highlighted	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  diverse	  mix	  of	  actors	  engaged	  in	  
these	  networks	  that	  drive	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  EU	  security	  forwards,	  as	  illustrated	  
by	  Howorth	  in	  his	  account	  of	  how	  a	  new	  communicative	  discourse	  took	  hold	  in	  the	  
epistemic	  community.190	  James	  Rogers’	  explication	  of	  how	  a	  group	  of	  euro-­‐strategists	  
elaborated	  and	  facilitated	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  from	  civilian	  power	  to	  global	  power	  around	  
the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  small	  elite	  networks	  that	  
employ	  their	  institutional	  and	  knowledge	  authority.	  Similar	  arguments	  have	  been	  
forwarded	  by	  Mérand,	  Mérand	  et	  al.	  and	  Davis	  Cross.191	  	  
We	  should	  note,	  though,	  that	  while	  most	  studies	  employing	  the	  concept	  of	  
‘epistemic	  communities’	  primarily	  occupy	  themselves	  with	  shared	  discourse	  and	  the	  role	  
of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  expertise	  in	  structuring	  policy	  choices,	  they	  mostly	  abstain	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from	  making	  inferences	  at	  the	  level	  of	  decision-­‐taking	  and	  thus	  disregard	  a	  conception	  
of	  security	  that	  is	  practice-­‐oriented.	  	  
	  
The	  picture	  of	  the	  space	  of	  EU	  security	  that	  emerges	  shows	  a	  political	  sphere,	  which	  is	  in	  
many	  respects	  de-­‐politicised.	  The	  rationale	  of	  transgovernmentalism	  produces	  and	  
reinforces	  a	  strongly	  consensus-­‐oriented	  dynamic	  that	  steers	  policy-­‐making	  in	  EU	  
foreign	  policy,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  oppositional	  forces	  are	  excluded	  by	  default.	  Translated	  
into	  a	  policy	  formula	  we	  may	  surmise	  the	  following:	  in	  a	  system	  of	  executive	  dominance,	  
voting	  rules	  that	  require	  unanimity	  but	  allow	  abstention,	  significant	  socialisation	  
towards	  consensus-­‐oriented	  norms,	  the	  outcome	  is	  one	  where	  political	  contestation	  is	  
minimal.	  Either	  the	  policy	  process	  leads	  to	  unified	  action,	  no	  action	  or	  core	  group	  action	  
(e.g.	  variable	  geometry,	  multiple	  speeds,	  etc.).	  Consequently,	  the	  democratic	  deficit	  that	  
is	  generally	  invoked	  to	  criticise	  the	  opacity	  of	  EU	  politics	  is	  undeniably	  more	  grave	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  security	  if	  we	  consider	  its	  sensitive	  nature	  but	  overwhelming	  lack	  of	  checks	  and	  
balances	  within	  CSDP.	  The	  ‘democratic	  deficit’	  critique	  points	  at	  a	  critical	  structural	  
inhibition	  to	  democratic	  politics	  at	  the	  European	  level	  and	  it	  is	  reflective	  of	  a	  wider	  trend	  
in	  European	  politics,	  namely	  the	  transitioning	  into	  what	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  criticises	  as	  
‘post-­‐politics’.192	  	  
Post-­‐politics	  describes	  the	  denial	  of	  agony	  in	  politics,	  as	  the	  unreflexive	  pluralist	  
bias	  inherent	  in	  much	  of	  contemporary	  liberalism	  aims	  to	  externalise	  conflict	  from	  
politics.193	  The	  result,	  however	  is	  not	  an	  amelioration	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  but	  
rather	  its	  hollowing	  out	  through	  the	  imperative	  of	  consensus.	  It	  is	  the	  great	  paradox	  of	  
the	  European	  debt	  crisis	  –	  which	  by	  extension	  has	  become	  a	  constitutive	  crisis	  of	  the	  
European	  project	  itself	  –	  that	  it	  has	  made	  apparent	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  alternatives	  to	  
the	  dominance	  of	  neoliberal	  capitalism.	  The	  centre-­‐ground	  of	  national	  electoral	  
competition	  has	  become	  vanishingly	  small	  with	  regards	  to	  economic	  governance	  as	  
centre-­‐left	  parties	  do	  not	  offer	  alternative	  visions	  to	  neoliberal	  capitalism.194	  According	  
to	  Hay,	  widespread	  internalisation	  of	  the	  demands	  and	  effects	  of	  deregulation	  has	  led	  
European	  citizens	  to	  ‘hate	  politics’	  that	  cannot	  offer	  them	  any	  protection.	  195	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  Europe	  are	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While	  a	  state	  of	  post-­‐politics	  is	  increasingly	  felt	  as	  a	  political	  and	  social	  reality	  
since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis,	  its	  beginnings	  go	  back	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  
consolidation	  of	  late-­‐twentieth	  century	  globalisation	  (recall	  ‘The	  End	  of	  History’196	  as	  an	  
early	  manifestation	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  post-­‐political).	  At	  the	  international	  level	  the	  post-­‐
political	  is	  expressed	  in	  an	  aspiration	  towards	  universal	  human	  values	  and	  human	  rights,	  
and	  an	  overarching	  liberal	  consensus.	  	  	  
We	  can	  relate	  the	  previous	  discussion	  of	  EU	  security	  transgovernmentalism	  to	  
the	  idea	  of	  the	  post-­‐political	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  former,	  representative	  of	  a	  supranationality	  
without	  supranational	  institutions,	  sees	  EU	  security	  cooperation	  not	  so	  much	  as	  a	  
collective	  state	  response	  to	  the	  obstinacy	  or	  obsolescence	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  but	  rather	  
as	  its	  transformation.197	  This	  transformation	  is	  intimately	  motivated	  by	  the	  structural,	  
external	  forces	  of	  globalisation	  that	  have	  become	  unmanageable	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
national	  politics.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  post-­‐politics	  translates	  into	  a	  
demand	  for	  an	  amelioration	  of	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  globalisation.	  The	  next	  chapter	  
specifies	  how	  this	  informs	  not	  only	  EU	  external	  activity	  at	  large	  but	  also	  the	  realm	  of	  EU	  
security	  and	  counter-­‐piracy	  in	  particular.	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At	  this	  point	  I	  would	  like	  to	  weave	  together	  a	  few	  conceptual	  and	  substantive	  threads	  
that	  have	  outlined	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  analysis	  so	  far,	  by	  relating	  them	  to	  a	  particular	  
rationale	  of	  EU	  external	  action:	  ‘managing	  globalisation’.	  Regarding	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  
various	  narrative	  strands	  of	  EU	  power,	  when	  viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  post-­‐
political,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  what	  is	  missing	  in	  the	  international	  identity	  of	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  
conception	  of	  the	  ‘other’,	  which	  in	  turn	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  incomplete	  understanding	  of	  the	  
self.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  so	  far	  discussions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  or	  rationale	  for	  EU	  power	  
remain	  mired	  in	  inconclusiveness	  as	  they	  do	  not	  accomplish	  to	  construct	  the	  
constitutive	  arc	  between	  structure	  and	  practice	  of	  EU	  security.	  The	  recent	  emergence	  of	  
the	  notion	  of	  a	  strategic	  deficit	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  EU	  security	  is	  not	  so	  much	  an	  analytical	  
reflection	  of	  a	  new	  mismatch	  between	  capabilities	  and	  expectations	  to	  fulfil	  a	  global	  
power	  aspiration	  as	  it	  is	  the	  belayed	  empirical	  rejection	  of	  the	  inherently	  misguided	  
evolutionary	  logic	  pervasive	  in	  the	  epistemic	  community	  of	  EU	  security.	  The	  problem	  is	  
that	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  ‘natural’	  progression	  from	  civilian	  power	  towards	  global	  
power	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  view	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  deficit	  as	  something	  to	  be	  
overcome,	  instead	  of	  something	  to	  be	  understood.198	  	  
	   The	  historicity	  of	  EU	  security	  compels	  us	  to	  locate	  apparent	  contradictions	  such	  
as	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  within	  the	  contingent	  institutionalisation	  of	  EU	  security,	  a	  
defining	  yet	  largely	  overlooked	  feature	  of	  which	  is	  its	  post-­‐political	  nature.	  What	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  I	  reject	  such	  an	  abstraction	  of	  EU	  security	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  misguided	  attachment	  to	  state-­‐
centric	  notions	  of	  the	  national	  interest	  or	  military	  power	  (and	  unified	  command	  thereof)	  and	  
consequentially	  only	  finds	  disappointment	  in	  the	  state	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  aspiring	  global	  power.	  In	  
the	  move	  towards	  global	  power,	  ‘power’	  becomes	  a	  quality	  to	  be	  achieved,	  a	  resource	  to	  be	  
possessed.	  Even	  previous	  civilian	  and	  normative	  accounts	  of	  EU	  power	  were	  primarily	  interested	  
in	  the	  nature	  of	  power,	  instead	  of	  its	  effects.	  But	  it	  is	  precisely	  when	  looking	  towards	  the	  effects	  
of	  EU	  power	  –	  which	  we	  can	  only	  gauge	  by	  analysing	  its	  practice	  –	  that	  we	  gain	  a	  more	  thorough	  
understanding	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  EU	  international	  actorhood.	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allows	  us	  to	  do	  is	  not	  only	  to	  have	  a	  more	  precise	  understanding	  of	  the	  institutional	  
constraints	  on	  the	  delivery	  of	  EU	  crisis	  management	  operations,	  but,	  more	  importantly,	  
to	  point	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  overarching	  structuring	  device	  of	  EU	  external	  action,	  both	  
in	  terms	  of	  material	  reality	  as	  well	  as	  ideational	  frame	  of	  reference:	  globalisation.	  	  
Globalisation	  is	  a	  notion	  that	  is	  often	  invoked	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  explaining	  EU	  
action	  on	  the	  global	  scene.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  globalisation	  remains	  a	  hotly	  contested	  
term	  in	  IR.	  While	  for	  some	  it	  simply	  means	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  199,	  for	  
most	  globalisation	  represents	  a	  complex	  phenomenon,	  characterised	  by	  multiple	  
simultaneous	  processes.	  Accordingly,	  David	  Held	  et	  al.	  contend	  that	  globalisation	  can	  be	  
thought	  of	  as:	  
“a	  process	  (or	  set	  of	  processes)	  which	  embodies	  a	  transformation	  in	  the	  spatial	  
organization	  of	  social	  relations	  and	  transactions	  –	  assessed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  extensity,	  
intensity,	  velocity	  and	  impact	  –	  generating	  transcontinental	  or	  interregional	  flows	  and	  
networks	  of	  activity,	  interaction,	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  power”.200	  
	  
Its	  crucial	  component	  of	  interconnectedness	  is	  spelled	  out	  by	  Anthony	  Giddens:	  
“Globalization	  can	  thus	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  intensification	  of	  worldwide	  social	  relations	  
which	  link	  distant	  localities	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  local	  happenings	  are	  shaped	  by	  events	  
occurring	  many	  miles	  away	  and	  vice	  versa”.201	  
	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  EU	  –	  when	  considering	  its	  institutional	  evolution	  up	  to	  its	  present	  
state	  –	  is	  as	  much	  an	  outcome	  of	  (processes	  of)	  globalisation,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  driver	  of	  the	  
latter	  itself.	  Because	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  often	  treated	  as	  the	  archetypal	  institutional	  template	  
for	  a	  globalised	  order.	  More	  specifically	  to	  our	  case	  at	  hand,	  what	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  
intriguingly	  illustrates	  is	  not	  simply	  this	  dialectic	  of	  cause	  and	  effect,	  but	  how	  it	  leads	  to	  
an	  elaboration	  of	  self/other	  within	  the	  space	  of	  EU	  security,	  and	  consequentially	  reveals	  
the	  self-­‐referential	  positioning	  of	  the	  EU	  against	  global	  disorder	  and	  chaos	  as	  an	  
overarching	  problematique.	  Concurrently,	  the	  issue	  of	  piracy	  reflects	  a	  preoccupation	  
with	  the	  disparate	  challenges	  that	  globalisation	  poses.	  	  
The	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  this	  problematisation	  is	  
therefore	  logically	  grounded	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘the	  management	  of	  globalisation’,	  which	  I	  
contend	  to	  be	  a	  fundamental	  organising	  principle	  of	  EU	  external	  action.	  The	  notion	  goes	  
back	  to	  1999	  and	  was	  introduced	  by	  Pascal	  Lamy	  in	  his	  role	  as	  Commissioner	  of	  Trade	  in	  
the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  Single	  Market	  and	  the	  concurrent	  push	  of	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the	  EU	  towards	  assuming	  the	  stature	  of	  a	  trade	  bloc.202	  Rather	  unsurprisingly,	  the	  idea	  
of	  ‘managing	  globalisation’	  emerged	  as	  an	  economic	  rationale,	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  
predominantly	  economically	  oriented	  ‘power’	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  trade	  actor.	  It	  also	  
represents	  the	  typically	  continental	  European	  perspective	  on	  political	  economy	  –	  as	  
reflected	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  coordinated	  market	  economies	  under	  the	  research	  agenda	  of	  
‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  203	  –	  and	  arguably	  includes	  a	  measure	  of	  French	  dirigisme.204	  
Jacoby	  and	  Meunier	  define	  ‘managed	  globalisation’	  as:	  	  
“the	  attempt	  by	  public	  or	  private	  actors	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  liberalization	  of	  rules	  about	  
international	  flows	  of	  goods	  and	  services,	  capital,	  and	  labor	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  formal	  
practices	  to	  bind	  market	  players	  and	  their	  governments”.205	  	  
	  
As	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  idea	  of	  managing	  globalisation	  has	  implications	  that	  reach	  far	  
beyond	  its	  economic	  rationale.	  In	  fact,	  its	  conceptual	  import	  can	  be	  creatively	  applied	  to	  
the	  realm	  of	  EU	  security,	  which	  becomes	  apparent	  when	  we	  consider	  its	  five	  core	  
mechanisms	  that	  describe	  the	  management	  of	  globalisation:	  
“expanding	  policy	  scope,	  exercising	  regulatory	  inﬂuence,	  empowering	  international	  
institutions,	  enlarging	  the	  territorial	  sphere	  of	  EU	  inﬂuence,	  and	  redistributing	  the	  costs	  
of	  globalization”.206	  
	  
Again,	  while	  this	  conceptualisation	  of	  Jacoby	  and	  Meunier	  was	  developed	  more	  
specifically	  with	  EU	  trade	  policy	  in	  mind	  207,	  the	  following	  explication	  makes	  intelligible	  
how	  the	  concept	  travels	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  security	  and	  counter-­‐piracy:	  	  
1)	  Expanding	  policy	  scope:	  As	  a	  response	  to	  the	  various	  pressures	  emanating	  
from	  globalisation,	  which	  undermine	  the	  capacity	  of	  individual	  nation-­‐states	  to	  
effectively	  pursue	  their	  interests	  on	  the	  global	  stage,	  EU	  member	  states	  formulate	  and	  
execute	  joint	  policy	  initiatives.	  A	  prominent	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Euro,	  where	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  common	  currency	  was	  at	  the	  same	  time	  geared	  at	  providing	  EU	  
member	  states	  with	  a	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  stability	  mechanism	  –	  we	  shall	  ignore	  the	  
actual	  consequences	  of	  this	  harmonising	  move	  on	  many	  Euro	  countries’	  fiscal	  situation	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for	  now	  –	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  the	  collective	  more	  weight	  on	  the	  international	  financial	  and	  
trade	  stage.	  	  
It	  is	  a	  minor	  leap	  to	  consider	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  efforts	  as	  such	  an	  instance	  of	  
expanding	  policy	  scope.	  On	  the	  macro-­‐level,	  the	  creation	  and	  development	  of	  CSDP	  
itself	  has	  been	  a	  major	  step	  towards	  expanding	  policy	  scope.	  Within	  the	  realm	  of	  EU	  
foreign	  policy	  counter-­‐piracy	  is	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  instance	  as	  it	  brings	  together	  
the	  otherwise	  somewhat	  disparate	  realms	  of	  trade	  policy	  and	  security	  policy.	  Combined	  
with	  the	  targeting	  of	  private	  actors	  as	  security	  threat	  this	  implies	  a	  more	  variegated	  
view	  of	  security.	  What	  is	  of	  crucial	  significance	  in	  this	  respect	  is	  the	  discursive	  
construction	  of	  the	  pirate	  as	  universal	  enemy	  whereby	  EU	  action	  is	  legitimised.	  In	  
substantive	  terms,	  the	  primary	  composition	  of	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  as	  a	  naval	  security	  
operation	  represents	  a	  genuine	  novelty	  in	  EU	  security	  policy.	  This	  is	  further	  
compounded	  by	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  mission	  and	  resources	  committed.	  	  
2)	  Exercising	  regulatory	  inﬂuence:	  As	  Jacoby	  and	  Meunier	  make	  clear,	  the	  EU	  is	  
the	  world’s	  leading	  regulatory	  actor,	  setting	  standards	  in	  anything	  from	  food,	  to	  
chemicals,	  medicines	  and	  telecommunications,	  and	  regulatory	  influence	  is	  
operationalised	  via	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  mutual	  recognition,	  the	  open	  method	  of	  
coordination	  and	  variable	  geometry	  schemes.208	  	  
Transferring	  this	  idea	  to	  counter-­‐piracy	  highlights	  the	  relevance	  of	  EU	  efforts	  to	  
shape	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  local	  security	  regime,	  specifically	  regarding	  its	  
institutional	  support	  for	  the	  creation	  and	  reform	  of	  local	  security	  services	  and	  penal	  
systems.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  EU	  does	  not	  only	  fight	  piracy	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  but	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  establishes	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  its	  partnered	  local	  countries	  will	  
assert	  their	  own	  control	  over	  the	  issue.	  
3)	  Empowering	  international	  institutions:	  International	  institutions	  are	  both	  a	  
conduit	  for	  the	  management	  of	  globalisation	  as	  well	  as	  an	  incident	  thereof	  at	  the	  same	  
time.	  The	  EU	  has	  actively	  supported	  the	  expansion	  and	  strengthening	  of	  organisations	  
such	  as	  the	  WTO,	  OECD	  and	  IMF.209	  The	  underlying	  rationale	  for	  the	  EU	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
write	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  that	  is	  stipulating	  the	  conditions	  according	  to	  which	  states	  
compete	  and	  cooperate	  under	  globalisation.210	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In	  the	  case	  of	  counter-­‐piracy,	  the	  EU	  empowers	  international	  institutions	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  various	  coordinating	  mechanisms	  and	  forums	  that	  bring	  together	  a	  variety	  of	  
international	  actors,	  including	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  states,	  international	  organisations	  (such	  
as	  the	  UN	  and	  NATO),	  merchant	  and	  shipping	  companies,	  insurance	  companies,	  and	  
private	  security	  companies.	  
4)	  Enlarging	  the	  territorial	  sphere	  of	  EU	  inﬂuence:	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  
expansion	  of	  EU	  territorial	  influence,	  the	  prominent	  example	  remains	  the	  EU	  
enlargement	  policy.211	  Through	  the	  process	  of	  enlargement	  new	  member	  states	  become	  
effectively	  subsumed	  by	  the	  EU	  polity	  and	  its	  acquis	  communautaire.	  Other	  efforts	  in	  
this	  regard	  are	  regional	  trade	  agreements,	  such	  as	  the	  Economic	  Partnership	  
Agreements	  with	  blocs	  of	  African	  countries,	  which	  rest	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent	  on	  the	  
EU	  power	  as	  a	  model	  for	  regional	  integration.	  	  
While	  the	  geographical	  distance	  to	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  is	  undeniable,	  there	  is	  
some	  relevance	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘model	  power’	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  informs	  the	  EU	  approach	  to	  
supporting	  the	  creation	  of	  collective	  security	  schemes	  among	  stakeholder	  states	  in	  the	  
region	  –	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  integrated	  coast	  guard	  forces.	  
5)	  Redistributing	  the	  costs	  of	  globalisation:	  The	  fact	  that	  globalisation	  involves	  
winners	  and	  losers	  is	  all	  too	  apparent	  at	  this	  point.	  Generally,	  EU	  aid	  and	  development	  
assistance	  policies	  are	  meant	  to	  address	  this	  issue	  by	  providing	  financial	  support	  to	  least	  
developed	  countries,	  for	  instance,	  through	  the	  ‘Aid	  for	  Trade’	  scheme	  under	  the	  
umbrella	  of	  the	  WTO.212	  	  
Notably	  in	  the	  case	  of	  piracy,	  positions	  are	  reversed,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  EU	  that	  is	  
straightforwardly	  suffering	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  globalisation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
piracy,	  whereas	  the	  picture	  is	  considerably	  murkier	  for	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  HoA.	  The	  EU	  
assumes	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  direct	  costs	  of	  piracy	  mitigation	  –	  that	  is	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
naval	  deployments	  or	  financial	  support	  for	  the	  reform	  of	  local	  security	  services.	  
However,	  the	  EU	  approach	  to	  the	  management	  of	  piracy	  as	  a	  security	  concern	  also	  
involves	  an	  effort	  of	  externalising	  responsibility	  to	  HoA	  states	  to	  deal	  with	  unwanted	  
ancillary	  issues	  of	  piracy,	  such	  as	  the	  detention	  and	  prosecution	  of	  arrested	  pirates.	  
Consequently,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  redistribution	  works	  in	  the	  opposite	  
direction	  than	  in	  trade	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
members	  will	  have	  to	  submit,	  the	  very	  admission	  of	  such	  new	  members	  will	  unavoidably	  diminish	  
EU	  influence	  within	  these	  institutions.	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It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  ‘disparate’	  five	  mechanisms	  are	  often	  intertwined	  
at	  many	  points,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  they	  may	  work	  in	  conjunction	  or	  sequence	  with	  one	  
another.	  This	  will	  become	  clearer	  in	  the	  analysis	  to	  come.	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘management	  of	  globalisation’	  is	  well	  reflected	  in	  public	  
discourse	  by	  central	  EU	  officials,	  such	  as	  former	  Commission	  President	  Prodi	  and	  former	  
Commissioner	  for	  External	  Relations	  Ferrero-­‐Waldner.213	  According	  to	  Ferrero-­‐Waldner	  
“the	  EU	  is	  uniquely	  placed	  to	  deal	  with	  new	  trans-­‐national	  challenges.	  In	  the	  21st	  
century,	  managing	  globalization	  is	  its	  new	  raison	  d'être”.214	  Mario	  Monti	  cautioned	  
against	  the	  perils	  of	  “ungoverned	  globalization”215	  and	  Ferrero-­‐Waldner	  alluded	  to	  the	  
“dark	  side”	  of	  globalisation,	  which,	  for	  example,	  comes	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  technological	  
change	  that	  enables	  the	  enemies	  of	  globalisation	  (although	  she	  does	  not	  specify	  who	  
that	  might	  be).216	  What	  these	  statements	  indicate	  is	  that	  inherent	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  global	  
interconnectedness	  is	  also	  a	  volatility	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  mitigated	  and	  managed.	  	  
The	  discourse	  of	  ‘managing	  globalisation’	  captures	  the	  liberal,	  post-­‐political	  
approach	  to	  world	  politics.	  It	  constructs	  an	  image	  of	  the	  EU	  that	  is	  truly	  global	  in	  remit,	  
both	  affected	  by	  global	  processes	  and	  simultaneously	  intending	  to	  affect	  these	  same	  
processes.	  The	  issue	  is	  at	  core	  a	  strategic	  one	  as	  it	  asks	  what	  the	  EU	  can	  and	  should	  do	  in	  
the	  world.	  This	  study	  will	  demonstrate	  its	  applicability	  to	  EU	  security,	  particularly	  its	  
resonance	  with	  the	  EU’s	  objective	  of	  ‘effective	  multilateralism’.	  As	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  
by	  the	  empirical	  part	  of	  this	  investigation,	  Somali	  piracy	  can	  be	  (and	  indeed	  is)	  framed	  as	  
a	  quasi	  by-­‐product	  of	  globalisation	  by	  the	  EU,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  borne	  out	  of	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  globalisation	  while	  unsettling	  this	  global	  order.	  The	  EU’s	  response	  is	  built	  
around	  the	  notion	  of	  effective	  multilateralism	  in	  that	  it	  espouses	  an	  explicitly	  global	  
view	  of	  the	  security	  problem	  of	  piracy	  and	  forwards	  an	  explicitly	  global	  response	  to	  it	  as	  
well.	  The	  EU’s	  move	  towards	  the	  role	  of	  a	  security	  provider	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  spells	  out	  
its	  self-­‐perception	  as	  a	  manager	  of	  globalisation.	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One	  of	  the	  major	  difficulties	  in	  the	  study	  of	  EU	  security	  –	  evident	  in	  the	  discussion	  on	  
the	  strategic	  deficit	  –	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  security	  mostly	  exists	  as	  an	  abstract	  that	  is	  inferred	  
from	  loose	  references	  to	  ‘weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction’,	  ‘regional	  stability’,	  or	  ‘failed	  
states’.	  The	  absence	  of	  agency	  –	  i.e.	  not	  simply	  what	  is	  a	  threat	  but	  who	  is	  a	  threat?	  –	  is	  
striking.	  This	  is	  where	  piracy	  represents	  a	  departure.	  The	  elaboration	  of	  the	  pirate	  as	  the	  
relevant	  ‘other’,	  the	  enemy,	  allows	  the	  EU	  to	  define	  itself	  on	  the	  international	  stage.	  In	  
fact,	  the	  pirate	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  international	  relations	  is	  distinguished	  by	  his	  
unpolitical	  nature.	  Driven	  by	  profit	  and	  operating	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  outside	  of	  the	  formal	  
jurisdiction	  of	  states,	  the	  pirate	  represents	  a	  rather	  peculiar	  security	  threat.	  As	  an	  
inherently	  unpolitical	  creature,	  the	  pirate	  is	  transformed	  into	  the	  enemy	  of	  all,	  an	  
‘enemy	  of	  mankind’.	  By	  relating	  the	  material	  and	  ideational	  dimensions	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  
as	  expressed	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy,	  we	  can	  appreciate	  how	  the	  EU	  
constructs	  a	  security	  profile	  for	  itself	  that	  aims	  at	  a	  more	  global	  role,	  which,	  however,	  is	  
inherently	  unpolitical	  itself,	  as	  it	  expresses	  a	  predominantly	  technical	  approach	  of	  
managing	  globalisation.	  
This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  EU	  elevates	  piracy	  to	  the	  level	  of	  existential	  threat,	  
not	  to	  the	  EU	  itself	  but	  to	  global	  order	  and	  stability.	  The	  enacted	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  EU	  
as	  champion	  of	  globalisation	  and	  pirate	  as	  menace	  of	  and	  to	  globalisation	  facilitates	  a	  
new	  understanding	  of	  the	  EU	  a	  global	  security-­‐provider,	  a	  manager	  of	  globalisation	  and	  
its	  adverse	  effects.	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  First,	  I	  outline	  the	  relevant	  
legal	  definitions	  of	  piracy	  as	  forwarded	  by	  international	  organisations.	  Second,	  I	  outline	  
the	  mission	  parameters	  of	  EU	  naval	  force	  Atalanta	  and	  then	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  
material	  factors	  that	  are	  most	  commonly	  invoked	  to	  explain	  the	  EU’s	  engagement,	  
namely	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  Somali	  piracy,	  and	  the	  wider	  geostrategic	  significance	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of	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  Third,	  I	  move	  to	  the	  ideational	  side	  of	  Somali	  piracy,	  specifically	  
how	  the	  EU	  frames	  the	  issue	  with	  recourse	  to	  a	  Schmittian	  logic	  of	  identity	  construction	  
that	  views	  piracy	  as	  an	  ‘enemy	  of	  all’,	  the	  personification	  of	  the	  ‘dark	  side’	  of	  
globalisation.	  This	  provides	  the	  conceptual	  frame	  for	  understanding	  the	  EU’s	  
reductionist	  view	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  piracy	  and	  its	  maximalist	  view	  of	  piracy	  as	  
an	  instance	  of	  organised	  crime.	  The	  conclusion	  ties	  these	  lines	  of	  argumentation	  
together	  in	  as	  far	  as	  piracy	  represents	  a	  distinctly	  global	  –	  and	  globalised	  –	  security	  issue	  
for	  the	  EU.	  The	  EU’s	  framing	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  not	  only	  confirms	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  EU	  
claims	  for	  itself	  a	  more	  global	  role	  as	  a	  security	  actor	  but	  also	  specifically	  a	  role	  that	  
implies	  globalisation	  must	  be	  managed	  and	  the	  EU	  is	  particularly	  well-­‐placed	  to	  do	  this.	  	  
	  
	  
6.1	  What	  is	  piracy?	  	  
	  
The	  mission	  mandate	  of	  operation	  Atalanta	  makes	  specific	  reference	  to	  ‘piracy’	  and	  
‘armed	  robbery’	  at	  sea,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  well	  defined	  in	  international	  law.	  According	  to	  
Article	  101	  of	  1982	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  acts	  of	  piracy	  include	  any	  of	  
the	  following:	  
“(a)	  any	  illegal	  acts	  of	  violence	  or	  detention,	  or	  any	  act	  of	  depredation,	  committed	  for	  
private	  ends	  by	  the	  crew	  or	  the	  passengers	  of	  a	  private	  ship	  or	  a	  private	  aircraft,	  and	  
directed:	  
(i)	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  against	  another	  ship	  or	  aircraft,	  or	  against	  persons	  or	  property	  on	  
board	  such	  ship	  or	  aircraft;	  
(ii)	  against	  a	  ship,	  aircraft,	  persons	  or	  property	  in	  a	  place	  outside	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  
State;	  
(b)	  any	  act	  of	  voluntary	  participation	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  ship	  or	  of	  an	  aircraft	  with	  
knowledge	  of	  facts	  making	  it	  a	  pirate	  ship	  or	  aircraft;	  
(c)	  any	  act	  of	  inciting	  or	  of	  intentionally	  facilitating	  an	  act	  described	  in	  subparagraph	  (a)	  
or	  (b).”	  217	  
	  
Article	  2.2	  of	  Resolution	  A.1025(26),	  adopted	  by	  the	  26th	  Assembly	  Session	  of	  the	  
International	  Maritime	  Organisation	  on	  2	  December	  2009	  defines	  ‘armed	  robbery’	  
against	  ships	  as	  including	  any	  of	  the	  following	  acts:	  
“.1	  any	  illegal	  act	  of	  violence	  or	  detention	  or	  any	  act	  of	  depredation,	  or	  threat	  thereof,	  
other	  than	  an	  act	  of	  piracy,	  committed	  for	  private	  ends	  and	  directed	  against	  a	  ship	  or	  
against	  persons	  or	  property	  on	  board	  such	  a	  ship,	  within	  a	  State’s	  internal	  waters,	  
archipelagic	  waters	  and	  territorial	  sea;	  	  
.2	  any	  act	  of	  inciting	  or	  of	  intentionally	  facilitating	  an	  act	  described	  above.”	  218	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  Nations	  (1982).	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea,	  10	  December	  1982,	  
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf,	  last	  accessed	  
16	  June	  2013.	  This	  definition	  is	  directly	  derived	  from	  1958	  Convention	  on	  the	  High	  Seas.	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Both	  definitions	  are	  identical	  safe	  for	  the	  differentiation	  into	  ‘high	  seas’	  and	  ‘state’s	  
territorial	  sea’,	  relevant	  mostly	  in	  terms	  of	  international	  law	  and	  procedures	  for	  arrest	  
and	  prosecution.	  The	  second	  definition	  is	  important	  since	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  piracy	  
incidents	  occurring	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  some	  of	  these	  are	  in	  fact	  committed	  either	  in	  
port	  or	  in	  territorial	  waters.	  	  
For	  the	  sake	  of	  convenience,	  the	  less	  legalistic	  and	  more	  inclusive	  definition	  
forwarded	  by	  the	  International	  Maritime	  Bureau	  seems	  most	  appropriate	  for	  our	  
purpose:	  	  
“An	  act	  of	  boarding	  or	  attempting	  to	  board	  any	  ship	  with	  the	  apparent	  intent	  to	  commit	  
theft	  or	  any	  other	  crime	  and	  with	  the	  apparent	  intent	  or	  capability	  to	  use	  force	  in	  the	  
furtherance	  of	  that	  act.”	  219	  
	  
While	  these	  definitions	  give	  us	  a	  good	  idea	  of	  the	  act	  of	  piracy,	  they	  tell	  us	  little	  about	  
the	  phenomenon	  of	  piracy	  itself.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘Islamic	  terrorism’	  
does	  not	  simply	  make	  a	  statement	  about	  the	  religion	  that	  its	  perpetrators	  happen	  to	  
share	  but	  extends	  to	  the	  social,	  cultural,	  ideological	  and	  political	  struggles	  involved,	  
piracy	  is	  a	  complex	  phenomenon	  that	  operates	  at	  various	  conceptual	  lines	  of	  
international	  relations.	  	  
	  
	  
6.2	  Somali	  piracy	  and	  the	  EU:	  a	  material	  perspective	  
	  
To	  gauge	  why	  and	  how	  Somali	  piracy	  represents	  a	  security	  issue	  for	  the	  EU	  the	  first	  step	  
is	  to	  look	  at	  the	  mandate	  of	  operation	  Atalanta.	  The	  mission’s	  general	  objective	  is	  the	  
“deterrence,	  prevention	  and	  repression	  of	  acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  
Somali	  coast”.220	  The	  mandate	  is	  provided	  by	  Council	  Joint	  Action	  2008/851/CFSP	  of	  10	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  International	  Maritime	  Organization	  (2009).	  Resolution	  A.1025(26),	  Code	  of	  Practice	  for	  the	  
Investigation	  of	  Crimes	  and	  Piracy	  and	  Armed	  Robbery	  against	  Ships.	  2	  December	  2009.	  
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf,	  
last	  accessed	  7	  July	  2013.	  
219	  International	  Maritime	  Bureau	  (2003).	  Piracy	  and	  Armed	  Robbery	  against	  Ships:	  Annual	  Report	  
2002.	  London:	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  Commercial	  Crime	  Services.	  See	  
http://www.icc-­‐ccs.org/piracy-­‐reporting-­‐centre	  
220	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  (2008).	  COUNCIL	  JOINT	  ACTION	  2008/851/CFSP	  of	  10	  November	  2008	  on	  a	  
European	  Union	  military	  operation	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  deterrence,	  prevention	  and	  repression	  of	  
acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast.	  Official	  Journal	  of	  the	  EU,	  L	  301/33,	  12	  
November	  2008.	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November	  2008	  (in	  turn	  based	  on	  UNSC	  resolutions	  1814	  (2008),	  1816	  (2008)	  and	  1838	  
(2008))	  and	  includes	  the	  following	  parameters:	  
a) “provide	  protection	  to	  vessels	  chartered	  by	  the	  WFP,	  including	  by	  means	  of	  the	  
presence	  on	  board	  those	  vessels	  of	  armed	  units	  of	  Atalanta,	  in	  particular	  when	  cruising	  
in	  Somali	  territorial	  waters”;	  
b) “provide	  protection,	  based	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  evaluation	  of	  needs,	  to	  merchant	  vessels	  
cruising	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  it	  is	  deployed”;	  
c) “keep	  watch	  over	  areas	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast,	  including	  Somalia’s	  territorial	  waters,	  in	  
which	  there	  are	  dangers	  to	  maritime	  activities,	  in	  particular	  to	  maritime	  traffic”;	  
d) “take	  the	  necessary	  measures,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  to	  deter,	  prevent	  and	  
intervene	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  to	  an	  end	  acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  which	  may	  be	  
committed	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  it	  is	  present”;	  
e) “in	  view	  of	  prosecutions	  potentially	  being	  brought	  by	  the	  relevant	  States	  under	  the	  
conditions	  in	  Article	  12,	  arrest,	  detain	  and	  transfer	  persons	  who	  have	  committed,	  or	  are	  
suspected	  of	  having	  committed,	  acts	  of	  piracy	  or	  armed	  robbery	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  it	  is	  
present	  and	  seize	  the	  vessels	  of	  the	  pirates	  or	  armed	  robbers	  or	  the	  vessels	  caught	  
following	  an	  act	  of	  piracy	  or	  an	  armed	  robbery	  and	  which	  are	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  pirates,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  goods	  on	  board”;	  
f) “liaise	  with	  organisations	  and	  entities,	  as	  well	  as	  States,	  working	  in	  the	  region	  to	  combat	  
acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast,	  in	  particular	  the	  ‘Combined	  Task	  
Force	  150’	  maritime	  force	  which	  operates	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  ‘Operation	  Enduring	  
Freedom’”.	  
	  
The	  2012	  amendment	  of	  the	  Council	  Joint	  Action	  extended	  the	  mandate	  in	  geographical	  
scope,	  explicitly	  included	  the	  monitoring	  of	  fishing	  activities	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia,	  
and	  included	  African	  Union	  Mission	  in	  Somalia	  (AMISOM)	  vessels	  to	  protected	  status.221	  	  
The	  mission	  mandate	  shows	  that	  piracy	  poses	  a	  maritime	  security	  threat,	  
however	  it	  remains	  unclear	  what	  specifically	  is	  being	  threatened	  and	  how	  so.	  In	  terms	  of	  
its	  operational	  profile	  Atalanta	  represents	  an	  effort	  at	  containment,	  with	  European	  
navies	  patrolling	  the	  seas	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Somalia	  to	  contract	  the	  pirates’	  space	  of	  
manoeuvre.	  The	  military	  presence	  serves	  as	  a	  shield	  for	  any	  international	  ships	  passing	  
through	  the	  area.	  This	  should	  not	  lead	  us	  to	  construe	  the	  issue	  of	  piracy	  as	  a	  military	  
problem.	  Although	  the	  EU	  response	  is	  fashioned	  in	  military	  terms,	  the	  problem	  of	  piracy	  
itself	  is	  much	  more	  variegated.	  In	  fact,	  it	  would	  be	  outlandish	  to	  suggest	  that	  Somali	  
piracy	  could	  present	  a	  military	  threat	  to	  European	  countries,	  i.e.	  to	  put	  their	  military	  
and/or	  political	  survival	  in	  question.	  Instead	  of	  a	  military	  problem,	  Somali	  piracy	  is	  
framed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  specific	  trade	  interests	  as	  well	  as	  presenting	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  
global	  economic	  and	  legal	  order	  at	  large.	  Other	  secondary	  concerns	  may	  relate	  to	  the	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  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  (2012).	  COUNCIL	  DECISION	  2012/174/CFSP	  of	  23	  March	  2012	  amending	  Joint	  
Action	  2008/851/CFSP	  on	  a	  European	  Union	  military	  operation	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  deterrence,	  
prevention	  and	  repression	  of	  acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast.	  Official	  
Journal	  of	  the	  EU,	  L	  89/69,	  27	  March	  2012.	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threat	  to	  life	  of	  European	  and	  Somali	  citizens,	  and	  negative	  externalities	  to	  political	  
stability	  in	  Somalia.	  
	  
6.2.1	  The	  costs	  of	  piracy	  
Chalk	  and	  Hansen	  list	  four	  reasons	  why	  states	  should	  be	  concerned	  about	  piracy:	  1)	  it	  
represents	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  lives	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	  citizens	  of	  flag	  states;	  2)	  it	  has	  
direct	  economic	  costs	  in	  various	  forms;	  3)	  it	  poses	  a	  potential	  cause	  for	  major	  
environmental	  disaster;	  and	  4)	  it	  can	  erode	  political	  stability	  and	  legitimacy	  by	  
encouraging	  corruption.222	  It	  is	  especially	  in	  the	  first	  two	  points	  that	  we	  find	  strong	  
material	  factors	  that	  underpin	  the	  EU	  engagement.	  	  
A	  study	  calculating	  the	  global	  costs	  of	  modern	  maritime	  piracy	  covering	  the	  
period	  of	  1999	  until	  2008	  –	  which	  is	  the	  decade	  preceding	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  
European	  Union	  in	  Somalia	  –	  found	  it	  to	  be	  around	  $24.5	  billion	  worth	  of	  international	  
trade.223	  Another	  study	  estimated	  the	  costs	  of	  international	  piracy	  in	  2010	  to	  be	  $4.9-­‐
$8.3	  billion,	  and	  projected	  it	  to	  double	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  three	  years.224	  The	  
‘Oceans	  Beyond	  Piracy’	  project	  by	  the	  NGO	  One	  Earth	  Future	  forwards	  the	  most	  
comprehensive	  survey.	  It	  estimates	  that	  the	  global	  cost	  emanating	  from	  Somali	  piracy	  in	  
2012	  was	  between	  $5.7	  and	  $6.1	  billion	  (down	  from	  $6.9	  in	  2011,	  and	  thus	  reflecting	  
the	  overall	  impression	  that	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations	  are	  successful	  in	  apprehending	  
and	  deterring	  pirates).225	  Increased	  costs	  emanate	  from	  a	  number	  of	  factors:	  installation	  
of	  onboard	  security	  measures,	  i.e.	  equipment	  and	  guards	  (29%);	  increased	  steaming	  
speeds	  (27%);	  military	  operations	  (19%);	  higher	  insurance	  premiums	  (10%);	  hazard	  pay	  
to	  seafarers	  (8%);	  re-­‐routing	  of	  vessels	  (5%);	  and	  ransom	  payments,	  maintenance	  of	  
international	  counter-­‐piracy	  organisations,	  and	  prosecution	  and	  imprisonment	  of	  
apprehended	  pirates	  (3%	  combined).	  This	  means	  costs	  are	  divided	  between	  the	  public	  
and	  the	  private	  sector	  at	  a	  ratio	  of	  1:4.	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  Chalk,	  P.	  &	  Hansen,	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  J.	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  Present	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  Piracy:	  Scope,	  Dimensions,	  Dangers,	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  Causes.	  
Studies	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  35:	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  Review	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  Economics,	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  (5):	  870.	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  Pirate	  Ransoms	  &	  Livelihoods	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  
Somalia.	  May	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last	  accessed	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  One	  Earth	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  (2012).	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  Economic	  Cost	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  Somali	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  2012.	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  Paper.	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However,	  the	  Oceans	  Beyond	  Piracy	  survey	  only	  occupies	  itself	  with	  direct	  costs	  
from	  piracy	  and	  does	  not	  account	  for	  knock-­‐on	  effects,	  such	  as	  potential	  trade	  
diversions.	  Thus,	  other	  authors	  paint	  a	  rather	  different	  picture.	  According	  to	  Benassi	  &	  
Martinez-­‐Zarzoso,	  “piracy	  may	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  gross	  domestic	  product	  
(GDP)	  of	  the	  trading	  countries	  through	  a	  drop	  in	  trade,	  but	  its	  impact	  through	  asset	  
destruction	  or	  enhanced	  security	  measures	  is	  minimal”.226	  Whether	  most	  costs	  are	  
located	  in	  drops	  in	  trade	  or	  in	  piracy	  mitigation	  measures,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  there	  
exists	  overall	  agreement	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  piracy	  does	  create	  costs.	  What	  is	  more	  difficult	  
to	  establish	  from	  the	  aggregate	  numbers	  is	  how	  the	  EU	  and	  individual	  member	  states	  
are	  affected	  by	  Somali	  piracy	  specifically.	  	  
According	  to	  Mejia	  et	  al.,	  pirates	  do	  not	  choose	  a	  specific	  ship	  for	  hijacking	  
based	  on	  its	  origin.227	  Thus,	  we	  may	  assume	  that	  countries	  are	  adversely	  affected	  in	  
proportionality	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  rely	  on	  maritime	  trade	  passing	  through	  the	  
region,	  and	  are	  host	  to	  merchant	  fleets	  that	  conduct	  the	  shipping.	  According	  to	  statistics	  
compiled	  by	  the	  International	  Maritime	  Bureau,	  between	  2008	  and	  2012	  there	  were	  a	  
global	  total	  of	  1,884	  pirate	  attacks	  (see	  Table	  2,	  annex).228	  In	  that	  time	  a	  total	  of	  860	  
successful	  or	  attempted	  pirate	  attacks	  occurred	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  For	  the	  purposes	  
of	  looking	  at	  piracy	  the	  HoA	  here	  includes	  Somali	  waters,	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden,	  the	  Red	  Sea,	  
the	  Arabian	  Sea,	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  the	  territorial	  waters	  of	  Oman	  as	  all	  attacks	  that	  
occurred	  in	  these	  regions	  are	  generally	  attributed	  to	  Somali	  pirates.229	  Out	  of	  the	  860	  
incidents,	  356	  were	  targeted	  at	  European	  ships	  (see	  table	  3,	  annex).	  This	  number	  may	  
well	  be	  much	  higher	  as	  many	  attempted	  attacks	  go	  unreported	  because	  doing	  so	  
exposes	  shipping	  companies	  to	  potentially	  higher	  insurance	  premiums.	  Over	  95%	  of	  
global	  long-­‐distance	  trade	  is	  transported	  via	  sea.230	  The	  EU’s	  dependence	  on	  maritime	  
trade	  is	  equally	  dramatic.	  According	  to	  a	  report	  by	  NATO’s	  Parliamentary	  Assembly	  “90%	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  P.	  &	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  16:	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  Robbery	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Report	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  Commerce,	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  Crime	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229	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territorial	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  (447)	  or	  in	  the	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  of	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  (312).	  The	  rest	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  in	  the	  Red	  Sea,	  the	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  Sea,	  the	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  the	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  Oman.	  
230	  Marine,	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  (2011).	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  2011:	  Fakten	  und	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  zur	  Maritimen	  
Abhängigkeit	  der	  Bundesrepublik	  Deutschland.	  
http://www.marine.de/contentDownload/download/1320831828538S6GSVfxGvYHPHSfcUQugqa
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  last	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of	  the	  EU’s	  external	  trade	  is	  being	  transported	  by	  sea.231	  Additionally,	  member	  states	  
such	  as	  Greece	  and	  Germany	  run	  the	  largest	  and	  third-­‐largest	  controlled	  fleets,	  
respectively.232	  
There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  publicised	  incidents	  involving	  the	  abduction	  and	  
ransoming	  of	  European	  freighters	  and	  their	  crews	  as	  well	  as	  private	  vessels	  and	  civilians	  
aboard	  these.	  As	  Somali	  piracy	  skyrocketed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  2008	  numerous	  European	  
vessels	  of	  different	  kinds	  were	  attacked.	  In	  April	  the	  French	  yacht	  MY	  Le	  Ponant	  and	  the	  
Spanish	  fishing	  vessel	  FV	  Playa	  de	  Bakio	  were	  captured,	  in	  May	  the	  Dutch	  vessel	  MV	  
Amiya	  Scan,	  and	  the	  German	  cargo	  ship	  MV	  Lehmann	  Timber.233	  In	  the	  remaining	  
months	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  EU	  naval	  mission	  another	  German	  vessel,	  a	  French	  yacht,	  a	  
Danish	  tanker,	  a	  Greek	  bulk	  carrier,	  a	  Greek	  freighter	  and	  two	  Greek	  chemical	  tankers,	  
two	  Danish	  cargo	  ships,	  and	  a	  German	  cruise	  ship	  carrying	  492	  passengers	  onboard	  
were	  attacked.234	  In	  some	  of	  these	  cases	  the	  attacks	  were	  unsuccessful,	  in	  other	  cases	  
the	  vessels	  were	  released	  after	  capture,	  often	  after	  a	  ransom	  had	  been	  paid	  by	  the	  
company	  owning	  the	  ship.	  The	  two	  French	  yachts	  were	  freed	  by	  French	  commando	  
forces.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Greek	  chemical	  tanker	  MV	  Action,	  three	  of	  its	  crew	  died	  in	  
unknown	  circumstances.235	  Other	  high	  profile	  cases	  since	  2009	  include	  the	  MV	  Hansa	  
Stavanger	  (Germany)	  incident	  and	  the	  French	  commando	  raid	  on	  the	  captured	  yacht	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  NATO	  Parliamentary	  Assembly	  (2010).	  207	  CDS	  10	  E	  bis	  –	  Maritime	  Security:	  NATO	  and	  EU	  
Roles	  and	  Co-­‐ordination.	  NATO.	  http://www.nato-­‐pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2087,	  last	  
accessed	  14	  May	  2013.	  
232	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (2011).	  Review	  of	  Maritime	  Transport	  
2011.	  United	  Nations,	  http://unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2011_en.pdf,	  last	  accessed	  16	  May	  2013.	  
233	  BBC	  News	  (2008a).	  France	  is	  tracking	  hijacked	  yacht.	  5	  April	  2008.	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7332003.stm,	  last	  accessed	  7	  July	  2013;	  BBC	  News	  (2008b).	  
Spain	  in	  hostage	  hunt	  off	  Somalia.	  21	  April	  2008.	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7357831.stm,	  last	  accessed	  13	  August	  2013;	  CNN	  (2008).	  
Somali	  pirates	  hold	  Dutch	  firm's	  crew	  hostage.	  27	  May	  2008.	  
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/05/27/dutch.pirates/,	  last	  accessed	  4	  July	  2013;	  
Kommersant	  (2008).	  Hostages	  of	  Pirates	  at	  Lehmann	  Timber	  Are	  OK.	  1	  July	  2008.	  
http://www.kommersant.com/p-­‐12748/r_500/Hostage_Lehmann_Timber/,	  last	  accessed	  1	  July	  
2013.	  
234	  International	  Maritime	  Bureau	  (2009).	  Piracy	  and	  Armed	  Robbery	  against	  Ships:	  Annual	  Report	  
2008,	  International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  Commercial	  Crime	  Services.	  See	  http://www.icc-­‐
ccs.org/piracy-­‐reporting-­‐centre	  
235	  Independent	  Online	  South	  Africa	  (2008).	  Pirates	  release	  tanker,	  officials	  fear	  deaths.	  13	  
December	  2008.	  http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/pirates-­‐release-­‐tanker-­‐officials-­‐fear-­‐deaths-­‐
1.428887,	  last	  accessed	  12	  August	  2013.	  
	  76	  
Tanit,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  death	  of	  one	  French	  national.236	  The	  list	  goes	  on	  and	  affects	  
many	  EU	  member	  states,	  however,	  as	  a	  rule	  of	  thumb,	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  
member	  states,	  as	  well	  as	  landlocked	  countries	  such	  as	  Austria,	  are	  less	  impacted.	  
	  
6.2.2	  Piracy	  as	  geostrategic	  concern	  
While	  the	  case	  for	  the	  economic	  and	  human	  costs	  of	  piracy	  is	  straightforward,	  it	  is	  at	  the	  
strategic	  level	  that	  the	  EU	  argues	  for	  action	  most	  forcefully.	  The	  EU’s	  Strategic	  
Framework	  on	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  is	  the	  ‘strategic’	  document	  that	  guides	  EU	  policy	  in	  the	  
region	  and	  it	  creates	  the	  basis	  for	  understanding	  why	  and	  in	  what	  way	  Somali	  piracy	  
presents	  a	  security	  problem	  for	  a	  EU	  with	  a	  global	  outlook.	  The	  Strategic	  Framework,	  
adopted	  by	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Council	  on	  14	  November	  2011,	  is	  a	  broad	  document	  that	  
seeks	  to	  outline	  a	  comprehensive	  strategy	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  tackle	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  political,	  
economic	  and	  security	  problems	  facing	  the	  region.	  It	  combines	  a	  multitude	  of	  
instruments,	  such	  as	  political	  dialogue,	  trade,	  humanitarian	  assistance	  and	  crisis	  
management.	  While	  the	  first	  three	  have	  been	  present	  on	  the	  bilateral	  agenda	  for	  a	  long	  
time	  through	  the	  Cotonou	  Agreement	  (2000)	  and	  its	  various	  predecessors,	  it	  is	  the	  
realm	  of	  crisis	  response	  and	  management	  that	  has	  been	  “the	  fastest	  growing	  area	  of	  EU	  
engagement”.	  The	  Framework	  explains	  EU	  action	  thus:	  
“the	  EU’s	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  to	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  region’s	  geo-­‐
strategic	  importance,	  the	  EU’s	  desire	  to	  support	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  Horn	  
and	  to	  help	  lift	  them	  from	  poverty	  into	  self-­‐sustaining	  economic	  growth.	  Instability	  in	  
the	  region	  poses	  a	  growing	  challenge	  not	  only	  to	  the	  security	  of	  its	  peoples	  but	  also	  to	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  world”.237	  
	  
A	  similar	  and	  equally	  sweeping	  statement	  so	  characteristic	  of	  the	  European	  perspective	  
was	  delivered	  by	  German	  Foreign	  Minister	  Westerwelle:	  
“The	  freedom	  of	  the	  seas	  and	  security	  of	  sea	  routes	  are	  of	  particular	  importance	  
strategically.	  (…)	  Europe	  profits	  more	  than	  any	  other	  continent	  from	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  
global	  trade:	  the	  most	  important	  trading	  route	  between	  Europe,	  the	  Arabian	  peninsula,	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and	  Asia	  runs	  through	  the	  area	  off	  Somalia,	  above	  all	  through	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden.	  Keeping	  
this	  route	  open	  is	  an	  important	  international	  security	  task”.238	  
	  
These	  statements	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  for	  the	  EU	  the	  issue	  of	  piracy	  presents	  a	  security	  
problem	  at	  multiple	  levels:	  Locally,	  it	  directly	  impacts	  on	  sea	  trade,	  that	  is	  it	  endangers	  
ships,	  their	  cargos	  and	  crews.	  Regionally,	  it	  undermines	  overall	  stability	  by	  further	  
weakening	  political	  reconstruction	  in	  Somalia,	  thus	  proliferating	  its	  ‘failed	  state’	  status.	  
Most	  importantly,	  however,	  Somali	  piracy	  threatens	  the	  entire	  global	  trade	  system.	  	  
The	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  was	  the	  first	  document	  that	  made	  a	  claim	  to	  a	  
global	  outlook	  for	  EU	  security	  policy,	  stating	  that	  “in	  an	  era	  of	  globalisation,	  distant	  
threats	  may	  be	  as	  much	  a	  concern	  as	  those	  that	  are	  near	  at	  hand”	  and	  “with	  the	  new	  
threats,	  the	  first	  line	  of	  defence	  will	  often	  be	  abroad”.239	  The	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  is	  home	  to	  
the	  world’s	  most	  frequented	  shipping	  route	  –	  one	  which	  the	  EU	  is	  particularly	  
dependent	  on	  for	  its	  external	  trade	  as	  it	  represents	  the	  largest	  trading	  bloc	  in	  the	  world	  
–	  and	  cast	  in	  this	  light,	  operation	  Atalanta	  represents	  a	  forward	  deployment	  aimed	  at	  
environmental	  stabilisation.	  While	  the	  geopolitics	  of	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  are	  self-­‐evident,	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  reflects	  an	  inherently	  liberal	  conception	  of	  global	  order.	  It	  is	  
essentially	  the	  liberal	  peace	  argument	  of	  interdependence	  whereby	  trade	  becomes	  co-­‐
constitutive	  with	  peace,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  widely	  shared	  throughout	  EU	  member	  states	  
and	  institutions.	  What	  is	  crucial	  about	  this	  reasoning	  is	  less	  its	  argumentation	  than	  its	  
implications.	  The	  liberal	  peace	  argument	  can	  be	  critiqued	  on	  various	  grounds,	  be	  it	  its	  
Eurocentric	  bias	  that	  is	  predisposed	  to	  Westphalian	  notions	  of	  sovereignty,	  the	  
reductive	  automaticity	  of	  the	  ‘trade-­‐peace’	  formula	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  free	  trade	  
programmes,	  or	  its	  Western	  ethnocentric	  attachment	  to	  individual	  liberties.240	  More	  
importantly	  for	  our	  discussion,	  however,	  is	  the	  inherent	  globalising	  logic	  of	  security	  that	  
it	  proposes,	  a	  logic	  which	  is	  self-­‐reinforcing	  and	  circular.	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As	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace	  logic	  comes	  a	  constant	  affirmation	  of	  the	  
humanitarian	  motivations	  behind	  intervention,	  which	  are	  accorded	  precedence	  over	  any	  
‘selfish’	  concerns	  such	  as	  national	  interest.241	  
What	  this	  picture	  combines	  to	  is	  a	  view	  of	  security	  where	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
pirates	  operating	  in	  a	  geographically	  confined	  space	  that	  often	  lies	  outside	  of	  the	  
authority	  of	  affected	  states	  and	  employing	  miniscule	  means	  and	  effects	  of	  violence,	  
represent	  a	  fundamental	  threat	  to	  the	  global	  order.	  That	  this	  could	  be	  so	  becomes	  clear	  
when	  we	  look	  beyond	  the	  material	  dimension	  of	  piracy	  and	  consider	  how	  the	  EU	  
perceives	  the	  pirate	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  international	  relations.	  
	  
	  
6.3	  Somali	  piracy	  and	  the	  EU:	  an	  ideational	  perspective	  
	  
As	  piracy	  has	  re-­‐entered	  the	  international	  security	  agenda	  with	  furore	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  
so	  has	  the	  traditional	  image	  of	  the	  pirate	  itself.	  Leaving	  the	  romantic,	  or	  comedic,	  
depictions	  of	  pirates	  so	  pervasive	  in	  popular	  culture	  these	  days	  to	  the	  side,	  the	  
commonplace	  image	  of	  the	  pirate	  as	  a	  savvy,	  greedy	  and	  maverick	  agent	  of	  crime	  on	  the	  
high	  seas	  remains	  solidly	  intact.	  However,	  the	  ‘nature’	  of	  the	  pirate	  is	  rather	  more	  than	  
a	  criminal	  meme	  that	  combines	  a	  wide	  repertoire	  of	  forms	  of	  violence	  and	  illegality.	  The	  
pirate	  continues	  to	  be	  rendered	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  universal	  enemy,	  an	  ‘enemy	  of	  all’.	  
Carl	  Schmitt	  at	  the	  1937	  Nyon	  antipiracy	  conference	  observed	  this	  universally	  proposed	  
and	  accepted	  labelling	  of	  the	  pirate	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  mankind.242	  As	  will	  become	  clear,	  
this	  image	  is	  reaffirmed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Somali	  pirate,	  “an	  enemy	  the	  
whole	  world	  could	  agree	  on”.243	  	  
Piracy	  as	  a	  concept	  is	  derived	  from	  a	  state-­‐free	  context,	  as	  the	  state	  –	  and	  its	  
legal	  pre-­‐eminence	  via	  territorial	  sovereignty	  –	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  space	  of	  the	  
international	  seas	  (as	  in	  between	  states,	  but	  not	  of	  them).	  The	  pirate	  who	  operates	  this	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  the	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  with	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  of	  the	  sinking	  of	  
commercial	  shipping	  vessels	  by	  submarines	  in	  international	  waters,	  the	  line	  of	  reasoning	  
forwarded	  by	  Schmitt	  applies	  perfectly	  to	  the	  present	  example	  of	  Somali	  piracy.	  
243	  Bahadur,	  J.	  (2011).	  Deadly	  Waters.	  London:	  Profile	  Books,	  p.	  138.	  
	  79	  
space	  becomes	  logically	  denationalised.244	  	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning	  applies	  even	  more	  
forcefully	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Somalia,	  the	  failed	  state,	  the	  non-­‐state.	  Hypothetically	  then,	  
the	  pirate	  does	  not	  aim	  his	  actions	  against	  any	  specific	  state	  but	  rather	  against	  all	  states.	  
If	  we	  consider	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  international	  community’s	  response	  to	  Somali	  piracy	  –	  
Europe,	  the	  US,	  Russia,	  China,	  India,	  Japan,	  South	  Korea,	  and	  arguably	  even	  Iran	  all	  
cooperate	  (not	  just	  take	  individual	  action)	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  off	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  –	  it	  is	  
easy	  to	  see	  how	  the	  world	  stands	  united	  against	  pirates.245	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  find	  
any	  other	  international	  security	  issue	  that	  draws	  such	  a	  unified	  international	  response.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  pirate	  is	  seen	  as	  motivated	  solely	  by	  profit,	  a	  bandit	  of	  the	  
seas	  in	  search	  of	  treasure,	  who	  therefore	  operates	  at	  the	  critical	  nodal	  points	  of	  
international	  trade,	  such	  as	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  or	  the	  Malacca	  Strait.	  Traditional	  concepts	  
of	  International	  Relations	  such	  as	  national	  interest	  or	  ideology	  do	  not	  apply	  in	  this	  
context.	  If	  we	  combine	  these	  two	  elements	  of	  piracy	  –	  its	  non-­‐territoriality	  and	  the	  
profit-­‐motive,	  the	  phenomenon	  assumes	  a	  convincingly	  unpolitical	  stance.	  	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  globalisation	  has	  compressed	  space	  and	  global	  lines	  of	  
communication	  have	  been	  transformed	  into	  global	  public	  goods.	  And	  yet,	  it	  is	  difficult	  in	  
this	  context	  to	  classify	  piracy	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  international	  relations.	  The	  body	  of	  
international	  law	  was	  created	  by	  states	  for	  states,	  and	  the	  pirate	  is	  not	  accorded	  the	  
status	  of	  legal	  subject	  in	  this	  regard.	  As	  with	  other	  non-­‐state	  agents	  –	  most	  notably	  
terrorists	  but	  also	  transnational	  drug	  syndicates	  or	  arms	  traffickers	  –	  the	  pirate	  is	  
subject	  to	  the	  extended	  competence	  of	  the	  state.	  What	  follows	  from	  this	  
characterisation	  is	  neatly	  summed	  up	  by	  Schmitt:	  
“because	  this	  enemy	  of	  humanity	  is	  only	  an	  unpolitical	  entity,	  and	  because	  one	  classifies	  
oneself	  in	  some	  sense	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whom	  one	  recognizes	  as	  an	  enemy,	  a	  humanity	  
that	  no	  longer	  has	  any	  other	  enemy	  but	  this	  unpolitical	  ‘‘outlaw’’	  is	  itself	  also	  a	  mere	  
unpolitical	  entity”	  246	  
	  
If	  we	  substitute	  ‘humanity’	  with	  ‘the	  EU’	  we	  create	  an	  interesting	  premise	  on	  which	  to	  
survey	  how	  the	  EU	  understands	  its	  role	  in	  international	  affairs.	  While	  the	  pirate	  
represents	  the	  enemy	  of	  all,	  and	  thus	  must	  be	  similarly	  perceived	  by	  other	  entities,	  his	  
singularity	  as	  a	  threat	  agent	  on	  the	  EU	  security	  agenda	  poses	  a	  puzzle.	  However,	  before	  
we	  can	  assess	  whether	  the	  EU	  maintains	  an	  idiosyncratic	  stance	  towards	  piracy,	  we	  
need	  to	  unpack	  the	  EU’s	  discursive	  framing	  of	  piracy	  into	  a	  security	  issue.	  There	  are	  a	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  anonymous	  4	  (2013);	  see	  the	  
following	  chapter	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  international	  counter-­‐piracy	  cooperation.	  
246	  Ibid.	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number	  of	  discursive	  markers	  and	  tropes	  that	  create	  a	  linearity	  to	  support	  the	  argument	  
of	  the	  pirate	  as	  the	  enemy	  of	  all,	  most	  notably	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  professional	  pirate	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  subsistence	  pirate)	  and	  piracy	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  transnational	  organised	  
crime	  (often	  accompanied	  by	  speculation	  about	  a	  synergetic	  ’piracy-­‐terrorism	  nexus’).	  
These	  interrelated	  stories	  of	  ‘lawlessness’	  situate	  Somali	  piracy	  as	  an	  existential	  threat	  
to	  global	  order	  and	  peace.	  Through	  this	  discursive	  construction	  piracy	  assumes	  a	  
potential	  ‘other’	  to	  the	  EU’s	  self	  in	  international	  affairs.	  
	  
6.3.1	  On	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  piracy	  
Current	  explanations	  as	  to	  the	  causes	  of	  piracy	  are	  mostly	  concurrent	  in	  that	  they	  point	  
to	  the	  same	  set	  of	  factors.	  De	  Wijk	  summarises	  the	  main	  drivers	  of	  pirate	  activity	  as	  
opportunity,	  capability	  and	  targets.247	  According	  to	  him,	  opportunity	  is	  created	  by	  the	  
weakness	  of	  local	  government	  control,	  favourable	  geographical	  conditions,	  a	  lack	  of	  
economic	  development,	  and	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  international	  
maritime	  regimes	  and	  norms.	  Capability	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  technology,	  weapons	  and	  
logistical	  means	  pirates	  have	  access	  to.	  The	  choice	  of	  targets	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  
combination	  of	  opportunity	  and	  capability.	  While	  all	  the	  outlined	  factors	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
explaining	  why	  pirate	  attacks	  happen,	  the	  dominant	  view	  of	  why	  piracy	  occurs	  has	  been	  
largely	  reduced	  to	  a	  simplistic	  description	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  as	  a	  business	  model:	  “profit	  
rather	  than	  poverty	  is	  the	  driver	  of	  piracy”.248	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  efforts	  
are	  not	  only	  aimed	  at	  deterring	  piratical	  acts	  but	  at	  the	  business	  model	  as	  such.249	  This	  
line	  of	  reasoning	  characterises	  pirates	  as	  rational	  economic	  agents	  whose	  choice	  to	  
engage	  in	  piracy	  is	  determined	  by	  its	  utility	  function,	  i.e.	  its	  expected	  pay-­‐off.	  
To	  an	  extent	  this	  rationality	  seems	  evident.	  Regular	  Somalis’	  lifetime	  income	  can	  
only	  measure	  up	  to	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  income	  a	  pirate	  may	  earn	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  five-­‐
year	  career,	  and	  consequently	  piracy	  may	  seem	  an	  attractive	  alternative	  to	  earn	  a	  
living.250	  However,	  in	  many	  cases	  piracy	  is	  not	  as	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  choice	  of	  profession	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247	  De	  Wijk,	  R.	  (2010).	  The	  New	  Piracy:	  The	  Global	  Context,	  in:	  Forum:	  The	  New	  Piracy:	  Three	  
Contexts.	  Survival,	  52	  (1):	  39-­‐54.	  
248	  Ibid,	  p.	  42.	  
249	  De	  Rosiers,	  P.	  (2013).	  Looking	  Ahead:	  Longer-­‐Term	  Goals	  in	  European	  Defence.	  Speech	  
delivered	  at	  The	  Institute	  of	  International	  and	  European	  Affairs,	  30	  April	  2013.	  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePTRqMWUliw,	  last	  accessed	  7	  August	  2013.	  
250	  Geopolicity	  (2011).	  The	  Economics	  of	  Piracy:	  Pirate	  Ransoms	  &	  Livelihoods	  off	  the	  Coast	  of	  
Somalia.	  May	  2011.	  http://www.geopolicity.com/upload/content/pub_1305229189_regular.pdf,	  
last	  accessed	  26	  July	  2013.	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as	  European	  official	  discourse	  would	  suggest	  because	  the	  latter	  ignores	  the	  crucial	  
difference	  between	  subsistence	  and	  professional	  piracy.251	  	  
Numerous	  accounts	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  cite	  international	  illegal	  
fishing	  and	  the	  dumping	  of	  toxic	  waste	  as	  its	  initial	  drivers.252	  When	  Somalia	  plunged	  
into	  civil	  war	  in	  1991	  this	  was	  accompanied	  by	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  country’s	  armed	  
forces,	  including	  the	  national	  coast	  guard.	  Pirates	  that	  have	  been	  interviewed	  often	  
make	  reference	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  foreign	  fishing	  trawlers	  in	  Somali	  waters,	  destroying	  
the	  base	  of	  subsistence	  for	  local	  fishermen,	  which	  they	  themselves	  have	  allegedly	  been	  
in	  many	  cases.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  picture	  they	  draw	  of	  themselves	  is	  not	  one	  of	  pirates.	  
Instead,	  they	  portray	  themselves	  as	  Somalia’s	  new	  coast	  guard	  –	  one	  grouping	  calling	  
itself	  the	  National	  Volunteer	  Coast	  Guard	  –	  thus	  filling	  the	  vacuum	  left	  by	  the	  implosion	  
of	  the	  central	  government’s	  authority	  over	  the	  use	  of	  force.253	  The	  above	  storyline	  finds	  
it	  difficult	  to	  account	  for	  the	  sudden	  explosion	  in	  piracy	  in	  2008/9	  and	  it	  is	  accurate	  that	  
piracy	  has	  become	  increasingly	  professionalised	  since	  and	  now	  effectively	  operates	  as	  a	  
business	  venture	  in	  most	  parts	  of	  Somalia.	  However,	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  story	  of	  
fishermen-­‐turned-­‐pirates	  is	  a	  myth	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  debunked	  is	  problematic	  because	  it	  
fails	  to	  understand	  how	  pirates	  legitimate	  their	  activities	  in	  the	  local	  context.254	  	  
The	  Forum	  for	  African	  Investigative	  Reporters	  (FAIR)	  describes	  the	  activities	  of	  
Somali	  pirates	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ‘extralegal	  entrepreneurship’,	  which	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  
weakness	  of	  local	  institutions	  and	  their	  perceived	  illegitimacy.255	  The	  characterisation	  of	  
piracy	  as	  extralegal	  entrepreneurship	  implicitly	  acknowledges	  the	  fact	  that	  Somalia’s	  
economy	  effectively	  functions	  as	  a	  ‘war	  economy’.256	  Carvalho	  Oliveira	  makes	  a	  
compelling	  case	  that	  Somalia	  indeed	  represents	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  war	  economy:	  
“Somali	  piracy	  clearly	  represents	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  radical	  economy,	  
producing	  ‘real	  development’	  in	  its	  local	  context,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  threatening	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  Chalk,	  P.	  &	  Hansen,	  S.	  J.	  (2012).	  Present	  Day	  Piracy:	  Scope,	  Dimensions,	  Dangers,	  and	  Causes.	  
Studies	  in	  Conflict	  &	  Terrorism,	  35:	  498;	  Klein,	  A.	  (2013).	  The	  Moral	  Economy	  of	  Somali	  Piracy	  –	  
Organised	  Criminal	  Business	  or	  Subsistence	  Activity?	  Global	  Policy,	  4	  (1):	  94-­‐100.	  
252	  The	  Economist	  (2008).	  The	  Indian	  Ocean:	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Seas	  in	  the	  World.	  17	  July	  2008.	  
http://www.economist.com/node/11751360,	  last	  accessed	  22	  June	  2013.	  
253	  Time	  (2009).	  How	  Somalia’s	  Fishermen	  Became	  Pirates.	  18	  April	  2009.	  
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html,	  last	  accessed	  7	  July	  2013.	  
254	  Hansen,	  S.	  J.	  (2012).	  Debunking	  the	  Piracy	  Myth:	  How	  Illegal	  Fishing	  Really	  Interacts	  with	  
Piracy	  in	  East	  Africa.	  RUSI	  Journal,	  156	  (6):	  26-­‐30.	  	  
255	  Forum	  for	  African	  Investigative	  Reporters	  (2011).	  Pirates,	  Smugglers	  and	  Corrupt	  Tycoons:	  
Social	  Bandits	  in	  Africa.	  FAIR	  Transnational	  Investigation	  2011.	  
http://fairreporters.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/fair_2010_nov_rev_final-­‐1.pdf,	  last	  accessed	  2	  
August	  2013.	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  Pugh,	  M.	  &	  Cooper,	  N.	  (2004).	  War	  Economies	  in	  a	  Regional	  Context:	  Challenges	  of	  
Transformation.	  London:	  Lynne	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liberal	  order	  by	  ‘taxing’	  (via	  hijacking	  and	  ransom)	  one	  of	  the	  most	  strategic	  world	  
maritime	  trade	  routes”.	  257	  
	  
According	  to	  Carvalho	  Oliveira,	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  piracy	  demonstrates	  the	  reality	  
of	  a	  war	  economy	  in	  three	  respects.	  It	  operates	  as	  a	  ‘shadow	  economy’	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  
gives	  rise	  to	  highly	  profitable	  relationships	  between	  pirates	  and	  local	  businessmen,	  
corrupt	  government	  officials	  and	  police	  personnel,	  and	  khat	  vendors.258	  It	  also	  operates	  
as	  a	  ‘coping	  economy’	  that	  provides	  alternative	  employment	  opportunities	  for	  
unemployed	  youths	  and	  it	  creates	  and	  maintains	  a	  value	  chain	  of	  pirate	  goods	  (e.g.	  
anything	  from	  boats	  and	  fuel	  to	  food	  and	  water	  for	  abducted	  crews).	  Furthermore,	  
there	  exists	  an	  important	  knock-­‐on	  effect	  whereby	  the	  economy	  of	  piracy	  spurs	  
economic	  activity	  in	  the	  legitimate	  sector	  and	  may	  even	  produce	  social	  benefits	  within	  
these	  coastal	  communities.	  Finally,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  piracy	  functions	  as	  a	  ‘combat	  
economy’	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  circumvents	  the	  international	  arms	  embargo	  against	  Somalia	  
and	  where	  pirates	  transfer	  payments	  to	  the	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  militia	  in	  order	  to	  freely	  operate	  
within	  its	  territory.	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  instructive	  example	  of	  how	  much	  the	  Somali	  piracy	  economy	  
is	  tied	  into	  the	  wider	  economies	  of	  coastal	  communities	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  quasi	  stock	  
exchange	  for	  piracy	  operations	  in	  Haradheere	  in	  late	  2009.	  According	  to	  one	  of	  the	  local	  
pirates	  they	  turned	  piracy	  into	  a	  ‘community	  activity’	  and	  according	  to	  the	  town	  deputy	  
security	  officer,	  "The	  district	  gets	  a	  percentage	  of	  every	  ransom	  from	  ships	  that	  have	  
been	  released,	  and	  that	  goes	  on	  public	  infrastructure,	  including	  our	  hospital	  and	  our	  
public	  schools”.259	  Similarly,	  FAIR	  alleges	  that	  the	  government	  in	  the	  Puntland	  region	  is	  
drawing	  considerable	  income	  from	  piracy,	  with	  the	  2010	  report	  of	  the	  UN	  Monitoring	  
Group	  on	  Somalia	  and	  Eritrea	  stating	  that	  some	  30%	  of	  ransom	  payments	  end	  up	  in	  the	  
hands	  of	  Puntland	  government	  officials.260	  
The	  idea	  that	  EU	  action	  must	  be	  aimed	  at	  creating	  “sustainable	  alternative	  
livelihoods	  for	  coastal	  communities	  in	  Somalia”	  draws	  the	  right	  conclusion	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  
acknowledges	  the	  reality	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  many	  coastal	  communities	  that	  have	  come	  to	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  Carvalho	  Oliveira,	  G.	  (2013).	  'New	  wars'	  at	  sea:	  A	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  transformative	  approach	  to	  the	  
political	  economy	  of	  Somali	  piracy.	  Security	  Dialogue,	  44	  (1):	  5.	  
258	  Khat	  is	  a	  mild	  drug,	  a	  shrub	  native	  to	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  the	  chewing	  of	  which	  is	  pervasive	  
throughout	  Somali	  society	  and	  particularly	  popular	  with	  pirates.	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  gangs	  lure	  investors	  at	  pirate	  lair.	  1	  December	  2009.	  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/01/us-­‐somalia-­‐piracy-­‐investors-­‐
idUSTRE5B01Z920091201,	  last	  accessed	  10	  July	  2013.	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  on	  Somalia	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  2010.	  
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/91,	  last	  accessed	  19	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  2013.	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rely	  on	  piracy	  as	  it	  is	  responsible	  for	  a	  significant	  share	  in	  economic	  activity.261	  However,	  
the	  EU	  perspective	  does	  not	  take	  the	  distinction	  between	  subsistence	  and	  professional	  
piracy	  seriously	  as	  it	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  the	  latter.	  This	  view	  not	  only	  presupposes	  
the	  criminality	  of	  piracy	  but	  also	  enables	  its	  elevation	  to	  the	  global	  level,	  where	  Somali	  
piracy	  becomes	  an	  instance	  of	  transnational	  organised	  crime.	  
	  
6.3.2	  Transnational	  organised	  crime,	  terrorism	  and	  lawlessness	  
It	  is	  a	  small	  step	  from	  the	  image	  of	  the	  pirate	  as	  a	  profit-­‐seeker	  to	  an	  assertion	  of	  
organised	  crime.	  According	  to	  the	  EU,	  Somali	  piracy	  “bears	  all	  features	  of	  organised	  
crime”.262	  In	  fact,	  already	  the	  European	  Security	  Strategy	  in	  2003	  referred	  to	  maritime	  
piracy	  –	  then	  still	  a	  potential	  future	  security	  challenge	  -­‐	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  organised	  
crime.263	  Both	  personnel	  from	  within	  the	  CSDP	  bureaucracy,	  military	  personnel	  in	  
operational	  command,	  and	  member	  state	  officials	  all	  confirm	  this	  view	  of	  organised	  
crime.264	  	  
To	  a	  certain	  extent	  the	  label	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  simple	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  
level	  of	  sophistication	  with	  which	  Somali	  piracy	  operates	  at	  this	  point.	  It	  reflects	  the	  
gradual	  process	  of	  professionalisation	  that	  has	  seen	  pirates	  adapt	  to	  diverse	  changes	  in	  
their	  environment,	  most	  notably	  the	  arrival	  of	  various	  foreign	  navies.	  Pirate	  tactics	  have	  
been	  flexible,	  their	  operations	  now	  extending	  far	  into	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  targeting	  
ships	  of	  vast	  sizes.	  There	  is	  indeed	  a	  high	  level	  of	  organisation	  that	  has	  meant	  the	  
prolonged	  existence	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  external	  intervention.	  The	  
sophistication	  of	  organisational	  procedures	  is	  most	  evident	  in	  the	  extensive	  value	  chain	  
of	  piracy,	  especially	  regarding	  the	  complexity	  associated	  with	  the	  extortion	  of	  ransom	  
payments	  for	  abducted	  vessels	  and	  crews.	  Negotiating	  ransom	  payments	  has	  become	  a	  
delicate	  affair	  with	  pirate	  groups	  now	  effectively	  hiring	  external	  consultants	  (though	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accessed	  8	  August	  2013,	  
262	  EUNAVFOR	  (2013a).	  Mission.	  http://eunavfor.eu/mission/,	  last	  accessed	  24	  September	  2013.	  
263	  European	  Council	  (2003).	  A	  Secure	  Europe	  in	  a	  Better	  World	  –	  European	  Security	  Strategy.	  
Brussels,	  12	  December	  2003.	  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf,	  
last	  accessed	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often	  they	  are	  associated	  on	  clan	  lines)	  to	  conduct	  these	  negotiations.265	  There	  is	  ample	  
reference	  to	  the	  shadowy	  world	  behind	  piracy	  itself,	  that	  is	  those	  providing	  the	  funding	  
and	  logistics	  necessary	  to	  launch	  pirate	  attacks.	  This	  is	  where	  supposedly	  both	  the	  
organisational	  direction	  emanates	  and	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  the	  proceeds	  ends	  up.	  
	   In	  line	  with	  our	  previous	  discussion,	  the	  implication	  of	  ‘organised	  crime’	  is	  that	  
this	  is	  crime	  not	  borne	  out	  of	  necessity,	  the	  necessity	  to	  subsist.	  Instead	  organised	  crime	  
is	  professionalised	  and	  thus	  opportunist,	  and	  therefore	  something	  “we	  should	  not	  
trivialize”.266	  This	  classification	  as	  organised	  crime	  is	  made	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Convention	  against	  Transnational	  Organised	  Crime	  (UNTOC).267	  While	  it	  is	  easy	  
to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  some	  elements	  of	  the	  compound	  definition	  –	  such	  as	  ‘organised	  
criminal	  group’,	  ‘serious	  crime’,	  or	  ‘structured	  group’	  –	  this	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  the	  
operative	  term	  ‘transnational’.268	  According	  to	  UNTOC,	  an	  offence	  is	  deemed	  
transnational	  in	  nature	  if	  any	  of	  the	  following	  conditions	  are	  met:	  	  
“(a)	  It	  is	  committed	  in	  more	  than	  one	  State;	  (b)	  It	  is	  committed	  in	  one	  State	  but	  a	  
substantial	  part	  of	  its	  preparation,	  planning,	  direction	  or	  control	  takes	  place	  in	  another	  
State;	  (c)	  It	  is	  committed	  in	  one	  State	  but	  involves	  an	  organized	  criminal	  group	  that	  
engages	  in	  criminal	  activities	  in	  more	  than	  one	  State;	  or	  (d)	  It	  is	  committed	  in	  one	  State	  
but	  has	  substantial	  effects	  in	  another	  State.”	  
	  
What	  complicates	  the	  view	  of	  piracy	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  transnational	  organised	  
crime	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  often	  –	  and	  especially	  regarding	  its	  core	  business	  of	  hijacking	  ships	  
–	  it	  does	  not	  occur	  in	  any	  state	  at	  all.	  While	  many	  pirate	  attacks	  in	  the	  years	  before	  2010	  
occurred	  in	  Somalia’s	  territorial	  waters,	  much	  activity	  has	  rapidly	  shifted	  to	  the	  high	  
seas.	  However,	  even	  if	  a	  case	  of	  ‘state	  effect’	  is	  made,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish	  that	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  last	  accessed	  28	  July	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268	  UNTOC	  uses	  the	  following	  definitions:	  ““Organized	  criminal	  group”	  shall	  mean	  a	  structured	  
group	  of	  three	  or	  more	  persons,	  existing	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  and	  acting	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  aim	  
of	  committing	  one	  or	  more	  serious	  crimes	  or	  offences	  established	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  
Convention,	  in	  order	  to	  obtain,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  a	  financial	  or	  other	  material	  benefit”;	  
““Serious	  crime”	  shall	  mean	  conduct	  constituting	  an	  offence	  punishable	  by	  a	  maximum	  
deprivation	  of	  liberty	  of	  at	  least	  four	  years	  or	  a	  more	  serious	  penalty”;	  ““Structured	  group”	  shall	  
mean	  a	  group	  that	  is	  not	  randomly	  formed	  for	  the	  immediate	  commission	  of	  an	  offence	  and	  that	  
does	  not	  need	  to	  have	  formally	  defined	  roles	  for	  its	  members,	  continuity	  of	  its	  membership	  or	  a	  
developed	  structure”.	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multiple	  states	  are	  affected.	  Unsurprisingly,	  whereas	  the	  legal	  statutes	  on	  which	  
procedures	  for	  prosecution	  of	  pirates	  rest	  make	  ample	  reference	  to	  organised	  crime,	  it	  
has	  been	  rather	  difficult	  to	  make	  such	  allegations	  stick	  during	  court	  trials,	  at	  least	  in	  
European	  courts.269	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  indicating	  that	  up	  to	  half	  of	  the	  proceeds	  
from	  ransoms	  is	  transferred	  out	  of	  Somalia	  by	  informal	  money	  wire	  systems.270	  
However,	  there	  is	  no	  proof	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  money	  is	  channelled	  back	  into	  piracy	  
operations	  or	  other	  criminal	  undertakings.	  In	  fact,	  the	  financing	  processes	  that	  precede	  
most	  pirate	  operations	  are	  highly	  localised	  and	  directly	  depend	  on	  the	  standing	  of	  pirate	  
leaders	  in	  their	  local	  communities.271	  Further,	  there	  is	  also	  no	  hard	  evidence	  to	  
substantiate	  speculations	  about	  ransom	  proceeds	  financing	  the	  purchase	  of	  real	  estate	  
property	  in	  Kenya.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  assumptions	  about	  transnational	  links	  are	  
generally	  wrong,	  however,	  claims	  to	  the	  transnational	  character	  are	  often	  exaggerated	  
and	  lack	  hard	  evidence.	  Consequently,	  Somali	  piracy	  should	  not	  implicitly	  be	  compared	  
to	  well-­‐established	  organised	  crime	  syndicates	  whose	  illicit	  business	  activities	  operate	  
globally.	  
The	  invocation	  of	  ‘organised	  crime’	  does	  not	  primarily	  serve	  a	  legalistic	  or	  
jurisprudential	  end.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  a	  shorthand	  to	  locate	  piracy	  in	  a	  sphere	  of	  international	  
relations	  that	  is	  reserved	  for	  those	  that	  do	  not	  play	  by	  its	  rules,	  that	  is	  international	  law	  
written	  by	  states	  for	  states.	  This	  theme	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  literature	  on	  the	  
‘privatisation’	  of	  violence.	  Piracy	  is	  similarly	  situated	  as	  terrorism	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  agents	  
involved	  are	  clearly	  not	  of	  the	  ‘state’.272	  Organised	  crime	  presents	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  
authority	  of	  states	  as	  the	  primary	  actors	  in	  international	  affairs	  by	  exploiting	  the	  speed	  
and	  limited	  oversight	  of	  the	  transnational	  flows	  of	  globalisation	  that	  states	  cannot	  police	  
effectively.	  More	  dramatically,	  they	  are	  agents	  of	  change	  that	  influence	  processes	  of	  
globalisation	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  globalisation	  itself	  becomes	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  
manage	  for	  states.	  The	  EU’s	  Special	  Representative	  to	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  Alexander	  
Rondos	  outlined	  this	  concern	  when	  he	  stated	  that	  Somali	  piracy	  is	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bigger	  problem	  we	  face	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  -­‐	  the	  globalisation	  of	  organised	  crime”.273	  
Thus,	  trying	  to	  subject	  these	  non-­‐state	  agents	  to	  the	  legal	  authority	  of	  states	  is	  part	  of	  a	  
wider	  effort	  to	  reassert	  state	  control	  over	  the	  forces	  of	  globalisation.	  Interestingly,	  in	  
this	  context	  globalisation	  is	  not	  only	  that	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  protected	  (the	  referent	  
object)	  but	  it	  assumes	  the	  position	  of	  threat	  itself.	  	  
It	  is	  thus	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  characterisation	  of	  piracy	  as	  transnational	  
organised	  crime	  is	  often	  extended	  to	  an	  association	  with	  international	  Islamic	  terrorism.	  
The	  language	  of	  terror	  –	  pirates	  are	  frequently	  charged	  with	  ‘terrorising’	  the	  high	  seas	  –	  
is	  not	  only	  applied	  to	  piracy,	  but	  many	  accounts	  profess	  a	  structural	  link	  between	  piracy	  
and	  terrorism,	  held	  to	  be	  operating	  within	  a	  shared	  nexus	  of	  violence.	  There	  is	  a	  
considerable	  amount	  of	  such	  scholarship	  in	  American	  academia	  and	  policy	  discourse.274	  
However,	  in	  the	  European	  epistemic	  community	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  we	  have	  similar	  
tropes	  that	  connect	  piracy	  and	  terrorism.275	  According	  to	  Shortland	  and	  Vothknecht,	  
“counter-­‐piracy	  measures	  deterred	  pirates	  from	  forming	  alliances	  with	  Islamist	  
movements	  and	  may	  therefore	  make	  a	  major	  contribution	  to	  international	  security”.276	  	  
However,	  the	  presumed	  organisational	  overlap	  or	  cooperation	  between	  Somali	  
pirates	  and	  the	  terrorist	  movement	  of	  the	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  militia	  remains	  “highly	  
questionable”	  and	  to	  date	  there	  is	  no	  credible	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  
constitute	  a	  common	  nexus.277	  According	  to	  the	  International	  Expert	  Group	  on	  Piracy	  off	  
the	  Somali	  Coast,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  isolated	  incidents	  of	  operational	  synergy,	  which	  are	  
localised	  arrangements	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  those	  pirates	  and	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273	  EU	  Special	  Representative	  Alexander	  Rondos,	  in	  EU	  Observer	  (2012).	  EU	  studying	  links	  
between	  Italian	  mafia	  and	  Somalian	  pirates.	  20	  June	  2012.	  
http://euobserver.com/foreign/116692,	  last	  accessed	  13	  August	  2013.	  
274	  Cawthorne,	  N.	  (2010).	  Pirates	  of	  the	  21st	  Century:	  How	  Modern-­‐day	  Buccaneers	  Are	  Terrorising	  
the	  World’s	  Oceans.	  London:	  John	  Blake	  Publishing;	  Eichstaedt,	  P.	  (2010).	  Pirate	  State:	  Inside	  
Somalia’s	  Terrorism	  at	  Sea.	  Chicago:	  Lawrence	  Hill;	  Daniels,	  C.	  (2012).	  Somali	  Piracy	  and	  
Terrorism	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  Lanham:	  Scarecrow	  Press;	  Alexander,	  Y.	  &	  Richardson,	  T.	  B.	  
(2009).	  Terror	  on	  the	  High	  Seas:	  From	  Piracy	  to	  Strategic	  Challenge.	  Denver:	  ABC-­‐CLIO;	  The	  
Economist	  (2008).	  The	  Indian	  Ocean:	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Seas	  in	  the	  World.	  The	  Economist,	  17	  
July	  2008.	  http://www.economist.com/node/11751360,	  last	  accessed	  20	  May	  2013.	  
275	  	  Hague,	  W.	  (2012b).	  Hague:	  ‘There	  is	  an	  opportunity’	  to	  end	  piracy	  and	  terrorism	  in	  Somalia.	  
The	  Telegraph,	  3	  February	  2012.	  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9059913/Hague-­‐
There-­‐is-­‐an-­‐opportunity-­‐to-­‐end-­‐piracy-­‐and-­‐terrorism-­‐in-­‐Somalia.html,	  last	  accessed	  22	  August	  
2013.	  
276	  Shortland,	  A.	  &	  Vothknecht,	  M.	  (2011).	  Combating	  “maritime	  terrorism”	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  
Somalia.	  European	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  27	  (S1):	  133-­‐151.	  	  
277	  Chalk,	  P.	  (2008).	  The	  Maritime	  Dimension	  of	  International	  Security:	  Terrorism,	  Piracy,	  and	  
Challenges	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  RAND,	  p.	  31.	  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf,	  last	  
accessed	  22	  September	  2013.	  
	  87	  
members	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  clan.278	  The	  UN	  Monitoring	  Group	  on	  Somalia	  makes	  a	  
similar	  assessment	  and	  confirms	  that	  there	  are	  no	  grounds	  for	  generalisation,	  even	  
though	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  relaxed	  its	  position	  on	  piracy	  over	  time	  and	  moved	  to	  extract	  
payment	  for	  allowing	  pirates	  to	  operate	  within	  its	  controlled	  areas.279	  The	  alleged	  
‘nexus’	  seems	  to	  be	  largely	  representative	  of	  a	  charge	  ‘guilty	  by	  association’	  as	  both	  
groups	  of	  actors	  operate	  within	  the	  same	  unstable	  legal	  and	  institutional	  space	  of	  
Somalia.280	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  link	  between	  piracy	  and	  terrorism	  does	  not	  hold	  up	  to	  
scrutiny	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Al-­‐Shabaab’s	  removal	  from	  power,	  which	  has	  
remained	  without	  consequence	  for	  piracy	  operations.	  
What	  the	  unsubstantiated	  association	  of	  piracy	  as	  organised	  crime	  and	  
terrorism	  contributes	  to	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  Somalia	  which	  is	  not	  merely	  afflicted	  by	  
lawlessness	  but	  rather	  governed	  by	  it.	  Lawlessness	  is	  thus	  not	  contingent	  on	  the	  
asymmetric	  distribution	  of	  political	  power	  or	  its	  outright	  disintegration.	  According	  to	  
European	  policy-­‐makers	  “crimes	  of	  all	  degrees	  of	  severity,	  including	  piracy,	  are	  accepted	  
by	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  population	  as	  a	  way	  of	  earning	  a	  living”281,	  and	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  
impunity’	  fuels	  insecurity.282	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  remark	  the	  overall	  weakness	  of	  Somalia’s	  
political	  institutions,	  first	  and	  foremost	  the	  quasi	  non-­‐existent	  monopoly	  over	  the	  use	  of	  
force	  exercised	  by	  the	  central	  government.	  It	  is	  however	  quite	  another	  thing	  to	  suggest	  
that	  a	  general	  criminal	  mentality	  is	  responsible	  for	  piracy	  and	  thus	  threatens	  
international	  peace.283	  It	  crucially	  removes	  piracy	  from	  the	  extant	  interdependence	  
between	  local	  coastal	  economies	  and	  global	  trade	  by	  asserting	  the	  ‘plague’	  of	  piracy	  
with	  a	  mystical,	  structural	  quality	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  superimposes	  itself	  on	  the	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global	  order.284	  Piracy	  forms	  a	  threat	  complex	  in	  which	  local	  lawlessness	  is	  constantly	  
reproduced	  and	  translated	  into	  systemic	  instability	  through	  a	  parasitic	  relationship	  with	  
international	  trade.	  	  The	  result	  is	  a	  conversion	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  as	  a	  security	  issue	  
traditionally	  wedded	  to	  the	  context	  of	  maritime	  commerce,	  and	  thus	  commonly	  
approached	  as	  a	  mater	  of	  legal	  and	  criminal	  contestation,	  into	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  
international	  peace	  and	  security.285	  	  	  
	  
	  
6.4	  Somali	  piracy	  as	  a	  global	  security	  threat	  	  
	  
As	  with	  so	  many	  other	  CSDP	  missions,	  its	  name	  is	  derived	  from	  Greek	  mythology.	  
Atalanta,	  a	  Greek	  goddess,	  is	  a	  virgin	  huntress.286	  Without	  delving	  too	  deep	  into	  the	  
discursive	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  self-­‐understanding,	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  Somali	  
pirate,	  malnourished	  yet	  vicious,	  and	  the	  EU	  as	  innocent,	  immaculate	  while	  stalking	  its	  
prey	  (i.e.	  the	  pirate)	  is	  telling	  as	  the	  divide	  between	  self	  and	  other	  could	  hardly	  be	  more	  
pronounced.	  What	  is	  more,	  its	  etymology	  –	  from	  Greek	  atalantos,	  meaning	  ‘equal	  in	  
weight’	  –	  may	  also	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  how	  the	  EU	  perceives	  its	  role	  on	  the	  international	  
stage.	  	  
The	  European	  reading	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  constructs	  a	  conception	  of	  security	  that	  
extrapolates	  from	  the	  local	  and	  regional	  context	  of	  piracy	  to	  the	  global	  level.287	  The	  
motivation	  of	  Somalis	  to	  become	  engaged	  in	  piracy	  is	  not	  only	  found	  in	  the	  disastrous	  
state	  of	  the	  local	  economy	  but	  also	  in	  the	  opportunity	  to	  exploit	  a	  weakness	  in	  the	  
global	  trade	  system,	  i.e.	  the	  initial	  removal	  of	  the	  high	  seas	  from	  state	  control.	  The	  
elevation	  of	  Somali	  pirate	  groups	  to	  a	  highly	  professionalised	  transnational	  organised	  
crime	  network	  is	  less	  a	  matter	  of	  neutral	  observation	  than	  an	  implicit	  effort	  to	  assert	  the	  
pirate	  with	  his	  role	  as	  the	  universal	  enemy.	  The	  pirate	  as	  a	  denationalised,	  profit-­‐seeking	  
agent	  of	  crime	  may	  operate	  in	  a	  geographically	  confined	  space	  but	  his	  very	  existence	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undermines	  the	  global	  order.	  Due	  to	  the	  integrated	  view	  of	  international	  security	  that	  
pervades	  European	  ‘strategic’	  thinking	  –	  each	  of	  the	  various	  narratives	  of	  EU	  power	  sees	  
the	  EU	  as	  dependent	  on	  and	  constitutive	  of	  a	  multilateral	  economic,	  legal	  and	  military	  
order	  to	  some	  extent	  –	  piracy	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  abstract	  yet	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  
entire	  world.	  What	  follows	  from	  the	  assertion	  that	  Somali	  piracy	  is	  inherently	  a	  global	  
rather	  than	  a	  regional	  or	  local	  security	  challenge,	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  EU,	  by	  tackling	  this	  
threat,	  is	  also	  a	  global	  security	  provider.	  	  
The	  EU’s	  framing	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  characterises	  the	  security	  phenomenon	  as	  an	  
instance	  of	  globalisation,	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  as	  a	  negative	  externality	  of	  global	  
interconnectedness.	  The	  existence	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  is	  as	  much	  a	  threat	  to	  global	  free	  
trade	  as	  it	  is	  one	  of	  its	  by-­‐products.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  frequent	  invocation	  of	  the	  
geostrategic	  relevance	  of	  piracy	  within	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace	  notion	  of	  free	  
trade	  serves	  to	  underscore	  the	  EU	  move	  towards	  becoming	  a	  global	  security-­‐provider.	  
However,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  it	  establishes	  legitimacy	  for	  EU	  intervention	  and	  
concurrently	  expands	  the	  policy	  scope	  for	  EU	  security.	  As	  the	  EU	  positions	  itself	  in	  direct	  
contradistinction	  to	  what	  it	  holds	  to	  be	  a	  de-­‐territorialised,	  dynamic,	  volatile	  security	  
threat	  representing	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  globalisation,	  it	  consequently	  demarcates	  Somali	  
piracy	  as	  a	  security	  threat	  to	  be	  managed,	  and	  one	  to	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  EU.	  	  
How	  exactly	  the	  EU	  goes	  about	  this	  will	  be	  scrutinised	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  It	  
discusses	  the	  EU’s	  comprehensive	  approach	  and	  its	  constituent	  part,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  it	  
constructs	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  action	  as	  part	  of	  a	  general	  call	  for	  ‘effective	  
multilateralism’.	  This	  represents	  the	  reassertion	  of	  state	  control	  –	  and	  that	  includes	  the	  
EU	  –	  over	  the	  forces	  of	  globalisation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Somali	  piracy	  has	  allowed	  the	  EU	  
to	  showcase	  its	  military	  credentials	  by	  fielding	  its	  first	  naval	  mission,	  Atalanta.288	  
However,	  this	  goes	  well	  beyond	  the	  narrow	  view	  of	  military	  security,	  which	  suggests	  this	  
may	  simply	  be	  an	  exercise	  in	  raising	  the	  EU’s	  geopolitical	  stature	  to	  claim	  its	  place	  
among	  the	  great	  powers	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  as	  some	  have	  suggested.289	  More	  
importantly,	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  EU’s	  view	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  into	  counter-­‐piracy	  action	  
as	  reflected	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  ‘comprehensive	  security’	  approach,	  forwards	  a	  
template	  of	  EU	  security	  that	  simultaneously	  claims	  a	  ‘comparative	  advantage’	  in	  
delivering	  this	  type	  of	  security	  while	  being	  decidedly	  self-­‐referential	  as	  it	  seemingly	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extrapolates	  from	  the	  European	  experience	  of	  achieving	  peace	  and	  stability	  through	  
integration	  and	  mutual	  constraining.	  While	  security	  is	  formulated	  as	  a	  collective	  public	  
good,	  the	  EU	  makes	  a	  clear	  effort	  in	  demonstrating	  that	  it	  has	  moved	  from	  the	  role	  of	  a	  












Even	  though	  piracy	  at	  the	  HoA	  is	  making	  all	  the	  headlines,	  it	  is	  political	  reconstruction	  of	  
Somalia	  that	  remains	  the	  elephant	  in	  the	  room.	  In	  a	  CNN	  interview	  former	  High	  
Representative	  Javier	  Solana	  stressed	  that	  “the	  final	  solution	  will	  not	  be	  found	  until	  
Somalia	  is	  a	  more	  stable	  country”.290	  But	  how	  can	  security	  be	  achieved?	  To	  this	  end	  the	  
EU	  offers	  a	  ‘comprehensive	  approach’	  to	  security.291	  The	  term	  draws	  the	  same	  type	  of	  
critique	  as	  does	  the	  term	  ‘human	  security’	  for	  being	  all	  too	  often	  a	  catch-­‐all	  phrase	  or	  
laundry	  list	  of	  security	  threats	  and	  responses.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  
‘comprehensive	  security’	  relates	  specifically	  to	  the	  attempt	  to	  integrate	  civilian	  and	  
military	  approaches,	  while	  building	  a	  ‘culture	  of	  coordination’	  in	  its	  processes.292	  This	  
logic	  of	  security	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  remarks	  of	  Commission	  President	  Barroso,	  stating	  
that	  “security	  is	  the	  starting	  point,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  end-­‐point”.293	  Security	  policy	  –	  
and	  more	  explicitly	  its	  military	  dimension	  –	  can	  be	  a	  necessary	  component	  towards	  
restoring	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  order,	  but	  in	  itself	  it	  will	  rarely	  achieve	  a	  lasting	  
peace.	  	  
While	  operation	  Atalanta	  continues	  to	  form	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  EU’s	  security	  
efforts	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  around	  it	  the	  EU	  has	  assembled	  two	  civilian	  flanking	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missions	  –	  EU	  Training	  Mission	  Somalia	  and	  EUCAP	  Nestor	  –	  aimed	  at	  improving	  regional	  
security	  capabilities	  both	  on	  land	  and	  on	  sea.	  Additionally,	  the	  EU	  has	  sought	  transfer	  
agreements	  with	  regional	  states	  for	  the	  prosecution	  of	  pirates	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  
private	  industry	  through	  Best	  Management	  Practices.	  The	  military	  dimension	  comes	  
back	  into	  the	  picture	  by	  highlighting	  the	  cooperative	  nature	  of	  the	  EU	  approach.	  
This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  efforts	  can	  rightly	  be	  
characterised	  as	  being	  grounded	  in	  a	  ‘comprehensive	  approach’	  to	  security,	  yet	  this	  is	  
accompanied	  by	  two	  crucial	  imperatives	  that	  globalise	  piracy	  as	  a	  security	  issue	  while	  
relocating	  the	  responsibility	  for	  fighting	  it:	  the	  externalisation	  of	  EU	  security	  to	  regional	  
partners,	  and	  the	  integration	  of	  international	  partners	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  ‘effective	  
multilateralism’.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  EU	  approach	  of	  comprehensive	  
security	  fits	  neatly	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘managing	  globalisation’.	  
	   The	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  First,	  I	  outline	  the	  EU	  naval	  deployment	  
mission	  Atalanta	  and	  its	  operational	  parameters.	  Towards	  the	  background	  of	  the	  
expanded	  mandate	  from	  2012	  I	  scrutinise	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  mission	  is	  a	  success.	  I	  then	  
move	  to	  illustrate	  the	  comprehensive	  approach	  by	  presenting	  the	  civilian	  dimension	  of	  
EU	  counter-­‐piracy,	  discussing	  capability-­‐building	  and	  pirate	  transfer	  agreements	  before	  
critically	  dissecting	  what	  ‘comprehensive	  security’	  means	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  dialectical	  
relationship	  between	  pirate	  and	  ‘hunter’.	  Finally,	  I	  return	  to	  the	  expanded	  military	  
dimension	  by	  looking	  at	  how	  the	  EU	  operationalises	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘effective	  
multilateralism’	  via	  international	  counter-­‐piracy	  coordination.	  
	  
	  
7.1	  The	  military	  dimension:	  Atalanta	  naval	  deployment	  
	  
To	  recall,	  Atalanta’s	  general	  objective	  is	  the	  ‘deterrence,	  prevention	  and	  repression	  of	  
acts	  of	  piracy	  and	  armed	  robbery	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast’.	  The	  specific	  goals	  include	  the	  
protection	  of	  World	  Food	  Programme	  vessels	  and	  AMISOM	  vessels	  headed	  for	  Somalia,	  
the	  protection	  of	  merchant	  vessels	  passing	  through	  by	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  the	  
monitoring	  of	  fishing	  activities	  off	  the	  Somali	  coast,	  and	  the	  prosecution	  of	  apprehended	  
pirates.294	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As	  a	  military	  mission	  it	  deploys	  a	  number	  of	  navy	  vessels.	  Up	  until	  2011	  the	  
number	  used	  to	  be	  anywhere	  between	  five	  and	  ten	  vessels,	  but	  also	  depending	  on	  the	  
time	  of	  year	  (piracy	  substantially	  decreases	  during	  monsoon	  season,	  and	  so	  does	  the	  
international	  naval	  presence).	  Since	  2011	  the	  naval	  deployment	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  
permanently	  reduced	  to	  between	  four	  and	  seven	  surface	  warships.	  The	  type	  of	  ships	  
deployed	  is	  overwhelmingly	  frigates	  for	  naval	  patrol	  duties	  (a	  few	  corvettes	  had	  been	  
tasked	  as	  well),	  supported	  by	  replenishment	  ships.	  A	  French	  helicopter	  carrier	  formed	  
part	  of	  one	  rotation	  but	  was	  released	  from	  service	  as	  combat	  scenarios	  for	  Atalanta	  
were	  put	  to	  rest	  (see	  below).	  Recently,	  more	  diverse	  types	  of	  ships	  have	  been	  deployed,	  
such	  as	  those	  specialising	  in	  littoral	  (close	  to	  shore)	  and	  amphibious	  capabilities.	  The	  
present	  deployment	  consists	  of	  the	  following	  vessels:	  
	  




Previous	  rotations	  included	  naval	  vessels	  from	  a	  pool	  of	  13	  contributing	  nations:	  
Belgium	  (1),	  Finland	  (1),	  France	  (10),	  Germany	  (7),	  Greece	  (4),	  Italy	  (3),	  The	  Netherlands	  
(4),	  Norway	  (1),	  Portugal	  (1),	  Romania	  (1),	  Spain	  (13),	  Sweden	  (4),	  United	  Kingdom	  (2).	  
The	  naval	  component	  is	  supported	  by	  two	  to	  three	  Maritime	  Patrol	  and	  Reconnaissance	  
Aircrafts	  (MPRAs),	  which	  have	  been	  provided	  by	  France,	  Germany,	  Spain,	  and	  
Luxembourg.	  Further,	  a	  number	  of	  Vessel	  Protection	  Detachment	  (VPD)	  teams	  guard	  
merchant	  ships	  against	  pirate	  vessels.	  Other	  states	  that	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  make	  military	  
resources	  available	  for	  the	  missions	  contribute	  funds,	  personnel	  or	  other	  relevant	  
assets.	  To	  run	  the	  operation	  there	  is	  a	  military	  staff	  for	  ‘command	  and	  control’	  both	  at	  
the	  Operational	  Headquarters	  in	  Northwood	  (UK)	  as	  well	  as	  theatre-­‐based	  staff	  on	  
board	  the	  mission	  flagship.	  Non-­‐EU	  member	  states	  have	  also	  made	  contributions	  to	  the	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Country	  	   Vessel	  	   Type	  
	   FGS	  Niedersachsen	   Frigate	  
	   ITS	  Zeffiro	   Frigate	  
	   HNLMS	  Johan	  de	  Witt	   Amphibious	  transport	  ship	  
	   ESPS	  Meteoro	   Offshore	  patrol	  vessel	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mission	  (Croatia,	  Montenegro,	  Norway	  and	  Ukraine).296	  Overall,	  mission	  personnel	  
numbers	  around	  1,500.	  Thus,	  while	  a	  strong	  core	  exists	  in	  that	  a	  few	  participating	  
member	  states	  provide	  the	  bulk	  of	  forces	  –	  France,	  Germany	  and	  Spain	  in	  particular	  –	  
there	  is	  broad	  engagement	  in	  Atalanta.	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  measures	  under	  Atalanta	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Internationally	  
Recommended	  Transit	  Corridor	  (IRTC)	  –	  a	  naval	  corridor	  stretching	  650	  kilometres	  along	  
the	  coast	  of	  Yemen,	  which	  was	  heavily	  patrolled	  by	  international	  navies.	  The	  
concentrated	  presence	  of	  warships	  in	  this	  corridor,	  along	  with	  the	  organisation	  of	  
regular	  convoy	  escorts	  had	  an	  immediate	  impact	  in	  restoring	  safer	  conditions	  for	  
merchant	  vessels.297	  Regarding	  shipments	  to	  Somalia,	  according	  to	  EUNAVFOR’s	  internal	  
data,	  the	  mission	  has	  protected	  234	  WFP	  vessels	  (accounting	  for	  856,346	  cubic	  tonnes	  
of	  aid	  shipments)	  and	  127	  AMISOM	  vessels.	  During	  its	  activities	  it	  has	  apprehended	  and	  
transferred	  for	  prosecution	  149	  suspected	  pirates	  (of	  which	  100	  were	  convicted).298	  
However,	  to	  contextualise	  the	  operation	  it	  serves	  to	  remember	  that	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
warships	  patrols	  a	  vast	  area	  (approximately	  3,700,000	  square	  kilometres,	  i.e.	  an	  area	  
about	  roughly	  1.5	  times	  the	  size	  of	  mainland	  Europe),	  and	  therefore	  Atalanta	  functions	  
as	  a	  containment	  measure	  rather	  than	  living	  up	  to	  its	  literal	  meaning,	  i.e.	  hunting	  
pirates.	  EUNAVFOR	  opted	  for	  a	  somewhat	  more	  preventative	  approach	  over	  time	  that	  
relied	  more	  heavily	  on	  aerial	  reconnaissance.	  MPRAs	  were	  tasked	  with	  scouting	  out	  the	  
location	  of	  pirate	  motherships,	  which	  were	  then	  subsequently	  blockaded	  and	  skiffs	  
departing	  from	  them	  would	  be	  interdicted	  before	  they	  could	  reach	  international	  
shipping	  lanes.299	  	  
	  
7.1.1	  New	  mandate	  
Pirates	  have	  continually	  adapted	  to	  the	  international	  presence	  by	  widening	  their	  area	  of	  
operations,	  such	  that	  it	  now	  constitutes	  the	  vast	  area	  just	  mentioned.	  Atalanta	  has	  
followed	  suit	  by	  expanding	  its	  area	  of	  operation	  in	  turn.	  More	  important	  than	  the	  
geographical	  adaptation	  into	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  where	  pirates	  have	  increasingly	  staged	  
attacks,	  however,	  is	  the	  broadening	  of	  the	  tactical	  mission	  component	  that	  was	  decided	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in	  March	  2012.300	  Thus,	  the	  updated	  mandate	  now	  includes	  explicitly	  “Somalia's	  coastal	  
territory	  and	  internal	  waters”.	  This	  enables	  the	  EU	  to	  conduct	  targeted	  ‘disruption	  of	  
pirate	  logistical	  dumps’.	  The	  underlying	  reasoning	  was	  that	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  
combat	  piracy	  the	  military	  dimension	  would	  have	  to	  have	  a	  land-­‐based	  component	  as	  
well	  in	  order	  to	  constrain	  pirates’	  area	  of	  retreat.	  While	  some	  member	  states	  –	  such	  as	  
Spain	  and	  Germany	  –	  were	  initially	  critical	  of	  the	  new	  mandate,	  they	  eventually	  agreed	  
to	  it	  as	  the	  tactical	  argument	  was	  difficult	  to	  dismiss.301	  The	  mandate	  specifically	  forbids	  
placing	  ground	  troops	  on	  Somali	  soil	  but	  leaves	  a	  loophole	  for	  Search	  &	  Rescue	  
operations.	  This	  new	  rationalisation	  of	  the	  military	  intervention	  indicated	  a	  qualitative	  
shift	  in	  scope	  and	  intensity	  of	  operations,	  implying	  the	  possibility	  for	  naval	  and	  aerial	  
bombardment	  of	  pirate	  bases	  up	  to	  two	  kilometres	  inland	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  
pirate	  deployments.302	  It	  only	  took	  two	  months	  for	  it	  to	  become	  operationally	  active.	  
In	  line	  with	  the	  new	  mandate,	  on	  15	  May	  2012	  EU	  forces	  carried	  out	  their	  first	  
attack	  on	  pirate	  targets	  on	  shore.	  A	  group	  of	  helicopter	  gunships	  (rumoured	  to	  be	  a	  
combined	  strike	  force	  of	  Italian	  and/or	  French	  special	  forces)	  pursued	  a	  pirate	  group	  to	  
the	  shoreline	  where	  they	  destroyed	  five	  speedboats	  while	  no	  pirates	  or	  civilians	  were	  
killed	  or	  injured.303	  The	  attack	  directly	  reflected	  the	  tougher	  operational	  profile	  of	  
Atalanta,	  designed	  to	  disrupt	  pirate	  logistics	  and	  eradicate	  safe	  havens.	  Policy-­‐makers	  
are	  keen	  to	  stress	  the	  ‘robust’	  nature	  of	  the	  EU	  approach304,	  however,	  no	  additional	  
attacks	  of	  the	  sort	  have	  been	  undertaken	  since.	  The	  attack	  of	  15	  May	  stands	  as	  an	  
isolated	  incident.	  Some	  EU	  officials	  maintained	  that	  further	  on-­‐shore	  attacks	  were	  made	  
operationally	  undesirable	  as	  pirates	  had	  withdrawn	  farther	  inland,	  thus	  staying	  behind	  
the	  2km	  inland	  distance	  allowed	  for	  EU	  deployment.305	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  confirm	  whether	  
most	  pirates	  did	  indeed	  relocate	  and	  it	  is	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  confirm	  whether	  this	  
was	  the	  reason	  another	  Atalanta	  attack	  did	  not	  occur.	  If	  true,	  however,	  it	  should	  have	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seemed	  entirely	  predictable,	  thus	  rendering	  the	  new	  mandate	  and	  the	  attack	  of	  15	  May	  
into	  a	  symbolic	  act	  at	  best,	  and	  a	  publicity	  stunt	  at	  worst.	  	  
Another	  seconded	  national	  official	  more	  closely	  integrated	  into	  the	  operational	  
and	  tactical	  level	  instead	  remarked	  that	  sustained	  military	  attacks	  may	  de-­‐legitimise	  the	  
overarching	  political	  objective	  of	  the	  mission,	  which	  sees	  piracy	  as	  a	  specific	  source	  of	  
insecurity	  and	  thus	  an	  obstacle	  to	  political	  reconstruction	  in	  Somalia.306	  While	  this	  also	  
should	  have	  been	  entirely	  predictable	  it	  does	  point	  towards	  the	  EU’s	  preoccupation	  with	  
the	  humanitarian	  credentials	  of	  its	  undertaking.	  In	  the	  ordering	  of	  policy	  priorities,	  EU	  
discourse	  emphasises	  the	  humanitarian	  character	  of	  the	  mission.307	  The	  importance	  of	  
the	  delivery	  of	  WFP	  or	  AMISOM	  shipments	  is	  invoked	  to	  provide	  the	  mission	  with	  
legitimacy.	  And	  while	  such	  declaratory	  altruism	  may	  be	  expected,	  it	  is	  indeed	  reflected	  
in	  the	  unease	  with	  which	  the	  military	  component	  of	  Atalanta	  is	  pursued.	  	  
In	  January	  2011,	  for	  instance,	  the	  naval	  taskforce	  EUNAVFOR	  specifically	  
declared	  that	  it	  would	  not	  follow	  the	  example	  of	  Malaysian	  and	  South	  Korean	  forces,	  
which	  successfully	  recaptured	  two	  pirated	  vessels,	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  danger	  that	  such	  
actions	  posed	  to	  innocent	  seafarers.308	  One	  rescue	  operation	  that	  was	  undertaken	  under	  
the	  aegis	  of	  the	  EU,	  however,	  was	  the	  recapture	  of	  the	  German-­‐flagged	  MV	  Taipan	  by	  
the	  Dutch	  frigate	  Tromp.	  Yet,	  due	  to	  the	  extremely	  constrained	  Rules	  of	  Engagement	  of	  
Atalanta,	  which	  jeopardised	  the	  success	  of	  the	  operation	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  frigate	  
captain,	  he	  chose	  to	  temporarily	  detach	  the	  vessel	  from	  EUNAVFOR	  and	  instead	  raise	  
the	  Dutch	  colours.309	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  EU	  force	  does	  not	  use	  deadly	  force.	  
However,	  it	  does	  so	  very	  reluctantly.	  Although	  the	  data	  is	  highly	  tentative,	  out	  of	  64	  
pirates	  that	  were	  killed	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  actions	  between	  August	  2008	  and	  May	  2010,	  
two	  can	  be	  directly	  attributed	  to	  the	  EU,	  with	  the	  rest	  being	  attributed	  to	  other	  
navies.310	  Furthermore,	  the	  potential	  of	  civilian	  casualties	  as	  ‘collateral	  damage’	  from	  EU	  
rescue	  operations	  remains	  highly	  contentious.311	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Ultimately,	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  safety	  of	  seafarers	  is	  rather	  complicated	  for	  the	  EU	  
as	  it	  is	  beginning	  to	  understand	  the	  dialectic	  of	  piracy	  and	  this	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  rather	  
lop-­‐sided	  evaluations	  of	  Atalanta’s	  success.	  
	  
7.1.2	  A	  military	  success?	  …	  by	  what	  standards?	  
The	  general	  tone	  in	  policy	  circles	  and	  the	  media	  is	  a	  (self-­‐)congratulatory	  one.	  Counter-­‐
piracy	  measures	  –	  and	  in	  particular	  operation	  Atalanta	  –	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  ‘successful’	  
in	  being	  able	  to	  protect	  vessels	  in	  the	  area	  of	  operations	  while	  also	  apprehending	  pirates	  
and	  deterring	  future	  attacks.	  For	  instance,	  the	  EU	  claims	  that	  Atalanta	  has	  had	  a	  100%	  
success	  rate	  in	  protecting	  WFP	  ships.312	  Success	  is	  also	  inferred	  from	  the	  critical	  drop	  in	  
attempted	  and	  completed	  attacks	  on	  vessels	  traversing	  the	  region.313	  The	  IMB	  states	  
that	  “the	  reduction	  in	  overall	  attacks	  is	  primarily	  attributed	  to	  the	  disruptive	  actions	  and	  
pre-­‐emptive	  strikes	  by	  the	  navies	  in	  the	  region	  […	  ]	  This	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	  navies	  in	  deterring	  and	  combating	  Somali	  piracy”.314	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  to	  
suggest	  that	  pirates	  will	  try	  to	  avoid	  attacking	  a	  ship	  sailing	  under	  the	  flag	  of	  a	  country	  
that	  has	  a	  naval	  force	  present	  in	  the	  area.315	  Another	  oft-­‐cited	  indicator	  of	  the	  success	  of	  
counter-­‐piracy	  is	  the	  dramatic	  drop	  in	  ransoms	  paid.	  While	  overall	  31	  ransoms	  at	  a	  value	  
of	  $160	  million	  were	  paid	  in	  2011,	  that	  number	  fell	  to	  8	  payments	  totalling	  $32	  million	  in	  
2012	  –	  a	  drop	  of	  roughly	  74%	  and	  80%,	  respectively.316	  	  
However,	  as	  Somali	  piracy	  seems	  to	  have	  abated,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  
the	  money	  that	  is	  being	  spent	  on	  it	  at	  large.	  Arguably,	  the	  most	  telling	  number	  is	  the	  
one	  calculating	  the	  increase	  in	  per	  incident	  costs.	  According	  to	  the	  2012	  Oceans	  Beyond	  
Piracy	  report,	  	  
“Between	  2011	  and	  2012,	  the	  number	  of	  attempts	  and	  hijackings	  fell	  much	  more	  
drastically	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  combatting	  piracy.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	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“per	  incident”	  cost	  of	  piracy.	  In	  2011,	  $28.6	  million	  was	  spent	  per	  pirate	  attack,	  and	  in	  
2012,	  that	  number	  rose	  189.0%	  to	  $82.7	  million”.	  317	  
	  
Another	  important	  measure	  that	  sheds	  doubt	  on	  the	  ‘success’	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  is	  the	  
consistent	  ‘ratio	  of	  recurring	  costs	  vs.	  investment’:	  	  
“In	  2011,	  it	  was	  estimated	  that	  approximately	  99.5%	  of	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  piracy	  was	  spent	  
on	  the	  recurring	  costs	  of	  vessel	  protection.	  This	  figure	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  
money	  invested	  in	  prosecutions	  and	  building	  regional	  and	  Somali	  capacity	  to	  reduce	  
piracy.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  success	  achieved	  at	  sea	  in	  reducing	  piracy	  attacks	  and	  hijackings,	  
this	  ratio	  remains	  consistent	  with	  last	  year’s	  figures.	  In	  2012,	  99.4%	  of	  all	  funds	  were	  
spent	  on	  recurring	  suppression	  costs,	  with	  the	  remaining	  0.6%	  invested	  in	  long-­‐term	  
prevention	  solutions“.318	  
	  
Combined,	  the	  increase	  in	  per	  incident	  costs	  and	  the	  staggeringly	  high	  ratio	  of	  recurring	  
costs	  vs.	  investment	  indicate	  that	  counter-­‐piracy	  has	  moved	  from	  a	  private	  security	  
concern	  of	  merchants	  and	  insurers	  towards	  a	  public	  security	  concern	  of	  the	  state,	  which	  
has	  overwhelmingly	  adopted	  responsibility	  –	  and	  the	  financial	  burden	  –	  to	  mitigate	  
piracy.	  	  
The	  observed	  reduction	  in	  hijackings	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  
including	  improved	  international	  cooperation,	  sustained	  military	  operations,	  continued	  
adherence	  to	  industry	  best	  management	  practices,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  armed	  guards	  
aboard	  merchant	  vessels.	  What	  makes	  this	  picture	  somewhat	  blurry	  is	  the	  uncertainty	  
with	  regard	  to	  overall	  pirate	  activity.	  The	  multitude	  of	  piracy	  reporting	  centres	  now	  
produces	  sometimes	  competing	  or	  misleading	  statistics.	  Additionally,	  fishermen	  
continue	  to	  be	  frequently	  mistaken	  for	  pirates.319	  Lastly,	  there	  seems	  to	  exist	  a	  tendency	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  some	  private	  security	  companies	  that	  place	  guard	  details	  on	  vessels	  to	  
underreport	  pirate	  activity	  for	  reasons	  of	  liability,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  so	  insurance	  companies	  
do	  not	  raise	  their	  premiums.320	  	  
In	  any	  case,	  success	  cannot	  be	  critically	  evaluated	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  
the	  distortive	  effect	  of	  external	  intervention	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  dialectic	  of	  piracy	  is	  
constituted	  by	  the	  dynamic	  relationship	  that	  pirate	  and	  ‘hunter’	  find	  themselves	  in.	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  99	  
Pirates	  have	  adapted	  to	  the	  international	  naval	  presence	  primarily	  in	  three	  ways:	  they	  
have	  continuously	  relocated	  their	  logistics	  on	  land	  to	  stay	  beyond	  the	  grasp	  of	  foreign	  
navies,	  they	  have	  expanded	  their	  area	  of	  operations,	  and	  they	  have	  become	  increasingly	  
violent.321	  While	  initially	  pirate	  attacks	  were	  limited	  to	  Somali	  territorial	  waters	  and	  the	  
Gulf	  of	  Aden,	  due	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  foreign	  naval	  patrols	  in	  those	  areas,	  over	  time	  
pirates	  began	  to	  stage	  hijackings	  far	  out	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  (See	  map	  1,	  annex).	  More	  
importantly,	  however,	  pirates	  have	  reacted	  to	  the	  international	  presence	  by	  escalating	  
their	  violence,	  primarily	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  increase	  pressure	  in	  ransom	  negotiations.322	  We	  will	  
return	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  success	  at	  a	  later	  point.	  
	  
7.2	  The	  civilian	  dimension:	  towards	  a	  comprehensive	  approach	  	  
	  
The	  familiar	  critique	  often	  levelled	  against	  the	  EU	  is	  that	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  marshal	  the	  vast	  
resources	  it	  has	  at	  its	  disposal	  to	  advance	  its	  political	  and	  security	  objectives.323	  The	  
comprehensive	  approach	  seeks	  to	  transcend	  this	  problem.	  With	  regard	  to	  piracy	  it	  
draws	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  activities.	  According	  to	  the	  EU:	  	  
“Piracy	  is	  a	  complex	  issue	  that	  can	  only	  be	  overcome	  by	  combining	  political	  and	  
diplomatic	  efforts	  with	  military	  and	  legal	  action,	  development	  assistance	  and	  strong	  
international	  coordination.	  With	  all	  these	  tools	  at	  its	  disposal,	  the	  EU	  is	  in	  a	  unique	  
position	  to	  contribute	  to	  international	  efforts”	  and	  the	  EU’s	  comprehensive	  approach	  is	  
targeted	  at	  “both	  current	  symptoms	  and	  root	  causes	  of	  the	  problem”.324	  
	  
All	  in	  all,	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  “convincing	  course	  of	  action”.325	  
However,	  for	  our	  purposes	  here	  we	  shall	  exclude	  those	  instruments	  that	  were	  
part	  of	  the	  EU’s	  toolkit	  before	  counter-­‐piracy	  was	  initiated,	  i.e.	  especially	  development	  
assistance	  and	  political	  dialogue.	  These	  items	  remain	  undeniably	  important	  and	  central	  
to	  the	  EU’s	  approach,	  however,	  they	  do	  not	  tell	  us	  anything	  new	  about	  how	  the	  EU	  is	  
doing	  security	  in	  the	  present	  context.	  For	  instance,	  the	  EU’s	  recent	  initiative	  to	  host	  the	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Conference	  on	  A	  New	  Deal	  for	  Somalia	  once	  again	  promises	  a	  sweeping	  programme	  of	  
reform.	  Other	  than	  an	  impressive	  €1.8	  billion	  price	  tag,	  there	  is	  little	  in	  the	  proposals	  
that	  is	  genuinely	  new	  to	  trying	  to	  solve	  Somalia’s	  problems.	  The	  focus	  here	  rests	  on	  
those	  measures	  that	  are	  directly	  related	  to	  counter-­‐piracy,	  not	  least	  because	  it	  is	  
actually	  these	  security-­‐oriented	  activities	  that	  display	  a	  level	  of	  intensity	  that	  warrants	  
investigation.	  The	  ‘comprehensive	  approach’	  is	  nonetheless	  well-­‐represented	  in	  the	  case	  
selection	  which	  spans	  across	  military	  and	  civilian	  approaches	  (the	  latter	  including	  a	  
diverse	  range	  of	  capacity-­‐building	  schemes).	  
As	  already	  indicated,	  although	  everything	  started	  out	  with	  the	  military	  operation	  
Atalanta,	  it	  now	  constitutes	  one	  piece	  in	  a	  puzzle	  (albeit	  a	  big	  one).	  A	  number	  of	  
additional	  measures	  have	  been	  employed	  by	  the	  EU	  to	  bolster	  its	  fight	  against	  piracy	  at	  
the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  First,	  located	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  CSDP	  we	  have	  two	  civilian	  flanking	  
missions	  –	  EU	  Training	  Mission	  Somalia	  and	  EUCAP	  Nestor	  –	  that	  aim	  to	  facilitate	  
capacity-­‐building	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  security	  sector	  reform.	  Second,	  the	  EU	  lends	  
institutional	  support	  to	  create	  regional	  expertise	  and	  capacity	  in	  the	  prosecution	  of	  
pirates.	  Third,	  the	  EU	  seeks	  to	  promote	  regional	  cooperation	  through	  a	  number	  of	  
mechanisms.	  	  
	  
7.2.1	  Security	  sector	  reform	  
EU	  Training	  Mission	  Somalia	  is	  essentially	  a	  military	  training	  mission.	  It	  was	  launched	  in	  
February	  2010	  and	  has	  up	  until	  now	  provided	  for	  the	  training	  of	  some	  3,000	  Somali	  
troops	  at	  the	  Bihanga	  Training	  Camp	  in	  Uganda.326	  The	  mission’s	  purpose	  is	  to	  equip	  the	  
Somali	  security	  forces	  with	  the	  autonomous	  capability	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  security	  of	  
their	  country.327	  The	  underlying	  rationale	  is	  therefore	  that	  the	  mission	  will	  be	  completed	  
when	  European	  training	  personnel	  has	  transferred	  sufficient	  capacity	  to	  Somali	  security	  
services	  to	  conduct	  their	  military	  training	  independently,	  and	  the	  mandate	  is	  scheduled	  
to	  last	  until	  March	  2015	  at	  least.328	  16	  countries	  (15	  EU	  member	  states	  plus	  Serbia)	  have	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  101	  
contributed	  training	  personnel	  to	  the	  mission,	  ranging	  from	  1	  up	  to	  158	  staff.	  The	  
division	  of	  contributions	  roughly	  reflects	  that	  of	  Atalanta	  in	  that	  it	  is	  especially	  France,	  
Spain,	  Portugal	  and	  Germany	  that	  make	  the	  major	  commitments.329	  The	  issue	  of	  training	  
is	  not	  only	  a	  functional	  one	  targeted	  at	  transferring	  skills.	  EUTM	  also	  intends	  to	  instil	  
certain	  (European)	  values	  in	  the	  Somali	  recruits	  by	  delivering	  training	  modules	  dealing	  
with	  human	  rights,	  humanitarian	  law,	  gender	  issues	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  civilians.	  
Additionally,	  EUTM	  uses	  a	  quota	  for	  female	  recruits.330	  
Although	  EUTM	  was	  devised	  in	  order	  to	  stabilise	  the	  process	  of	  political	  
reconstruction,	  it	  has	  to	  face	  some	  of	  the	  same	  social	  problems	  that	  contribute	  to	  
insecurity	  in	  Somalia.	  For	  instance,	  the	  mission	  faces	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  illiteracy	  of	  its	  trainees,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strictures	  of	  Somalia’s	  clan-­‐
based	  social	  structure,	  which	  complicates	  the	  creation	  of	  mixed	  units,	  and	  the	  difficulty	  
in	  navigating	  four	  different	  languages.331	  
Although	  EUTM	  was	  more	  directly	  devised	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  radical	  Islamist	  
forces	  assuming	  control	  of	  the	  capital	  in	  mind	  –	  which	  has	  repeatedly	  happened	  –	  its	  
rationale	  is	  intimately	  connected	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  piracy	  is	  so	  far	  as	  its	  seeks	  to	  create	  the	  
conditions	  which	  will	  allow	  the	  Somali	  national	  forces	  to	  re-­‐fill	  the	  institutional	  security	  
void	  that	  has	  been	  exploited	  by	  pirates	  for	  their	  operations.	  
EUCAP	  Nestor	  is	  a	  civilian	  assistance	  mission	  under	  CSDP	  that	  aims	  to	  improve	  
regional	  countries’	  maritime	  security	  capabilities,	  initially	  targeted	  at	  Somalia,	  Djibouti,	  
Kenya	  and	  the	  Seychelles.	  Specifically,	  it	  sets	  out	  to	  1)	  assist	  Somalia	  in	  setting	  up	  a	  land-­‐
based	  coastal	  police	  force	  and	  functioning	  judiciary,	  2)	  support	  partner	  countries’	  sea	  
going	  maritime	  capacities	  through	  the	  training	  of	  coast	  guard	  bodies,	  3)	  strengthen	  the	  
rule	  of	  law	  in	  partner	  countries,	  and	  4)	  foster	  cooperation	  in	  maritime	  security	  between	  
these	  countries.332	  Thus,	  while	  Atalanta	  tackles	  piracy	  on	  sea,	  EUCAP	  Nestor	  is	  meant	  to	  
tackle	  the	  issue	  from	  land.	  The	  declared	  goal	  of	  the	  mission	  –	  i.e.	  the	  condition	  for	  its	  
obsolescence	  –	  is	  when	  the	  partner	  countries	  have	  developed	  sufficient	  capabilities	  to	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combat	  piracy	  by	  themselves.333	  Note	  that	  EUCAP	  Nestor	  efforts	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  
European	  Commission’s	  ‘Critical	  Maritime	  Routes	  Programme’,	  which	  has	  also	  sought	  to	  
advance	  counter-­‐piracy	  in	  the	  form	  of	  funding	  the	  upgrading	  of	  regional	  maritime	  
administration	  and	  law	  enforcement	  capacities.334	  Similar	  to	  EUTM,	  EUCAP	  Nestor	  is	  still	  
in	  a	  phase	  where	  it	  would	  be	  too	  early	  to	  assess	  its	  impact	  let	  alone	  success.	  However,	  
we	  can	  already	  detect	  certain	  conceptual	  confusions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  overarching	  
imperative	  of	  comprehensive	  security.	  	  
	   For	  instance,	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  in	  how	  far	  the	  EU	  is	  pushing	  a	  consistent	  
agenda	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  local	  coast	  guard	  capabilities.	  The	  selection	  
of	  partner	  countries	  indicates	  that	  the	  EU	  seeks	  to	  construct	  a	  broad	  counter-­‐piracy	  
front	  but	  the	  functionality	  of	  including	  Kenya	  and	  especially	  the	  Seychelles	  in	  this	  
initiative	  is	  rather	  obscured	  as	  both	  lie	  at	  the	  very	  South-­‐Western	  and	  Southern	  edges	  of	  
the	  zone	  of	  reported	  piracy	  incidents.	  The	  coastal	  waters	  of	  Kenya	  and	  the	  Seychelles	  
are	  less	  important	  for	  international	  maritime	  transport	  than	  they	  are	  for	  regional	  trade	  
and	  AMISOM	  shipments.	  
	   More	  importantly,	  the	  idea	  that	  comprehensive	  security	  will	  contribute	  to	  
regional	  stability	  assumes	  a	  sequencing	  of	  events	  (better	  regional	  coast	  guard	  
capabilities	  	  decrease	  in	  piracy	  	  regional	  stability)	  that	  disregards	  the	  political	  
realities	  of	  Somali	  regional	  politics.	  Put	  differently,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia	  is	  must	  be	  
regarded	  as	  highly	  doubtful	  whether	  a	  stable	  long-­‐term	  initiative	  can	  be	  achieved	  before	  
significant	  progress	  in	  political	  reconstruction	  is	  made,	  especially	  regarding	  political	  
relations	  among	  the	  three	  main	  regions	  of	  Somalia.	  A	  deal	  signed	  on	  30	  July	  2013	  
between	  the	  Somali	  government	  and	  the	  Dutch	  maritime	  security	  company	  Atlantic	  
Marine	  and	  Offshore	  Group,	  which	  tasks	  the	  latter	  with	  the	  creation	  and	  operation	  of	  a	  
coast	  guard	  fleet	  to	  protect	  Somalia’s	  exclusive	  economic	  zone,	  illustrates	  this	  
reservation	  rather	  well.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  governments	  of	  Puntland	  and	  Somaliland	  
speedily	  rejected	  any	  such	  attempt	  by	  the	  central	  Somali	  government	  to	  reassert	  control	  
over	  its	  contested	  northern	  territories	  and	  their	  waters	  casts	  into	  further	  doubt	  whether	  
any	  effective	  organisation	  of	  coast	  guard	  forces	  can	  be	  achieved	  without	  a	  political	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settlement	  between	  the	  various	  Somali	  regions.335	  As	  political	  relations	  continue	  to	  be	  
poor	  and	  have	  hit	  a	  new	  low	  following	  this	  recent	  spat,	  such	  a	  political	  settlement	  
appears	  to	  be	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  distant	  future.	  	  
	  
7.2.2	  Transfer	  and	  prosecution	  of	  pirates	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  EU	  approach	  to	  solving	  the	  problem	  of	  piracy	  follows	  
through,	  the	  EU	  has	  laid	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  prosecution	  of	  pirates.	  In	  the	  most	  
straightforward	  cases	  EU	  naval	  forces	  arrest	  and	  detain	  pirates	  caught	  in	  the	  act	  of	  
hijacking	  a	  ship	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  outside	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  HoA	  country.	  If	  
sufficient	  grounds	  for	  prosecution	  exist	  pirates	  are	  brought	  before	  court	  in	  the	  country	  
whose	  naval	  contingent	  picked	  them	  up.	  This	  process	  has	  led	  to	  convictions	  in	  Germany,	  
France,	  and	  the	  Netherlands.336	  
However,	  member	  states	  quickly	  grew	  disenchanted	  with	  the	  design	  of	  the	  
process	  for	  two	  reasons:	  First,	  the	  costs	  of	  transferring	  the	  pirates	  to	  Europe,	  for	  trying	  
them	  in	  court,	  and	  for	  potentially	  incarcerating	  them	  for	  long	  sentences,	  stand	  in	  no	  
relationship	  to	  the	  potential	  danger	  from	  simply	  releasing	  them.	  Second,	  the	  idea	  of	  
incarcerating	  Somali	  pirates	  in	  a	  place	  thousands	  of	  kilometres	  away	  from	  where	  the	  
crime	  was	  committed	  –	  and	  thousands	  of	  kilometres	  away	  from	  their	  relatives	  –	  though	  
legally	  sound,	  seemed	  morally	  wrong.337	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  dilemma	  of	  ‘justice’	  was	  
found	  in	  striking	  up	  transfer	  agreements	  with	  countries	  in	  the	  region,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  
Strategic	  Framework	  for	  the	  HoA:	  
“To	  complement	  and	  support	  counter-­‐piracy	  operations,	  the	  EU	  agreed	  the	  transfer	  of	  
suspected	  pirates	  captured	  by	  operation	  Atalanta	  with	  third	  states	  (Kenya,	  Seychelles	  
and,	  since	  16	  July	  2011,	  Mauritius).	  The	  EU	  provides	  support	  through	  its	  IfS	  [Instrument	  
for	  Stability]	  to	  prosecution,	  court,	  police	  and	  prison	  services	  in	  the	  three	  countries.”338	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  Online	  
International	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Piracy	  Trial.	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hands-­‐down-­‐somali-­‐pirate-­‐sentences-­‐a-­‐862350.html,	  last	  accessed	  11	  June	  2013;	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Whereas	  the	  transfer	  agreements	  with	  the	  Seychelles	  and	  Mauritius	  are	  in	  effect,	  Kenya	  
cancelled	  the	  agreement	  in	  late	  2010	  but	  transfers	  are	  possible	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  
basis.339	  The	  EU	  is	  also	  in	  the	  process	  of	  negotiating	  another	  agreement	  with	  
Tanzania.340	  The	  agreements	  contain	  human	  rights	  clauses	  such	  that	  the	  legal	  and	  prison	  
systems	  of	  the	  prosecuting	  countries	  must	  conform	  with	  certain	  (European)	  standards.	  
For	  instance,	  countries	  that	  still	  apply	  the	  death	  penalty	  are	  excluded.	  	  
How	  exactly	  the	  EU	  sees	  the	  issue	  of	  prosecution	  and	  incarceration	  of	  pirates	  
can	  be	  observed	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  Seychelles,	  Rear	  Admiral	  Garcia	  de	  Paredes	  
(Atalanta	  mission	  commander	  from	  December	  2012	  until	  April	  2013)	  claimed	  that	  “the	  
best	  place	  to	  imprison	  [the	  pirates]	  would	  be	  Somalia.	  But	  at	  least	  they	  stay	  in	  countries	  
of	  the	  region	  that	  are	  suffering	  the	  effects	  of	  piracy”.341	  The	  Seychelles	  have	  been	  
shouldering	  a	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  Somali	  piracy,	  or,	  more	  
accurately,	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  Somali	  piracy.	  In	  fact	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  
the	  Seychelles	  were	  strongly	  affected	  by	  Somali	  piracy.	  Only	  after	  having	  accepted	  the	  
role	  of	  ‘main	  prosecutor’	  bestowed	  upon	  it	  by	  the	  EU	  did	  piracy	  become	  a	  problem	  for	  
the	  country.342	  Such	  notions	  of	  ‘ownership’	  and	  ‘fair	  burden-­‐sharing	  within	  the	  region	  
itself’	  can	  de	  directly	  deduced	  from	  the	  Strategic	  Framework	  for	  the	  HoA,	  and	  also	  find	  
expression	  in	  the	  ‘East	  and	  Southern	  Africa/Indian	  Ocean	  (ESA/IO)	  Regional	  Strategy’	  for	  
maritime	  security	  and	  against	  piracy,	  which	  was	  brokered	  by	  the	  High	  Representative	  in	  
2010.343	  
The	  most	  encompassing	  measure	  regarding	  pirate	  prosecution	  has	  been	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Regional	  Anti-­‐Piracy	  Prosecutions	  Intelligence	  Coordination	  Centre	  
(RAPPICC)	  in	  the	  Seychelles,	  sponsored	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  operational	  since	  2013.	  According	  
to	  Oceans	  Beyond	  Piracy,	  RAPPICC	  aims	  to	  create	  a	  “multi-­‐disciplinary	  and	  multinational	  
centre	  for	  law	  enforcement	  cooperation”	  with	  the	  participation	  of	  various	  countries	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the	  region	  and	  a	  multitude	  of	  international	  bodies	  (e.g.	  EUROPOL,	  INTERPOL,	  UNODC,	  
IMO,	  etc.)	  and	  national	  police	  force,	  and	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  
operations.	  	  
Although	  there	  now	  exists	  a	  dense	  institutional	  web	  of	  jurisprudential	  capacity	  
to	  ‘bring	  pirates	  to	  justice’,	  prosecution	  remains	  problematic	  in	  many	  cases.	  This	  is	  
illustrated	  by	  the	  high	  proportion	  of	  apprehended	  pirates	  who	  are	  released	  without	  
trial.	  According	  to	  Rear	  Admiral	  Pedro	  Garcia	  de	  Paredes,	  8	  out	  of	  29	  arrested	  pirates	  
were	  released	  without	  trial.344	  The	  reason,	  as	  in	  most	  cases,	  was	  that	  months	  after	  the	  
alleged	  attack	  it	  had	  become	  prohibitively	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  evidence	  of	  a	  crime.	  The	  
reason	  for	  this	  has	  also	  been,	  once	  again,	  pirates’	  adaptability	  to	  changes	  in	  their	  
environment.	  Thus,	  pirates	  have	  developed	  a	  number	  of	  tactics	  to	  evade	  detection	  or	  
apprehension,	  which	  include	  concealing	  weapons	  aboard	  skiffs	  do	  avoid	  detection	  from	  
aerial	  surveillance,	  using	  boarding	  ladders	  as	  benches,	  or	  simply	  throwing	  equipment	  
overboard	  when	  faced	  with	  arrest	  by	  a	  foreign	  warship.345	  	  
The	  EU	  has	  also	  sought	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  more	  structured	  involvement	  of	  private	  
industry	  into	  the	  fight	  against	  piracy.	  In	  order	  to	  better	  coordinate	  passage	  for	  transiting	  
ships	  the	  EU	  established	  MSCHOA,	  the	  Maritime	  Security	  Centre	  -­‐	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  It	  
provides	  round-­‐the-­‐clock	  monitoring	  of	  vessels	  passing	  through	  the	  area	  and	  allows	  
merchant	  companies	  or	  their	  ship	  captains	  to	  register	  their	  vessels	  with	  the	  Centre	  to	  
traverse	  through	  the	  IRTC,	  which	  provides	  ships	  with	  quasi-­‐escorts	  by	  naval	  forces.	  The	  
second	  measure	  targeted	  at	  industry	  has	  been	  the	  championing	  of	  Best	  Management	  
Practices	  (BMPs).	  They	  provide	  ship	  masters	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  piracy	  in	  the	  region	  and	  
with	  the	  protective	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  their	  companies,	  themselves	  and	  their	  
crews	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  hijackings.346	  BMPs	  have	  been	  lauded	  for	  contributing	  to	  the	  
successful	  repulsion	  of	  multiple	  pirate	  attacks.347	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As	  a	  side	  note,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  2012	  Germany	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  began	  
cooperation	  on	  targeting	  the	  financial	  and	  logistical	  flows	  that	  enable	  and	  sustain	  
piracy.348	  However,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  what	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  this	  regard.	  
	  
7.2.3	  A	  comprehensive	  approach,	  but	  for	  whom?	  
The	  EU’s	  comprehensive	  approach	  includes	  military	  naval	  action	  (oscillating	  between	  
containment	  and	  pre-­‐emption	  but	  strongly	  favouring	  the	  former),	  military	  training	  of	  the	  
Somali	  army,	  civilian	  capability-­‐building	  for	  Somali	  and	  regional	  coast	  guard	  forces,	  as	  
well	  as	  for	  regional	  prosecution	  capacity,	  transfer	  agreements	  for	  prosecution,	  and	  the	  
integration	  of	  private	  industry	  into	  coordinative	  schemes	  aimed	  at	  avoiding	  hijackings.	  It	  
is	  thus	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  the	  EU	  approach	  combines	  an	  eclectic	  mix	  of	  instruments	  in	  its	  
fight	  against	  Somali	  piracy.	  What	  is	  also	  clear,	  however,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  measures	  
depend	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  on	  the	  cooperation	  of	  regional	  stakeholders	  and	  private	  
industry.	  In	  fact,	  apart	  from	  operation	  Atalanta,	  all	  other	  measures	  are	  effectively	  
enforced	  by	  other	  actors	  than	  the	  EU.	  This	  points	  to	  a	  core	  characteristic	  of	  the	  EU’s	  
comprehensive	  approach:	  its	  reliance	  on	  the	  externalisation	  of	  EU	  security.	  
The	  defining	  feature	  of	  externalisation	  is	  the	  relocation	  of	  responsibility	  (and	  
therefore	  by	  extension	  costs).	  Arguably,	  externalisation	  is	  inherent	  to	  a	  degree	  in	  any	  
‘comprehensive	  approach’	  as	  it	  is	  bound	  to	  devolve	  responsibility	  over	  policy	  and	  policy	  
outcomes	  to	  some	  other	  actors.	  After	  all,	  the	  allure	  of	  comprehensive	  security	  lies	  in	  its	  
promise	  of	  inclusivity	  and	  breadth	  of	  scope.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  externalisation	  functions	  
most	  efficiently	  as	  a	  security	  design	  when	  inserted	  into	  a	  discursive	  context	  of	  threat	  
formation	  and	  response	  that	  alludes	  to	  collective	  responsibility	  and	  action.	  As	  we	  have	  
already	  established,	  the	  image	  of	  the	  pirate	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  all	  serves	  well	  in	  this	  regard.	  
But	  on	  the	  implementation	  side	  of	  security	  policy	  it	  is	  the	  discursive	  markers	  of	  
‘comprehensive	  security’	  and	  ‘effective	  multilateralism’	  that	  locate	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  
solution	  with	  the	  policy	  entrepreneur	  while	  locating	  the	  responsibility	  to	  implement	  the	  
policy	  with	  others.	  While	  the	  EU	  supplies	  the	  frame	  of	  action,	  the	  implementation	  
thereof	  is	  largely	  reserved	  for	  its	  partners.	  While	  externalisation	  is	  less	  relevant	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  military	  counter-­‐piracy	  efforts	  (where	  the	  EU	  does	  make	  a	  sizable	  contribution),	  
it	  is	  certainly	  crucial	  to	  understand	  the	  rationalisation	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  
overarching	  policy	  approach,	  namely	  the	  comprehensive	  approach.	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7.3	  International	  coordination	  in	  military	  counter-­‐piracy	  
	  
The	  success	  of	  redistributing	  responsibility	  and	  costs	  of	  a	  security	  issue	  through	  
externalisation	  depends	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  cooperation.	  And	  while	  externalisation	  
does	  not	  characterise	  the	  military	  domain	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  a	  similar	  dynamic	  of	  
building	  cooperative	  schemes	  that	  redistribute	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  security	  issue	  manifests	  
itself	  in	  the	  EU’s	  objective	  of	  ‘effective	  multilateralism’.	  In	  the	  European	  Security	  
Strategy	  the	  EU	  outlined	  its	  goal	  to	  strive	  for	  “an	  international	  order	  based	  on	  effective	  
multilateralism”,	  because:	  
“in	  a	  world	  of	  global	  threats,	  global	  markets	  and	  global	  media,	  our	  security	  and	  
prosperity	  increasingly	  depend	  on	  an	  effective	  multilateral	  system.	  The	  development	  of	  
a	  stronger	  international	  society,	  well	  functioning	  international	  institutions	  and	  a	  rule-­‐
based	  international	  order	  is	  our	  objective”.349	  
	  
In	  this	  totalised,	  interconnected	  and	  indivisible	  conception	  of	  the	  ‘global’,	  cooperation	  is	  
not	  only	  a	  facilitator	  of	  stability	  but	  becomes	  constitutive	  of	  stability	  itself.	  
Recalling	  the	  argument	  from	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  the	  Somali	  pirate	  has	  been	  
constructed	  as	  the	  enemy	  of	  all,	  EUNAVFOR	  constitutes	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  (concerted)	  
international	  fight	  against	  piracy.	  Other	  multinational	  contingents	  are	  NATO’s	  Ocean	  
Shield,	  and	  Combined	  Task	  Forces	  (CTF)	  150	  (part	  of	  counter-­‐terrorism	  Operation	  
Enduring	  Freedom),	  and	  CTF	  151.	  National	  navies	  patrolling	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  come	  from	  
far	  and	  apart.	  China,	  India	  and	  Russia	  have	  permanent	  navy	  contingents	  on	  station.	  
Australia,	  Iran,	  Japan,	  Malaysia,	  Pakistan,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Thailand	  have	  
all	  at	  some	  point	  dispatched	  vessels,	  either	  attaching	  to	  one	  of	  the	  CTFs	  or	  operating	  
individually.	  What	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  seas	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  amounts	  to	  is	  “perhaps	  
the	  most	  eclectic	  and	  diverse	  armada	  of	  naval	  firepower	  ever	  assembled”.350	  In	  fact,	  
some	  might	  consider	  the	  presence	  of	  so	  many	  navies	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  each	  other	  a	  
recipe	  for	  disaster.	  Of	  course,	  a	  number	  of	  tactical	  problems	  persist,	  for	  instance	  
regarding	  the	  reluctance	  to	  share	  classified	  intelligence	  or	  differing	  Rules	  of	  
Engagement,	  but	  by	  and	  large	  the	  counter-­‐piracy	  effort	  presents	  a	  unified	  front.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349	  European	  Council	  (2003).	  A	  Secure	  Europe	  in	  a	  Better	  World	  –	  European	  Security	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Brussels,	  12	  December	  2003.	  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf,	  
last	  accessed	  7	  June	  2013.	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  Kraska,	  J.	  (2009).	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Comparative	  Strategy,	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The	  EU	  has	  sought	  for	  itself	  a	  coordinating,	  or	  steering	  role	  in	  this	  eclectic	  mix	  of	  
actors.	  The	  EU’s	  coordinating	  role	  rests	  in	  its	  co-­‐chairing	  of	  the	  Shared	  Awareness	  and	  
Deconfliction	  (SHADE)	  conferences	  in	  Bahrain,	  where	  participating	  countries	  discuss	  and	  
agree	  on	  operational	  and	  tactical	  matters,	  for	  example	  how	  best	  to	  use	  available	  assets,	  
and	  with	  which	  geographic	  distribution.351	  In	  this	  role	  it	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  neutral	  arbiter.	  
From	  this	  somewhat	  privileged	  institutional	  position	  the	  EU	  has	  carved	  out	  a	  small	  yet	  
relevant	  self-­‐conception	  of	  a	  ‘leader’	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  at	  the	  HoA.	  This	  call	  to	  leadership	  
is	  grounded	  in	  the	  perceived	  superiority	  of	  the	  EU’s	  comprehensive	  approach.	  	  
First,	  EU	  member	  states	  clearly	  prefer	  the	  operational	  profile	  of	  EUNAVFOR	  over	  
that	  of	  Ocean	  Shield.	  This	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  naval	  assets	  between	  
the	  two.	  At	  the	  NATO	  Force	  Generation	  Conference	  for	  Ocean	  Shield	  Greece	  and	  the	  UK	  
(along	  with	  the	  US	  and	  Turkey)	  pledged	  a	  single	  frigate,	  whereas	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Spain	  
and	  Portugal	  –	  all	  willing	  contributors	  to	  Atalanta	  –	  promised	  no	  assets.352	  Second,	  
Atalanta	  is	  generally	  very	  well-­‐received,	  whereas	  NATO’s	  counter-­‐piracy	  effort	  is	  seen	  in	  
a	  much	  more	  sceptical	  light	  by	  policy	  experts.353	  Third,	  while	  an	  operational	  liaison	  exists	  
at	  OEF	  HQ	  in	  Bahrain,	  tactical	  cooperation	  with	  CTF-­‐151	  is	  resisted.	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  
divergent	  mission	  mandates	  and	  memberships,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  a	  concern	  that	  
associating	  EUNAVFOR	  with	  ‘The	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror’	  would	  jeopardise	  the	  integrity	  of	  
the	  EU’s	  comprehensive	  approach.354	  	  
While	  cooperation	  with	  NATO	  is	  not	  as	  intensive	  as	  observers	  may	  have	  
expected	  –	  the	  vision	  of	  interlocking	  institutions	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO	  is	  hardly	  
realised	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa355	  and	  at	  some	  point	  former	  German	  Defence	  Minister	  
Jung	  cautioned	  against	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO	  entering	  into	  a	  ‘beauty	  contest’	  over	  who	  can	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  Somalia,	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  &	  F.	  Putten	  (Eds.)	  The	  International	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  to	  Somali	  Piracy:	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  (pp.	  65-­‐103).	  Leiden:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  p.	  85.	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  Wiegold,	  S.	  (2009).	  Ocean	  Shield	  wird	  nur	  ein	  Shieldchen.	  Focus	  Online,	  11	  June	  2009.	  
http://wiegold.focus.de/augen_geradeaus/2009/06/ocean-­‐shield-­‐wird-­‐nur-­‐ein-­‐shieldchen.html,	  
last	  accessed	  6	  May	  2013.	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  Foreign	  Policy	  (2012).	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  Future	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  14	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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/14/expert_survey_the_future_of_nato?page=0,
3,	  last	  accessed	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  EU	  Naval	  Operation	  in	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  (EU	  NAVFOR	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  Problem	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  Piracy	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  Causes	  Remain,	  in:	  M.	  Asseburg	  &	  R.	  Kempin	  (Eds.),	  The	  EU	  as	  a	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  in	  the	  Realm	  of	  Security	  and	  Defence?	  A	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  Assessment	  of	  ESDP	  Missions	  
and	  Operations	  (pp.	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do	  the	  job	  better356	  –	  this	  differentiation	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  comparative	  
advantage	  that	  the	  respective	  organisation	  can	  offer.	  	  
Generally,	  cooperation	  is	  also	  broader	  with	  little	  preconceived	  reservations	  as	  to	  
potential	  partners.	  Accordingly,	  cooperation	  with	  non-­‐EU	  and	  non-­‐NATO	  countries	  has	  
intensified.	  For	  instance,	  on	  22	  June	  2013	  the	  Italian	  frigate	  ITS	  Zeffiro	  turned	  over	  
escort	  duties	  of	  a	  WFP	  vessel	  to	  the	  Chinese	  warship	  CNS	  Mianyang	  for	  the	  final	  
transport	  stage	  towards	  Djibouti.	  In	  line	  with	  such	  singular	  cooperative	  endeavours,	  the	  
EU	  and	  Chinese	  naval	  forces	  have	  a	  major	  counter-­‐piracy	  exercise	  planned	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  
Aden	  for	  the	  end	  of	  2013.357	  Contributions	  from	  non-­‐traditional	  partners	  are	  welcomed,	  
and	  while	  EUNAVFOR,	  Ocean	  Shield	  and	  CTF-­‐151	  have	  started	  to	  decrease	  their	  naval	  
deployments	  since	  2011,	  other	  nations	  acting	  unilaterally	  have	  increased	  their	  presence,	  
including	  China,	  India,	  Russia,	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea.	  Thus,	  burden-­‐sharing	  has	  become	  
more	  equalised	  at	  this	  point.358	  
	  
7.3.1	  Success	  revisited	  
Returning	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  success	  we	  can	  now	  see	  that	  the	  EU	  naval	  force	  essentially	  
functions	  as	  what	  Till	  has	  described	  as	  ‘postmodern	  navies’,	  which	  have	  an	  
“internationalist,	  collaborative	  and	  almost	  collective	  world	  outlook”	  whose	  role	  is	  one	  of	  
maintaining	  systemic	  stability.	  Maritime	  security	  here	  implies	  an	  operational	  profile	  
defined	  by	  constabulary	  and	  low-­‐intensity	  tasks.359	  This	  self-­‐understanding	  departs	  
significantly	  from	  the	  traditional	  image	  of	  war-­‐fighting	  navies,	  and	  institutes	  a	  different	  
one	  that	  suggests	  a	  police	  force	  of	  the	  seas.	  This	  soft	  approach	  to	  military	  security	  is	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  wider	  cooperative	  effort	  to	  involve	  international	  partners.	  While	  the	  
relevance	  of	  the	  quantitative	  measure	  of	  piracy	  –	  i.e.	  number	  of	  pirate	  attacks;	  financial	  
costs	  –	  is	  obvious,	  there	  is	  another	  measure	  of	  success	  that	  is	  rather	  indirect.	  The	  
importance	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  cooperation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  international	  partners	  
can	  be	  gauged	  from	  the	  elaborate	  scheme	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  facilitate	  it.	  However,	  it	  is	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  Jung,	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  J.	  in:	  Weber	  (2009).	  p.	  75.	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  (2013b).	  EU	  Naval	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  and	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  Navy	  Work	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  To	  Ensure	  World	  Food	  
Programme	  Aid	  Ship	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  Safe	  From	  Pirates	  At	  Sea,	  27	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  2013,	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  last	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358	  We	  should	  note,	  however,	  that	  for	  a	  country	  like	  China	  the	  scenario	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  not	  only	  
represents	  an	  opportunity	  to	  share	  in	  the	  responsibility	  of	  global	  security	  and	  thus	  achieve	  a	  
better	  reputation	  with	  other	  states.	  An	  alternative	  –	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  –	  idea	  is	  that	  Somali	  
piracy	  is	  used	  as	  a	  test	  case	  to	  develop	  China’s	  blue	  sea	  deployment	  capability.	  	  
359	  Till,	  G.	  (2007).	  Maritime	  Strategy	  in	  a	  Globalizing	  World.	  Orbis,	  51	  (4):	  569-­‐575.	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cooperation	  itself	  –	  and	  not	  just	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  a	  set	  objective	  –	  that	  is	  rated	  as	  
success	  in	  itself.360	  
	  
	  
7.4	  Counter-­‐piracy	  as	  ‘effective	  multilateralism’	  in	  action?	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  EU’s	  counter-­‐piracy	  effort	  started	  out	  as	  an	  explicitly	  military	  intervention,	  
it	  has	  quickly	  been	  transformed	  into	  what	  can	  justifiably	  be	  described	  as	  a	  
comprehensive	  approach	  to	  piracy.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  military	  component	  was	  left	  
conflicted	  by	  the	  half-­‐hearted	  attempt	  to	  give	  the	  mission	  a	  more	  robust	  nature,	  and	  its	  
success	  is	  difficult	  to	  gauge	  from	  a	  complex	  picture	  where	  pirates	  seem	  to	  become	  less	  
successful	  but	  more	  efficient	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Further,	  through	  their	  interactions	  
pirates	  and	  ‘hunters’	  constantly	  change	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  relationship.	  Instead,	  civilian	  
counter-­‐piracy	  measures	  have	  proliferated,	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  training	  of	  
the	  Somali	  military,	  institutional	  support	  to	  the	  upgrading	  of	  legal	  and	  prison	  systems	  
throughout	  the	  region,	  and	  pirate	  transfers	  for	  prosecution.	  What	  makes	  these	  
initiatives	  interesting	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  reflect	  a	  strong	  tendency	  towards	  
externalisation	  of	  EU	  security	  that	  pervades	  the	  comprehensive	  approach.	  This	  is	  further	  
compounded	  by	  the	  decisive	  cooperative	  bias	  in	  the	  EU	  approach	  that	  sheds	  a	  different	  
light	  on	  what	  success	  in	  the	  military	  realm	  might	  look	  like.	  In	  what	  reflects	  the	  idea	  of	  
effective	  multilateralism,	  cooperation	  becomes	  a	  security	  objective	  in	  itself.	  	  
Once	  again	  we	  can	  tie	  this	  story	  of	  security	  as	  practice	  back	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘managing	  globalisation’.	  Externalisation	  and	  effective	  multilateralism	  are	  both	  
expressions	  of	  an	  international	  security	  identity	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  management	  of	  
globalisation.	  We	  find	  its	  component	  parts	  prominently	  represented	  in	  the	  previous	  
analysis.	  First,	  expanding	  policy	  scope	  is	  by	  and	  large	  synonymous	  with	  the	  
comprehensive	  approach.	  Second,	  the	  EU	  exercises	  regulatory	  influence	  by	  shaping	  the	  
legal	  and	  prison	  systems	  in	  the	  region,	  training	  the	  Somali	  army,	  and	  by	  setting	  the	  
standards	  for	  the	  prosecution	  of	  pirates.	  Third,	  the	  EU	  indirectly	  empowers	  international	  
institutions	  by	  contributing	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  regional	  counter-­‐piracy	  regime.	  Fourth,	  
it	  achieves	  a	  redistribution	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  piracy	  through	  an	  elaborate	  effort	  at	  
externalisation.	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  Interview	  French	  official,	  anonymous	  4	  (2013);	  interview	  with	  EP	  officials,	  Bassot,	  Karock,	  
Manrique	  Gil	  (2013);	  interview	  with	  M.	  Harder	  (2013).	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The	  EU	  is	  currently	  in	  the	  process	  of	  formulating	  a	  Maritime	  Security	  Strategy.361	  
Although	  another	  strategic	  document	  is	  arguably	  not	  what	  the	  EU	  needs,	  it	  is	  telling	  that	  
policy-­‐makers	  consider	  there	  to	  be	  enough	  critical	  mass	  for	  this	  step.	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  
EU’s	  counter-­‐piracy	  engagement	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  has	  played	  a	  big	  part	  in	  the	  
rationalisation	  of	  the	  EU’s	  international	  maritime	  interests	  and	  objectives.362	  It	  has	  done	  
so	  primarily,	  as	  this	  study	  has	  hopefully	  clarified,	  by	  allowing	  the	  EU	  to	  step	  into	  a	  
process	  of	  self-­‐exploration.	  By	  engaging	  the	  security	  phenomenon	  of	  piracy	  the	  EU	  has	  
reconstructed	  itself	  in	  line	  with	  a	  number	  of	  rationales:	  1)	  the	  adversary	  of	  the	  ‘enemy	  
of	  all’	  and	  thus	  guardian	  of	  global	  order;	  2)	  the	  actor	  with	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  
comprehensive	  security;	  3)	  and	  the	  driver	  of	  a	  new	  effective	  multilateralism	  that	  fosters	  
cooperation	  and	  burden-­‐sharing.	  
It	  is	  useful	  to	  revisit	  the	  three	  initial	  question	  posed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  
study	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  EU’s	  framing	  and	  action	  –	  i.e.	  its	  practice	  –	  of	  counter-­‐
piracy	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  have	  shaped	  its	  identity	  as	  an	  international	  actor:	  What	  
makes	  Somali	  piracy	  a	  threat	  for	  the	  EU?	  What	  is	  the	  referent	  object	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  
protected?	  What	  policies	  are	  enacted	  to	  that	  end?	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  at	  this	  point	  that	  
this	  study	  has	  not	  attempted	  to	  give	  singular	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	  In	  fact,	  it	  
would	  be	  rather	  confusing	  if	  such	  uni-­‐dimensional	  answers	  were	  forthcoming.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  
contradiction	  that	  piracy	  exists	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  military	  threat	  (to	  both	  civilian	  and	  
military	  vessels	  traversing	  the	  Indian	  Ocean),	  economic	  threat	  (to	  merchant	  and	  
shipping	  companies,	  to	  national	  and	  European	  economies,	  and	  to	  the	  global	  economy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361	  See:	  European	  Commission	  &	  High	  Representative	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
and	  Security	  Policy	  (2014).	  Joint	  Communication	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Council,	  
‘For	  an	  open	  and	  secure	  global	  maritime	  domain:	  elements	  for	  a	  European	  Union	  maritime	  
security	  strategy’,	  JOIN(2014)	  9	  final.	  Brussels,	  6	  March	  2014,	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014JC0009&from=EN,	  last	  accessed	  10	  April	  2014.	  
362	  Interview	  with	  M.	  Harder	  (2013).	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itself),	  or	  even	  ‘political-­‐systemic’	  threat	  (in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  undermines	  global	  order).	  It	  is	  
also	  not	  contradictory	  that	  the	  EU	  claims	  protection	  for	  itself	  (or	  rather	  disaggregated	  
component	  parts	  of	  itself,	  e.g.	  economies,	  companies,	  seafarers)	  while	  also	  claiming	  
protection	  for	  the	  global	  trade	  system.	  What	  matters	  is	  the	  contextualisation	  of	  these	  
rationalisations	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  EU	  security.	  When	  the	  EU	  
claims	  protection	  for	  the	  global	  trade	  system	  it	  does	  so	  as	  1)	  a	  practical	  concern	  of	  its	  
own	  reliance	  on	  that	  system,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  a	  2)	  construction	  of	  its	  present	  
and	  future	  role	  as	  guardian	  of	  that	  system.	  	  
	   What	  asserts	  itself	  as	  the	  dominant	  theme	  with	  regard	  to	  threat,	  referent	  object	  
and	  policies	  is	  the	  globalising	  discourse	  of	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  as	  it	  finds	  representation	  in	  
the	  idea	  of	  managing	  piracy	  as	  an	  adverse	  instance	  of	  globalisation.	  The	  ‘management	  of	  
globalisation’	  is	  operationalised	  in	  the	  EU’s	  counter-­‐piracy	  approach	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  
Africa.	  The	  framing	  of	  the	  pirate	  as	  universal	  enemy	  and	  enemy	  of	  global	  order	  serves	  to	  
legitimise	  EU	  intervention.	  As	  I	  have	  shown,	  there	  exist	  considerable	  grounds	  on	  which	  
to	  doubt	  the	  characterisation	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  as	  a	  sophisticated	  transnational	  organised	  
crime	  network.	  The	  removal	  of	  the	  Somali	  pirate	  from	  his	  immediate	  local	  context	  is	  
achieved	  by	  ignoring	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  effectively	  
functions	  as	  a	  war	  economy.	  Instead	  the	  pirate	  is	  elevated	  to	  the	  status	  of	  universal	  
enemy,	  threatening	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  global	  order.	  The	  EU’s	  elaboration	  of	  its	  own	  role	  
in	  global	  affairs	  establishes	  a	  clear	  contradistinction	  to	  that	  of	  the	  pirate,	  effectively	  
nominating	  itself	  as	  guardian	  of	  that	  same	  global	  order.	  Consequently,	  counter-­‐piracy	  is	  
not	  simply	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  scope	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  creates	  a	  novel	  item	  
under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  EU	  crisis	  management,	  for	  instance,	  as	  the	  first	  naval	  deployment	  
of	  CSDP.	  It	  reaches	  far	  beyond	  this	  as	  it	  elaborates	  an	  international	  identity	  for	  the	  EU	  
that	  is	  oriented	  towards,	  and	  assumes	  responsibility	  for,	  global	  systemic	  stability	  as	  
such,	  in	  the	  process	  redefining	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  global	  security-­‐provider.	  
	   Whereas	  the	  framing	  of	  piracy	  primarily	  creates	  the	  rationale	  and	  justification	  
for	  counter-­‐piracy	  intervention,	  it	  is	  in	  its	  implementation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘comprehensive	  
security’	  that	  the	  EU’s	  management	  of	  globalisation	  becomes	  most	  visible.	  The	  notion	  of	  
comprehensive	  security	  in	  itself	  implies	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  policy	  scope	  as	  it	  broadens	  
the	  security	  agenda.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  counter-­‐piracy	  at	  the	  HoA	  the	  initial	  and	  on-­‐going	  naval	  
intervention	  was	  quickly	  complemented	  by	  additional	  features,	  such	  as	  security	  sector	  
reform	  (EUTM),	  assistance	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  local	  coast	  guard	  forces	  (EUCAP	  Nestor)	  
and	  support	  for	  the	  reform	  of	  penal	  systems	  in	  partner	  states.	  These	  civilian	  measures	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also	  indicate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  EU	  seeks	  to	  exercise	  regulatory	  influence	  over	  
these	  states.	  	  
A	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  EU’s	  efforts	  at	  the	  HoA	  is	  the	  objective	  of	  ‘effective	  
multilateralism’.	  In	  order	  to	  create	  an	  effective	  counter-­‐piracy	  regime,	  the	  EU	  has	  not	  
only	  sought	  to	  coordinate	  and	  cooperate	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  states,	  it	  has	  also	  pushed	  
the	  empowering	  of	  international	  institutions	  to	  that	  end.	  Although	  cooperation	  with	  
NATO	  remains	  limited,	  it	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  host	  of	  regional	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  
Shared	  Awareness	  and	  Deconfliction	  conferences,	  the	  Maritime	  Security	  Centre	  -­‐	  Horn	  
of	  Africa	  and	  the	  Regional	  Anti-­‐Piracy	  Prosecutions	  Intelligence	  Coordination	  Centre	  that	  
create	  an	  institutional	  continuity	  to	  counter-­‐piracy.	  	  
Although	  the	  issue	  of	  enlarging	  the	  territorial	  sphere	  of	  EU	  inﬂuence	  at	  the	  Horn	  
of	  Africa	  has	  little	  significance	  in	  direct	  terms	  due	  to	  the	  geographical	  distance	  between	  
the	  two	  entities,	  we	  can	  tentatively	  state	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  EU’s	  model	  power	  is	  at	  
work	  here.	  Most	  prominently,	  the	  creation	  of	  local	  coast	  guard	  forces	  that	  operate	  in	  an	  
integrated	  fashion	  and	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  shared	  structures	  such	  as	  RAPPICC	  bear	  
witness	  to	  this.	  
Another	  important	  instantiation	  of	  the	  EU	  managing	  globalisation	  is	  found	  in	  the	  
way	  it	  seeks	  to	  redistribute	  the	  costs	  of	  globalisation.	  The	  EU	  seeks	  to	  foster	  cooperation	  
with	  and	  between	  states	  that	  usually	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  cooperate	  on	  international	  
security	  issues	  –	  such	  as	  Russia,	  China	  or	  Iran	  –	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  broad	  international	  
counter-­‐piracy	  regime	  now	  tentatively	  functions.	  Crucially,	  under	  effective	  
multilateralism	  it	  is	  cooperation	  that	  becomes	  a	  security	  objective	  in	  itself.	  Additionally,	  
the	  EU	  externalises	  part	  of	  the	  responsibility	  and	  cost	  of	  mitigating	  piracy	  to	  a	  number	  of	  
HoA	  states,	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  pirate	  detention	  and	  prosecution.	  
	  
So	  what	  can	  we	  say	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  international	  identity	  of	  the	  EU?	  I	  hope	  that	  my	  
findings	  have	  contributed	  to	  clarifying	  some	  of	  the	  present	  confusion	  and	  contradictions	  
in	  the	  field	  of	  EU	  security.	  For	  instance,	  while	  the	  major	  EU	  power	  narratives	  outlined	  at	  
the	  beginning	  of	  this	  study	  continue	  to	  provide	  some	  useful	  insights	  into	  the	  what,	  why	  
and	  how	  of	  EU	  foreign	  policy,	  their	  prescriptive	  story-­‐telling	  of	  what	  the	  EU	  is	  and	  what	  
it	  should	  do	  stands	  in	  frequent	  contrast	  to	  the	  empirical	  reality	  of	  EU	  security	  that	  
portrays	  a	  more	  multifaceted	  actor	  than	  captured	  in	  these	  grand	  narratives	  –	  hence	  the	  
emergence	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  strategic	  deficit.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  find	  little	  cause	  to	  
partake	  in	  the	  lamentations	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  EU	  security	  as	  I	  do	  not	  share	  the	  
fatalism	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  and	  the	  concomitant	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imperative	  to	  overcome	  it	  that	  are	  so	  pervasive	  both	  at	  the	  academic	  and	  policy	  levels	  
of	  EU	  security.	  Instead	  of	  ramping	  up	  unrealistic	  and	  distracting	  expectations	  of	  ‘grand	  
strategy’,	  the	  protracted	  ‘shortcomings’	  of	  EU	  security	  should	  be	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration	  
rather	  than	  disillusionment,	  as	  they	  motivate	  us	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  multifaceted	  
and	  contingent	  nature	  of	  the	  institutional	  beast	  that	  is	  the	  EU	  and	  especially	  those	  
characteristics	  that	  delineate	  the	  particularity	  of	  the	  EU	  policy	  space.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  
the	  sui	  generis	  nature	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  is	  highly	  conditioned	  by	  its	  
institutional	  evolution,	  namely	  the	  pervasive	  uncertainty	  that	  has	  facilitated	  institutional	  
imitation	  and	  the	  entrenched	  bureaucratic	  transgovernmentalism	  that	  steers	  EU	  
security	  towards	  highly	  consensual	  and	  technocratic	  outcomes.	  This	  combination	  of	  
drivers	  has	  created	  a	  policy	  space	  that	  is	  ‘post-­‐political’	  in	  nature	  and	  thus	  lends	  itself	  
particularly	  well	  to	  a	  ‘managerial’	  approach	  to	  security.	  
My	  findings	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  indeed	  vying	  for	  a	  more	  global	  
profile	  in	  its	  overall	  foreign	  policy.	  It	  does	  so	  not	  out	  of	  an	  inherent	  lust	  for	  power	  or	  the	  
functional	  imperative	  of	  ‘new	  threats’	  but	  rather	  out	  of	  the	  realisation	  that	  its	  own	  
security	  is	  tightly	  integrated	  with	  global	  security,	  and	  therefore	  the	  EU	  should	  engage	  
insecurity	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  Thus,	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  play	  the	  great	  power	  game,	  a	  
successful	  strategy	  for	  the	  EU	  would	  require	  tying	  its	  relevant	  international	  counterparts	  
into	  a	  tightly-­‐knit	  web	  of	  shared	  vulnerabilities,	  responsibilities	  and	  strategies,	  thus	  
managing	  globalisation.	  	  
One	  may	  ask	  whether	  the	  EU’s	  management	  of	  globalisation	  has	  been	  effective	  
or	  successful	  in	  the	  case	  of	  counter-­‐piracy.	  Looking	  at	  the	  numbers	  that	  support	  the	  EU’s	  
claim	  that	  pirate	  activity	  has	  been	  reduced	  at	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  ongoing	  
intervention,	  we	  may	  assert	  effectiveness	  and	  success	  in	  so	  far	  as	  stated	  mission	  
objectives	  have	  been	  met.	  However,	  if	  we	  conceive	  of	  piracy	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  security	  
complex	  that	  operates	  at	  multiple	  levels,	  the	  picture	  becomes	  more	  complicated.	  The	  
dominant	  characterisation	  of	  Somali	  piracy	  as	  a	  regional	  and	  global	  threat	  dissociates	  
the	  phenomenon	  from	  its	  rooting	  in	  a	  particular	  local	  context.	  Specifically,	  it	  leads	  to	  a	  
blurred	  image	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  piracy,	  understood	  by	  the	  EU	  mostly	  as	  a	  
parasitic	  by-­‐product	  of	  globalisation.	  While	  such	  a	  flawed	  understanding	  can	  sustain	  the	  
prolonged,	  concerted	  effort	  at	  the	  deterrence	  and	  suppression	  of	  pirate	  activity,	  it	  
proves	  unable	  to	  lay	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  new	  perspective	  on	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  
reconstruction	  of	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  based	  on	  a	  lasting	  eradication	  of	  the	  underlying	  
drivers	  of	  piracy.	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The	  problem	  with	  the	  ‘management’	  practice	  of	  security	  is	  that	  it	  implicitly	  
forfeits	  claims	  to	  ‘resolution’.	  As	  security	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  anymore,	  it	  can	  only	  be	  
constantly	  produced	  and	  reproduced.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
cooperation	  in	  counter-­‐piracy	  itself	  has	  been	  made	  into	  a	  category	  of	  success.	  
Consequently,	  it	  is	  the	  processes	  of	  security,	  rather	  than	  its	  outcomes,	  that	  provide	  the	  
yardstick	  against	  which	  security	  policy	  is	  increasingly	  evaluated	  by	  the	  EU.	  In	  a	  similar	  
vein	  as	  Chris	  Bickerton,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  foreign	  
policy	  has	  exhausted	  itself	  and	  that	  we	  should	  rather	  look	  at	  the	  role	  EU	  foreign	  and	  
security	  policy	  –	  and	  specifically	  its	  practice	  –	  plays	  in	  the	  future	  constitution	  of	  the	  
European	  project.363	  	  
What	  this	  study	  has	  attempted	  to	  do	  is	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  on-­‐going	  
debates	  about	  EU	  security,	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  international	  actor,	  and	  the	  
nature	  of	  EU	  power.	  First,	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  art	  of	  the	  field	  –	  
mainly	  captured	  by	  the	  central	  position	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  strategic	  deficit	  –	  I	  argued	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  dissociate	  ourselves	  from	  a	  misguided	  attachment	  to	  traditional	  
notions	  of	  security,	  such	  as	  power	  or	  strategy,	  and	  instead	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  practice	  of	  security.	  Second,	  focusing	  attention	  on	  the	  institutional	  determinants	  of	  
EU	  security	  requires	  us	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  post-­‐political	  state	  of	  the	  policy	  area	  –	  and	  
perhaps	  of	  the	  polity	  as	  such	  –	  and	  the	  significant	  implications	  this	  holds	  for	  the	  study	  of	  
EU	  security.	  Third,	  by	  understanding	  EU	  counter-­‐piracy	  as	  an	  effort	  aimed	  at	  the	  
‘management	  of	  globalisation’	  we	  can	  uncover	  the	  intimate	  link	  between	  the	  EU’s	  self-­‐
perception	  and	  its	  globalised	  rationalisation	  of	  security.	  Taking	  these	  lessons	  to	  heart	  
will	  allow	  us	  to	  refashion	  theoretical	  and	  analytical	  bridges	  between	  the	  manifold	  
activities	  of	  the	  European	  project	  that	  have	  been	  somewhat	  lost	  under	  the	  semiotic	  
pressures	  of	  pillarisation	  and,	  recently,	  crisis.	  
	  
	  
8.1	  A	  note	  on	  future	  research	  avenues	  
	  
My	  theoretical	  focus	  has	  been	  that	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  as	  it	  is	  oriented	  towards	  
identity	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  conceive	  of	  its	  construction	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  practice.	  However,	  
the	  central	  concern	  of	  threat	  formation	  can	  also	  be	  tackled	  from	  other	  angles	  that	  might	  
provide	  valuable	  insights.	  There	  are	  two	  conceptual	  fields	  related	  to	  the	  investigation	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undertaken	  here	  –	  one	  closely,	  one	  by	  degrees	  –	  that	  can	  help	  clarify	  some	  of	  the	  core	  
arguments	  made	  in	  this	  thesis,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  some	  critical	  questions	  that	  may	  guide	  
future	  research	  on	  the	  topic:	  securitisation	  theory,	  and	  risk	  analysis.	  
Although	  securitisation	  theory	  is	  often	  portrayed	  as	  conducting	  discourse	  
analysis	  as	  well,	  there	  is	  a	  crucial	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  between	  discourse	  as	  conceived	  
in	  this	  study	  as	  opposed	  to	  securitisation	  theory.	  Whereas	  here	  I	  explicitly	  integrate	  
material	  and	  ideational	  factors	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  discourse	  theory	  of	  practice,	  the	  latter	  
combines	  the	  linguistic	  and	  social.	  In	  securitisation,	  security	  is	  a	  speech-­‐act,	  a	  
performative	  utterance	  that	  moves	  an	  issue	  –	  potentially	  any	  issue	  –	  from	  the	  level	  of	  
‘normal’	  politics	  to	  the	  level	  of	  ‘extraordinary’	  security:	  	  
“‘Security’	  is	  thus	  a	  self-­‐referential	  practice,	  because	  it	  is	  in	  this	  practice	  that	  the	  issue	  
becomes	  a	  security	  issue–not	  necessarily	  because	  a	  real	  existential	  threat	  exists	  but	  
because	  the	  issue	  is	  presented	  as	  such	  a	  threat”.	  364	  
	  
Three	  components	  are	  necessary	  for	  a	  successful	  securitising	  move:	  A	  securitising	  actor	  
that	  performs	  the	  securitising	  move;	  the	  referent	  object	  for	  which	  protection	  is	  invoked;	  
and	  an	  audience	  that	  accepts	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  securitising	  actor	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  
his	  claim.	  The	  idea	  forwarded	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  EU	  security	  operates	  in	  an	  institutional	  
space	  that	  is	  depoliticised	  to	  a	  considerable	  degree	  presents	  a	  theoretical	  challenge	  to	  
securitisation	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  theory	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  securitisation	  presupposes	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  political	  space	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Therefore,	  what	  complicates	  the	  
applicability	  of	  securitisation	  to	  EU	  security	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  policy	  space	  lacks	  
an	  audience	  due	  to	  its	  isolated	  institutional	  gestation.	  If	  we	  comprehend	  the	  very	  
existence	  of	  EU	  security	  policy	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  successful	  securitising	  move,	  what	  is	  
there	  left	  to	  explain	  for	  securitisation	  theory	  at	  the	  EU	  level?	  The	  challenge	  for	  
securitisation	  theory	  then	  is	  to	  uncover	  the	  localities	  of	  the	  sequential	  moves,	  i.e.	  to	  
demonstrate	  the	  intent	  of	  agency.	  ‘Who	  are	  the	  securitising	  actors’,	  and	  ‘Who	  is	  their	  
audience?’	  are	  questions	  that	  are	  mired	  in	  conceptual	  confusion	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  EU	  
security.	  	  
Another	  concept	  that	  can	  bring	  the	  results	  of	  this	  thesis	  further	  is	  that	  of	  risk.	  As	  
the	  international	  security	  agenda	  seems	  to	  become	  broader	  and	  broader,	  the	  concept	  of	  
risk	  can	  provide	  important	  insight	  in	  this	  regard	  because	  it	  “permits	  the	  identification	  of	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unknown	  and	  unknown-­‐unknown	  risks	  through	  interpretation	  and	  imagination”.365	  It	  
allows	  us	  to	  be	  conceptually	  more	  critical	  towards	  newly	  emerging	  forms	  of	  violence	  
and	  insecurity,	  such	  as	  those	  that	  point	  at	  the	  privatisation	  of	  violence,	  of	  which	  piracy	  is	  
also	  characteristic.	  In	  fact,	  risk	  analysis	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  wider	  literature	  on	  
the	  privatisation	  of	  violence,	  and	  it	  is	  specifically	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  Private	  Military	  
Companies	  that	  is	  intriguing	  here.366	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Best	  Management	  Practices,	  many	  
shipping	  companies	  now	  have	  so-­‐called	  Autonomous	  Vessel	  Protection	  Details	  present	  
on	  their	  vessels	  when	  transiting	  high-­‐risk	  waters.	  If	  this	  trend	  continues	  and	  national	  
navies	  reduce	  their	  presence	  even	  further,	  Somali	  piracy	  may	  become	  an	  entirely	  
‘private’	  security	  issue,	  at	  least	  on	  sea.	  We	  are	  already	  seeing	  some	  of	  the	  implications	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  questionable	  liability	  of	  private	  guards	  when	  engaging	  a	  pirate	  attack	  
group.	  Furthermore,	  the	  concept	  of	  risk	  also	  strikes	  an	  interesting	  link	  to	  a	  critical	  
understanding	  of	  ‘comprehensive	  security’	  and	  relates	  well	  to	  the	  present	  utilisation	  of	  
the	  perspective	  of	  ‘managing	  globalisation’	  since	  the	  “probabilistic	  concept	  of	  risk	  
suggests	  that	  insecurity	  can	  only	  be	  managed“.367	  	  
	   In	  any	  case	  more	  conceptual	  work	  is	  needed	  to	  uncover	  how	  the	  EU	  constructs	  
specific	  threats	  (selection;	  origin;	  characterisation),	  and	  more	  empirical	  work	  is	  needed	  
to	  compare	  and	  confirm	  the	  insights	  that	  we	  have	  gained	  here.	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Actual	  and	  attempted	  attacks	  against	  ships	  by	  year	  and	  location:	  
Country	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
Somalia	   19	   80	   139	   160	   49	  
Gulf	  of	  Aden	   92	   117	   53	   37	   13	  
Red	  Sea	   	   15	   25	   39	   13	  
Arabian	  Sea	   	   1	   2	   	   	  
Indian	  Ocean	   	   1	   	   	   	  
Oman	   	   4	   	   1	   	  
TOTAL	   111	   218	   219	   237	   75	  
World	   293	   410	   445	   439	   297	  
	  






Nationalities	  of	  ships	  attacked:	  
Flag	  state	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
Austria	   	   	   	   1	   	  
Belgium	   	   1	   	   2	   	  
Bulgaria	   	   	   1	   	   	  
Canary	  Islands	   1	   	   	   	   	  
Cyprus	   14	   13	   9	   8	   1	  
Denmark	   3	   3	   4	   7	   7	  
France	  	   7	   2	   4	   6	   	  
Germany	   5	   5	   5	   5	   4	  
Gibraltar	   2	   2	   3	   2	   2	  
Greece	   2	   9	   3	   12	   3	  
Isle	  of	  Man	   5	   2	   6	   3	   4	  
Italy	   3	   10	   8	   8	   5	  
Lithuania	   	   1	   1	   	   	  
Luxemburg	   	   	   2	   1	   2	  
Malta	   10	   21	   19	   25	   8	  
Netherlands	   3	   9	   3	   	   1	  
Netherlands	  Antilles	   	   	   1	   	   	  
Portugal	   1	   	   	   	   	  
Spain	   	   2	   4	   2	   2	  
United	  Kingdom	   6	   5	   6	   6	   3	  
EU	  TOTAL	  	   62	   85	   79	   88	   42	  
Rest	  of	  world	   231	   325	   366	   351	   255	  
World	   293	   410	   445	   439	   297	  
	  






Area	  of	  pirate	  operations:	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